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EDITOR'S NOTE
In the University ofDenver Water Law Review's inaugural Editor's Note twenty years ago,
Editor-in-Chief Vicki Spencer declared that the Review's primary goal was to provide a unique,
high-quality forum for sharing ideas, information, and legal and policy analyses on issues in water
law. The Water Law Review's founders sought to make the Review an invaluable resource for
practitioners, scholars, and policy-makers. Twenty years later, members of the Water Law Review
remain steadfast in that mission, and it is my pleasure to bring you Volume 20, Issue 1 of the
Review.
Our lead article is a collaborative piece entitled, Fifty Years ofEvolving Water Law and
Management in the U.S. The overall article is made up of four individual articles authored by four
different authors. The four authors presented on the subject matter of this piece at the American
Water Resources Association's annual conference in November of 2014. Only the first three
individual articles appear in this issue. The fourth article will appear in Volume 20, Issue 2.
Professor James May, University of Delaware's Widener School of Law, authored the first
article, Evolving Water Law and Management in the U.S.: Delaware. As an eastern state, Delaware
faces unique challenges related to water law, particularly when compared with issues facing states
in the West. Professor May provides an overview of some of the ways in which stakeholders in
Delaware address those unique circumstances, including the application of regulated riparianism,
management of Delaware's Atlantic coast, and the allocation of water resources in the Delaware
River Basin.
As an alumnus of the University of Kansas, I enjoyed the opportunity to work with
Professor John C. Peck in publishing the second article, Evolving Water Law and Managementin
the U.S.: Kansas. Mr. Peck is a professor at the University of Kansas School of Law. His article
provides an overview and analysis of some of the most important developments, both judicial and
legislative, in Kansas water law in recent decades.
Irma Russell, professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and
former Dean of the University of Montana School of Law, authored the article, Evolving Water
Law and Managementin the U.S.: Montana. Professor Russell's article covers topics from the
Montana's application of the public trust doctrine to the implications of federal reserved rights on
other Montana water rights.
We are also excited to publish A Recipe for Breach: Kansas v. Nebraska's Unclear
Standards Will Breed Interstate Water Litigation written by Theodore E. Yale. Mr. Yale is student
at Harvard Law School. In his article, Mr. Yale argues that despite some positive outcomes of the
Supreme Court's decision in the case of Kansas v. Nebraska, the Court's reliance on contract law
rather than water-compact jurisprudence may create confusing standards for future interstate
litigation.
Next, Thirstyfor a Solution: PromotingMore Efficient Water Use in the West, was
authored by Casey Clowes, Tess Hustead, and Daniel Kolomitz. All three authors are J.D.
candidates at the Arizona State University's Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law. Their article
provides an overview of the current water scarcity and drought problems facing the southwestern
United States and proposes several solutions. Some of their proposed solutions include reforming
the application of the doctrine of prior appropriation, improvements in irrigation technology, and
amendments to the federal Farm Bill, among others.
Our final featured article entitled, A Lawyer's Guide to EthicalIssues in Enforcement
Proceedings, was authored by Heidi Ruckriegle and Mary Viviano. Ms.Viviano is the General
Counsel of Vantage Energy LLC, and Ms. Ruckriegle is an Associate with the firm of Welborn
Sullivan Meck & Tooley, P.C. Their article explores many of the ethical implications associated
with reporting, mitigating, and litigating flowback water spills in the context of oil and gas

operations. Ms. Ruckriegle served as sources editor of the Water Law Review while attending the
Sturm College of Law.
We are excited to feature selections of poetry written by Retired Justice Gregory Hobbs, Jr.
In addition to serving nineteen years on the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Hobbs is a CoDirector of the Sturm College of Law's Environmental and Natural Resources Law Program. The
selections of poetry appearing in this issue represent additions to selections of poetry written and
published by Justice Hobbs in previous issues of the Review.
This issue features several conference notes and court reports written by student members
of the Water Law Review. The Review takes special pride in our student contributions, because
they allow our members to become better acquainted with the ways in which practitioners, scholars,
and lawmakers shape water law, while providing stakeholders with abbreviated analyses of the
ever-changing field. We are excited to launch what we hope will be a long-running series of
legislative reports that will serve to track and analyze important legislation from around the nation.
We hope you find our student coverage of these recent water cases, conferences, and laws useful in
your practice or research.
We would like to express our most sincere gratitude to Mr. and Mrs. Ken and Ruth Wright
for their extremely generous contribution to the Review. Mr. and Mrs. Wright made their recent,,
contribution to the Review in the name of Retired Justice Gregory Hobbs, Jr. We will further
recognize Mr. and Mrs. Wright for their contribution at the Review's Tenth Annual Symposium on
April 7, 2017. We hope you will join us for that event.
Finally, we would like to thank all of our readers for their continued support of the Review.
The Review would not be able to pursue its mission of serving as a high-quality forum for sharing
ideas, information, and legal and policy analyses on issues in water law without the support of the
practitioners, scholars, lawmakers, and students who so readily engage in that mission. We hope
that our twentieth volume represents the beginning of many milestones, as we strive to serve as an
invaluable resource for many years to come.
Blaine Bengtson
Editor-in-Chief
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EVOLVING WATER IAW
AND MANAGFMENT IN THE U.S.
JOHN C. PECK, BURKE W. GRIGGS,
JAMES R. MAY, AND IRMA S. RUSSELL
INTRODUCTION
JOHN C. PECK
The "vision" of the American Water Resources Association (AWRA) is
"to be recognized as the pre-eminent multidisciplinary association for information exchange, professional development and education about water resources and related issues."' Its "mission" is "to advance multidisciplinary water
resources education, management and research."' The AWRA celebrated its
fiftieth anniversary in 2014. To commemorate the anniversary and to reflect
on the state of water resources management in the U.S., the AWRA dedicated
its annual conference held in Tysons Corner, Virginia, November 3-6, 2014,
to the overall subject of the history of water management over the past fifty years.
The four authors of this journal article participated in one of the conference's
"special sessions." The title of the special session was "Fifty Years of Evolving
Water Law and Management in the U.S." The authors live in various parts of
the country and work in various facets of water law.
The special session program, like this article, was broken down into four
presentations. First, Professor May discussed water allocation issues in the state
of Delaware, a small eastern state having a high population density and unique
water issues due in part to the large interstate Delaware River which enters the
state from the north and runs into Delaware Bay and then the Atlantic Ocean.
Professor Peck discussed Kansas water management issues. A large state, part
of the Great Plains, Kansas has a small population density, a largely-irrigationbased agricultural economy, and water resources supplied by rivers in the east
and the High Plains Aquifer in the west. Still larger geographically is Montana
in the West, which has mountains and plains, much federal land and many
Indian reservations, a population density smaller than that of Kansas, and various types of water resources-rivers formed by mountain runoff, large federal
reservoirs, and groundwater. Professor Russell, former professor and Dean of
the University of Montana School of Law, discussed Montana water resources
development. Finally, Professor Griggs, then Kansas Assistant Attorney General Griggs, summarized the law of interstate water conflicts over the last fifty
years. He has worked on the two recent interstate water cases Kansas has filed
1. AM. WATER REs. ASs'N, VISION, MIssION, OiBECTlVEs, AND BRAND PROMISE (2016), http://-

awra.org/about/Vision-Mission-Objectives-Braind-Promise.pdf.
2. Id.
1

2
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in the U.S. Supreme Court.
The tide to this article exaggerates its contents. Obviously, a short article in
a law journal cannot provide an exhaustive portrayal or analysis of U.S. water
management practices over the last half century nor could it do so for any of
the three states or for interstate water issues. Instead, it provides a glimpse of
the disparate problems and issues three representative states have faced as well
as an overview of interstate water disputes. Three parts of the article appear in
this issue. The fourth part on interstate issues will appear in a future issue. The
authors have written independent, stand-alone pieces, using their own chosen
formats.

EVOLVING WATER IAW AND MANAGEMENT IN
THE U.S.: DEIAWARE
JAMES R. MAY*
Water law in Delaware is a complex tapestry resulting from four centuries
of common, civil, and constitutional law. It contains remnants of both natural
flow doctrine and riparian rights, and has culminated in a regulated riparian
overlay that-for the most part-has the Delaware Division of Environmental
Resources and Environmental Control manage reasonable water uses. Water
rights in Delaware are also affected by the Delaware Coastal Zone Act-a pioneering state law that prohibits new industrial uses within Delaware's 120-mile
long coast-and a federal program managed by the Delaware River Basin Commission designed to coordinate water use of the entire 400-mile reach of the
Delaware River, from its headwaters in upstate New York, to where it forms the
Delaware Estuary, opens into the Delaware Bay, and empties into the Atlantic
Ocean. Lastly, water rights in Delaware are shaped by a century of cases adjudicated under original jurisdiction by the U.S. Supreme Court, primarily resolving water and riparian use disputes between Delaware and New Jersey.
Shaped like a 130-mile long jagged isosceles triangle, the State of Delaware
is small, flat, and awash in water. Delaware has a variety of plentiful water resources that belie its modest size (only Rhode Island is smaller). The northern
tip of the state lies in the Piedmont region and is characterized by a bed of
crystalline rock that runs from New England to Alabama. Most of the state,
however, is within the Atlantic Coastal Plain province, which is typically flat.
Indeed, Delaware is flatter than Kansas, with a mean elevation of sixty feet, and
a high point of 448 feet, which means that water flows across the state like billiards on a felt tabletop.'
Water is arguably the state's most significant resource.! More than one in
every six square miles in the state is under water, which means about 540 out of
a total area of approximately 2,500 square miles, exclusive of the Delaware

Chief Sustainability Officer, Widener University; Distinguished Professor of Law, and co-Director of the Environmental Rights Institute at Widener University Delaware Law School. The
author thanks Joseph Dellapenna for helpful comments and Janet Lindenmuth for assistance
with tracking down hard to find sources.
1. See U.S. CENsus BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 226 (2012)
2
http://www.census.gov/Iibrary/publications/ 01 1/compendia/statab/1 31ed.html (last visited Nov.
12, 2016); WATERS & RIGHTS, infra note 4.
2. SecJames R. May, UnlinishedBusiness Restoring Water Quality in )ela ware, 16 DEL.
LAw. 14,14-15 (1998).
*
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River and Bay is submerged.! In addition, some 490 square miles of the Delaware River and Bay lie within the boundaries of the state.' There are also large
areas of fresh and saltwater marshes and hydric soils. All in all, Delaware boasts
about 3,000 miles of rivers and streams, 4,500 acres of lakes, reservoirs, and
ponds, 130,000 acres of freshwaters wetlands, 90,000 acres of coastal and tidal
wetlands, 850 square miles of estuaries and bays, and twenty-five ocean coastal
miles.'
This article surveys evolving water law and management in Delaware, and
is divided into three sections. The first tracks the evolution of water rights law
in Delaware over four centuries, and its remnants in the modern regulatory regime. The second surveys modern water rights law in Delaware, focusing on
the processes and standards for obtaining a permit to use, withdraw, or divert
water in the state. The third addresses other modern regulatory influences on
water rights law in Delaware, namely the Delaware Coastal Zone Act, the Delaware River Basin Commission, and the U.S. Supreme Court. It concludes that
waster law in Delaware is a pastiche of many influences over four centuries of
development, culminating in what can be thought of as a modern example of
regulated riparian rights, with some additional regulatory layers.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF WATER RIGHTS IN DEIAWARE

Historically, water has served as the state's lifeblood. Delaware was first
home to Eastern Algonquian tribes that relied on Delaware's bountiful water
supply for fishing, hunting, and sustenance.! Then Dutch and Swedish explorers in the early and mid-1600's settled portions of what would become Delaware, largely due to ready access and availability of intricate and connected water
systems.! These attributes made it valuable for ingress and egress into William
Penn's Pennsylvania during English colonization.' By the time Delaware became the nation's first state in 1787, it already possessed some of the most elaborate water laws in the country.o
The state's special brand of water laws attracted commerce large and small,
including French emigrd6 Eleuthere Irenee duPont de Nemours. DuPont established black powder mills along the banks for the shallow but brisk-flowing
Brandywine River, and with it, launched the industrial revolution." Water access remains essential to Delaware's great petrochemical, pharmaceutical, agri-

3. How Much of Your State is Wet?, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SuRv., http://water.usgs.gov/
edu/wetstates.hltml (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
4. CHARLES M. ALMOND, III, 4-DE WATERS & RIGHTS § I, (Any K. Keller, ed., 3rd ed.
LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2016) [hereinafter WATERS & RIGHTS..

5.

Id.

May, supra note 2; see geneially W. BARKSDALE MAYNARD, THE BRANDYWINE: AN
INTIMATE PORTRAIT 5 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015) (discussing the Brandywine River
and its relation to the development of the state of Delaware in a historical narrative).
7. MAYNARD, supa note 6, at 17.
6.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Seeid. at18-21.
Id. at 27.
See WATERS & RIGHTS, supma note 4.
MAYNARD, supla note 6.
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cultural and animal farming, automotive, port, fishing, crabbing, housing, shopping, motel, restaurant, and tourism industries.
Disputes about water use in Delaware have had profound effects on water
and constitutional law in the United States. There is evidence of the recognition
of water rights in Delaware as early as 1658, as settlers vied for position for siting
water-powered mills. Determining water rights for mill operations remained
the dominant force in Delaware water law for the next two hundred and fifty
years. Indeed, the colonial assembly enacted water laws to sort out use by mill
operators in 1719, 1760, and 1773. Post-independence, the state's assembly
enacted water laws in 1819, 1859, 1869, and 1911, some of which remain in
effect even though the water-powered mills that once dominated are but memories." The idea that the Commerce Clause contains a 'dormant' or 'negative'
aspect originated in a water rights case from Delaware. ChiefJustice John Marshall coined the phrase "dormant Commerce Clause" in Willson v. Black Bird
Creek Marsh Co., a case that allowed Delaware to issue a license to block navigation of the Blackbird Creek, absent a countervailing federal law."
Thus, reaching back four centuries, with a wildly varied colonial past and
dominated by mill-races first and industry later, modem water law in Delaware
is a bit of this and a bit of that, like an old house restored over time to fit new
owners and new codes. While it generally favors eastern water law and its riparian flavors, water law in Delaware defies simple classification.
II. MODERN WATER RIGHTS IN DEIAWARE"
Modern water rights in Delaware can be thought of as a system of regulated
riparian rights in the service of reasonable uses. In Delaware, the Delaware
Division of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC) is
charged with effectuating state policy to develop, use, and control surface water
and groundwater "to make the maximum contribution to the public benefit."
Accordingly, DNREC issues permits to "construct, install, replace, modify, or
use any equipment or device or other article .. . intended to withdraw ground
water or surface water for treatment and supply."" Moreover, DNREC must
authorize any increases in water use-again, to ensure public benefit.
As with many states in the eastern U.S. the ultimate inquiry on whether to
grant a permit application is whether the requested use is "reasonable."" Rea-

12. May, supranote 2.
13. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1901-04 (2015) (discussing Delaware laws related to dam building, which replaced laws related to water powered mills).

14. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829).
15. See geneally WATERS & RIGHTS, supra note 4, at §§ I-V (giving an overview of water
use in Delaware); Charles M. Allmond, III, Ricaran Rights fi Delaware, 2 DEL. IAw. 44, 4449 (1983) (tracing the development of water rights in Delaware).
16. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6001 (2015).
17. § 6003(b)(4) (2015).

18.

§6030 (2015).

19. See generallyJOSEPH M. DELLAPENNA, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, CH. 7 (Amy K.
Keller, ed., 3rd ed. LcxisNexis/Matthew Bender 2016) (discussing application of reasonable use
theory). See, e.g., McCarthy v. Abe, 1993 WL 93373, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 3,1993) (stating that
pumping water into a drainage ditch emptying into plaintiffs land "is not compatible with the
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sonableness determinations in Delaware are influenced by lbngstanding approaches for managing natural watercourses-waters that flow naturally along a
discrete natural channel with a bed and banks-which historically were generally
subject to the riparian rights to uses undiminished in quantity and unchanged
in quality or temperature." Delaware's regulated riparian rights approach also
borrows from the natural flow doctrine, which recognizes the "right to the
stream, using it so as not to injure any others."" In essence, this allows diversion
and other uses, provided water flow is returned to the natural channel before
reaching the next riparian owner, and so on." Moreover, as with most eastern
states, and following more than a century of precedent, DNREC also applies
the reasonable use doctrine to groundwater withdrawals so as not to jeopardize
common supplies for neighboring owners."
Certain activities are exempt from the permit process. These include damming a stream that originates on one's property when doing so does not detrimentally affect another, damming a stream flow of less than one-half million
gallons per day, or creating a pond not larger than sixty thousand square feet for
conservation, recreation, propagation and protection of fish and wildlife, watering of stock, or fire protection."
Judicial standards of review for resolving water disputes in Delaware are
hardly exceptional east of the Mississippi. First, riparian ownership in Delaware
of a non-tidal stream is deed-specific, but failing that, ownership defaults to the
middle of the stream. Second, in the event of erosion, rights of way are lost
until restored by accretion." Third, riparian owners are entitled to both natural
water quality and quantity." Fourth, riparian rights yield to those of state or
federal governments with no right to perpetual flow, for instance." However,
reasonable user standard.").

20. See generallyState ex rel. Buckson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 228 A.2d 587 (Del. Super. Ct.
1967); Iiirtherprocedmgs,237 A.2d 579 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967), and, 244 A.2d 80 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1968), a/Fd, 267 A.2d 455 (Del. 1969) (determining the tide and related rights to a strip of
"foreshore" both parties claim ownership to and discusses the principles of riparian rights ownership).
21. See Delaney v. Boston, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 489, 493 (Del. Super. Ct. 1839) ("The owner of
property adjoining a stream, has a right to own the stream, using it so as not to injure any others.
He cannot detain it nor divert it from its natural course or descent. If he own on both sides, he
may erect a mill; if he have or can get all the land that the pond will dam, and if the ponding loll
the waters will not back the waters so as to injure anyone above, or detain them so as to injure
any below.").
22. See, e.g., Beck v. Kulesza, 156 A. 346, 349 (Del. Super. Ct. 1926) ("However . .. a riparian owner who, by his willful act diverts the waters of a natural stream from its accustomed channel, and causes it to flow upon the lands of his neighbor, or into a nearby stream to overflow its
banks, is liable for the damages resulting from such diversion. Any obstruction of the natural
course of a stream is done at the risk of being answerable in damages to other riparian owners
who sustain loss thereby."); accordWagner v. Tidewater Oil Co., 191 A.2d 326 (Del. Ch. 1963).
23. See, e.gi, Little v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 67 A. 169, 172 (Del. Super. Ct. 1907); MacArtor
v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 187 A.2d 417, 419 (Del. Ch. 1963); Artesian Water Co. v.
New Castle Cly., No. 5106,1983 WL 17986, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 1983).

24. § 6029 (2015).
25. See, e.g, Hearn v. Abbott, No. 89C-11-001, 1992 WL 207270, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct.
Aug. 6, 1992).
26. See, e.g., Scureman v.Judge, 747 A.2d 62, 66-67 (Del. Ch. 1999).
27. See, e.g., Forman v. Ford, 33 A. 617 (Del. Ch. 1886);Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Ford,
33 A. 618, 619 (Del. Ch. 1887), liirtherpi-oceedings,44 A. 778 (Del. Ch. 1895).
28. See, e.g., Bailey v. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R.R., 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 389, 396
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governmental uses potentially raise takings issues." For example, the state must
compensate landowners for flooding that results from government activities,
such as highway construction.o Fifth, landowners have no duty to prevent natural runoff from harming adjoining land, but may not collect and direct it to a
neighbor."' Sixth, damming a stream does not create concomitant fishing
rights." Last, DNREC is given wide but not unchecked discretion in determining 'reasonable' uses. For example, courts have upheld DNREC's authority to
order removal of a dock," but invalidated an attempt to charge a lease fee for
subaqueous land beneath the landholder's pier." Moreover, applicants may
appeal DNREC's decision-making to the Delaware Environmental Appeals
Board 3 and then to the Superior Court of Delaware."
Yet, in what can sometimes be quite a consequential departure from practices elsewhere, riparian ownership along tidal streams extends to the low-water
mark, unlike the practice in most eastern states, which limits ownership of riparian areas of tidal waters to the high-water mark."
III. RELATED IAWS AND CONTROVERSIES THAT INFLUENCE WATER USE
IN DELAWARE"
Two laws not directly related to water rights and law in Delaware nonetheless have a profound impact upon it: The Delaware Coastal Zone Act," and the
Delaware River Basin Compact." The Delaware Coastal Zone Act ("CZA")
was the first comprehensive coastal land-use law in the world aimed at curbing
industrial uses of a coastal area." Delaware's coastal zone-which runs

(Del. 1846) ("The owner of such property holds it subject, to the right of the public to use the
stream at the will of the legislature; and if, in the use of it, indirect damage arises to such property,
it is an inconvenience to which he must submit unless the State makes compensation as a mere
gratuity. It is darnnum absque injuria.").
29. Wilmington v. Parcel of Land Known as Tax Parcel No. 26.067.00.004, 607 A.2d 1163,

1169 (Del. 1992).
30. See e.g., State v. Hawkins, No. 91C-10-183-WTQ, 1995 WL 717407 (Del. Super. Ct.
Nov. 22, 1995).
31. See, e.g., Chorman v. Queen Anne's R.R., 54 A. 687 (Del. Super. Ct. 1901).
32. See, e.g., Hagan & Blaisdell v. Del. Anglers & Gunners Club, No. 7989, 1992 WL 82369

(Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1992).
33. Clark v. Moore, No. 1485, 1992 WL 322057, at* I (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 1992).
34. Oceanport Indus. v. State, No. 12553,1993 WL 181297, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 18,1993)
("To hold that a riparian owner's property right to wharf out over publicly owned subaqueous
land is subject to the State's proprietary ownership rights would stand the riparian right on its
head."), aji'd wihoutpubhshed opinion. State v. Oceanport Indus., 639 A.2d 74 (Del. 1994).

35. § 6008 (2015).
36. § 6009 (2015).

&

37. Bickel v. Polk, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 325, 326 (Del. Super. Ct. 1851); see e.g., State v. Reybold,
5 Del. (5 Harr.) 484 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1854); Harlan & Hollingsworth Co. v. Paschall, 5 Del. Ch.
435 (1882); Phillips Y. State, 449 A.2d 250 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982); Buckson, supra note 20.
38. This section has been adapted by the author in part from sections of James R. May
Wendy L. Myers, It is Still Not a Shore Thing: EnvironmentalImprovement andIndustialUses
ofDelaware's Costa/Zone, 17 DEL. IAw. 20 (1999).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 §§ 7001-13 (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws, ch. 201) (2015).

40. Id.§§6501-11.
41. James R. May & Wendy L. Myers, Itis Stil Not a Shore Thmg: EnvfionmentalImprovenict and IndusaialUses ofDelawaire's Costal Zone, 17 DEL. LAw. 20, 20 (1999) [hereinafter
Shore 7ingl.
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from Swede's Landing in Wilmington, through the Bombay and Prime Hook
National Wildlife Refuges, to the state's southern beaches, freshwater wetlands, and inland bays-stands as the state's most distinguishing feature." It
serves as a primary flyway for the Northern Hemisphere's most significant
avian migration." The Delaware coastal zone's wetlands are recognized under the Ramsar Convention, an international treaty that recognizes wetlands
of international importance."
The coastal zone is also central to the state's multi-million dollar tourism
industry. 5 For example, tourists flock from world-round to view shore
birds stopping over to fatten themselves on a banquet of horseshoe crab
eggs each spring before the birds proceed along on a grueling 5,000 mile trek
to northern climes."
To protect these resources, the Delaware Legislature enacted the CZA
at the behest of then-governor Russell Peterson in 1971." The CZA aims to
protect the "natural environment of its bay and coastal areas," for recreation,
tourism, and environmental uses, and establishes that the "protection of the
environment, natural beauty and recreational potential of the State is ... of
great concern." The CZA also compliments the federal Coastal Zone
Management Act, which has states like Delaware develop "Coastal
Zone Management Plans" to "preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance the resources of the nation's coastal zone."
The CZA forbids large and new industrial development in the
coastal zone, regulates certain existing uses, and is agnostic about
commercial and residential development.-o Specifically, the CZA prohibits new "heavy industry" and "bulk product transfer facilities"' but

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48.

Id.; see adso DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7,

49.

16 U.S.C. Sec. 1452.

§ 7001(LEXIS

through 80 Del. Laws, ch. 201) (2015).

50. See Shore Thing, supia note 41, at 20 n.1 ("The CZA does not regulate numerous industrial uses, such as those not constituting the "initiation, expansion of heavy industry or manufacturing uses . . . These include: The raising of agricultural commodities or livestock, warehouses or other storage facilities, not including tank farms, tank farms of less than five acres,
parking lots or structures, health care and day care facilities, maintenance facilities, commercial
establishments not involved in manufacturing, office buildings, recreational facilities and facilities related to the management of wildlife, facilities used in transmitting, distributing, transforming, switching, and otherwise transporting and converting electrical energy, the repair and
maintenance of existing electrical generating facilities providing ... liti does not result in any
negative environmental impacts, (locking facilities which are not used as bulk product transfer
facilities, maintenance and repair of existing equipment and structures, and any other activity
which the Secretary determines ... is not an expansion or extension of a non-conforming use
or heavy industry. The CZA does not regulate other quasi-industrial, commercial and residential
development in the zone." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see idso 7 DEL.
ADMIN. CODE § 101-5.0 (LEXIS through 19 Del. Reg. Issue 7 (January 1, 2016)) [hereinafter
COSTAL REGUIATIONS].
51. Shore Thing; supra note 41, at 21; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7003.
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"grandfathers" in" existing heavy industrial uses and bulk product transfer
facilities, with the exception of "abandoned" facilities."
First, the CZA prohibits "[hleavy industry use of any kind not in operation
on June 28, 197." "Heavy industry" is defined as uses "characteristically
involving more than 20 acres," and employing equipment"5 with the "potential
5
to pollute when equipment malfunctions or human error occurs."

Prohib-

ited new heavy industry uses also include extension or expansion of certain
"non-conforming uses" 7 beyond

their footprints 8 and other similar heavy

industrial uses."
Second, the CZA prohibits "Iblulk product transfer facilities and pipelines, which serve as bulk transfer facilities that were not in operation on
June 28, 1971."'" Corresponding regulations define "bulk product" as
"loose masses of cargo such as oil, grain, gas and minerals, which are typically
stored in the hold of a vessel."" In turn, a "Bulk Product Transfer Facility"
includes the transfer of bulk products from vessel to vessel."
52. Shore Thing, supra note 41, at 21, 22 n.6. ("The CZA provides that'lainy nonconforming use in existence and in active use on June 28, 1971' is not prohibited by the CZA)"; S 7004
(2015).
53. Shore Thing, supra note 41, at 21; To determine whether a facility is abandoned or
merely temporarily shut down, DNREC considers various factors, including the "status of environmental permits and/or business licenses, maintenance or machinery and structures, owner
presence and involvement to some degree in reinstating the use and the duration of the cessation." COSTAL REGULATIONs (12.3) (2016). A facility will not be deemed "abandoned" if the
shutdown was involuntary and DNREC determines that the "owner had no intention to abandon
the use." (12.2). If the Secretary determines a facility abandoned, he must notify the owner of
his intention to declare the facility abandoned. (12.4). The owner has 60 days from the receipt
of such notification, to "demonstrate that there is or was no intention to abandon the use and
when operation of the use will resume." Id. DNREC must make a final decision concerning
abandonment within 120 days from the date of original notification, taking into account all subsequent information. (12.5). The owner may appeal any such determination. (12.6); see also
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7007.
54. Shore Thig, supra note 41, at 21; S 7003.
55. § 7002(d) (Such equipment includes that which "characteristically employ[sl some but
not necessarily all of such equipment such as, but not limited to, smokestacks, tanks, distillation
or reaction columns, chemical processing equipment, scrubbing towers, pickling equipment and
waste-treatment lagoons; which industry, although conceivably operable without polluting the
environment, has the potential to pollute when equipment malfunctions or human error occurs."); see also COSTAL REGULATIONs (4) (2016).
56. Shore Ting; supra note 41, at 21; S 7002(d); see abo COSTAL REGUlATIONS (8.2.1)
(2016).
57. Shore Thng, supra note 41, at 21 n.9 ("Nonconforming use" means a "use, whether of
land or of a structure, which does not comply with the applicable use provisions in [the Acti
where such use was lawfully in existence and in active use prior to June 28, 1971."); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 7002(f).

58. See § 7004(b)(5).
59. Shore Thing, supra note 41, at 21 n.10 ("These include: (1) The 'conversion of an existing unregulated, exempted, or permitted facility to a heavy industry use'; (3) 'offshore gas, liquid,
or solid bulk product transfer facilities which were not in operation on June 28, 1971'; and (4)
'any new tank farm greater than 5 acres in size not associated with a manufacturing use."');
COSTAL REGULATIONS (4.1), (4.3), (4.4).
60. Shore Thing; supranote 41, at 21; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7003; COSTAL REGULATIONS
(4.5).
61. Shore Thig, supra note 41, at 21; COsTAL REGULATIONS (3.0).
62. Shore Thimg, supra note 41, at 21 (citing Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus.
Control Board, 492 A.2d 1242, 1247 (Del. 1985)). Coastal Barge involved the vessel-to-vessel
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Expanded or extended "manufacturing"" uses, or expansions or extensions of existing "nonconforming" uses, such as existing heavy industry,
bulk product transfer facilities, and other non-conforming uses within their
existing footprints, require a permit." The CZA also requires a permit for
"the construction of pipelines or docking facilities serving as offshore bulk
product transfer facilities if such facilities serve only one on-shore manufacturing or other facility," and any "public sewage treatment plant or public recycling
plant." 5

Permit applicants must include an "Environmental Impact Statement,"
that assesses whether a project "may result in any negative impact" on the
coastal zone." The state's evaluation must consider the "direct and cumulative
environmental impacts" of the proposal. 7 To obtain approval, applicants
"must more than offset the negative environmental impacts associated with
the proposed project or activity."" The extent of any negative impact and
the means by which to offset them are a function of various "environmental
indicators."" The chosen offset project must be "clearly and demonstrably
more beneficial to the environment in the Coastal Zone than the harm done

transfer of coal in the Delaware Bay. Id. at 1243. DNREC initially found that the operation was
not regulated by the CZA. Id. at 1244. On appeal, the Board reversed the ruling, finding that
the CZA prohibited the activity as a "bulk product transfer facility." Id. Coastal barge then appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, who allirmed the Board's ruling. Id. Petitioners Coastal
Barge argued that the CZA did not prohibit their operation because it involved neither a "port"
nor a "facility," and did not constitute the "transfer of any substance from vessel to onshore
facility." Id at 1245. The Court disagreed, holding that the "ordinary common meaning" of the
term "bulk product transfer facility" included vessel-to-vessel bulk transfers. Id. at 1247. In so
doing, the Court reasoned that "a literal interpretation would lead to ... unreasonable or absurd
consequences." Id. at 1246.
63. Shore Thbg; supra note 41, at 21 n.15 ("'Manufacturing' means 'the mechanical or
chemical transformation of organic or inorganic substances into new products, characteristically
using power-driven machines and materials handling equipment, and including establishments
engaged in assembling component parts of manufactured products, provided the new product
is not a structure or other fixed improvement."'); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, S 7002(e); §
7004(a) ("The CZA provides: 'IMianufacturing' uses not in existence and in active use on June
28, 1971, are allowed in the coastal zone by permit only.").
64. Shore Thig, supra note 41, at 21; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7004;
COSTAL
REGULATIONS (6.0).
65. Shore Thing, supra note 41, at 21; see also COSTAL REGULATIONS (6.0-.2).
66. Shore Th7ing; supra note 41, at 21; COSTAL REGULATIONS (8.2).
67. Shore Ting; supra note 41, at 21; COSTAL REGULATIONS (8.3.2).
68. Shore Thing, supra note 41, at 21.
69. Shore Thig; supra note 41, at 21, n.18 ("Once developed, environmental indicators
should provide a mechanism for evaluating whether the proposed project will meet the "environmental improvement" standard. Environmental indicators also help the State to develop an
accurate picture of the health of the coastal zone, to measure developing trends, and to provide
it with a basis to explain permitting decisions to the public and applicants.") (internal citations
omitted); COSTAL REGULATIONS (3.0) ("Environmental Indicators" are "a numerical parameter
which provides scientifically-based information on important environmental issues, conditions,
trends, influencing factors and their significance regarding ecosystem health. Indicators inherently are measurable, quantifiable, meaningful and understandable. They are sensitive to meaningful differences and trends, collectible with reasonable Cost and effort over long time periods,
and provide early warning of environmental change. They are selected and used to monitor
progress towards environmental goals.").
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by the negative environmental impacts associated with the permitting activities themselves."" Past achievements of the applicant, as well as the location
and timing of the proposed offset, may affect the extent of offset required,
and the offset need not occur in the coastal zone." Permits are then approved contingent on the completion of the offset." Permitting decisions
may be appealed to the Board."
The ultimate objective of the permitting process is "environmental
improvement" in the coastal zone," considering: "(1) Environmental impact, (2) Economic effect, (3) Aesthetic effect, (4) Number and type of supporting facilities required and the impact of such facilities on all factors listed
in this subsection, (5) Effect on neighboring land uses, and (6) County and
municipal comprehensive plans for the development and/or conservation of
their areas of jurisdiction.
Project status under the CZA need not be guesswork. Project applicants
may"-and under some circumstances must"-seek a "status decision" to

70. Shore Thing, supranote 41, at 21, n.20 ("The proposal must contain, at a minimum: [al
qualitative and quantitative description of how the offset project will more than offset the negative impacts from the proposed project ... How the offset project will be carried out and in what
period of time. What the environmental benefits will be and when they will be achieved. How
the offset will impact the attainment of the Department's environmental goals for the Coastal
Zone and the environmental indicators used to assess long-term environmental quality within
the zone. What, if any, negative impacts are associated with the offset project. What scientific
evidence there is concerning the efficacy of the offset project in producing its intended results.
How the success or failure of the offset project will be measured in the short and long term.");
COSTAL REGULATIONS (9.2).
71. Shore Thing, supra note 41, at 21, 22 n.21 ("An applicant who has 'undertaken past
voluntary improvements may be required to provide less of an offset than applications without
a similar record of past achievements.' Additionally, the Secretary may look more favorably on
projects that 'are within the Coastal Zone, that occur in the same environmental medium as the
source of degradation of the environment, that occur at the same site as the proposed activity
requiring a permit and that occur simultaneously with the implementation of the proposed activity needing an offset."') (internal citations omitted); COSTAL REGULATIONs (9.1.2).
72. Shore Thig, supra note 41, at 21; CosTALREGULATIONs (9.3.1).
73. Shore Thimg, supra note 41, at 21, n.22 ("The Board may accept DNREC's permit decision, or modify the permit in any way. Any party who feels they are aggrieved by the decision
of the Board may petition the Delaware Superior Court for review. The Court's review is essentially de novo, as it may accept the Board's decision or modify the permit as appropriate.")
(internal citations omitted); (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 §§ 7007, 7008 (LEXIS through 80 Del.
Laws, ch. 201)); COSTAL REGUIATIONS (16.1-.3).
74. Shore Thing, supra note 41, at 21, n.17 ("The MOU provides: '[TIhis means that each
grandfathered heavy industrial facility, manufacturing facility, public sewage treatment plant, and
public recycling facility should be allowed increased flexibility in permitting and operations only
after DNREC had developed a carefully defined procedure for assessing applications to ensure
that proposed activities meet the environmental improvement standard, as well as the six criteria
cited in the Act"') (citing Memorandum of Understanding From the Delaware Coastal Zone
Regulatory Advisory Comm. to the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (Mar. 19, 1998) reprinted in LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET. AL., NEGOTIATING
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: How To AvoID ESCALATING CONFRONTATION, NEEDLESS
COSTs, AND UNNECESSARY LITIGATION 151,152 (2nd ed. 2000) (reproduced in full).
75. Shore Thing; supra note 41, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted); tit. 7, § 7004(b);
COSTAL REGULATIONS (8.3.2).
76. Shore Thing, supra note 41, at 21, n.12 ("Any applicant who wishes to begin a new activity or construct a new facility, may request that DNREC issue a status decision to determine
if the proposed activity would be considered a heavy industry."); COSTAL REGULATIONS (7.1).
77. Shore Thing; supra note 41, at 21 n.13 ("All new manufacturing facilities or research and
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determine whether a project constitutes a prohibited use, requires a permit,
or is exempted from the CZA" and to receive feedback on offsets, effects, and
indicators.
Additionally, the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) also plays a
minor role in water law in Delaware." The DRBC consists of the four Delaware River basin states (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Delaware)
and the federal government." The DRBC focuses on such issues as watershed
planning, water supply allocation, regulatory review, water conservation initiatives, drought management, and flood control." Those wishing to withdraw water from the Delaware River, including that adjacent to Delaware, must apply
for a permit from the DRBC."
The U.S. Supreme Court has also been called upon to resolve water disputes three times between New Jersey and Delaware, with Delaware invariably
coming out on top." Most relevant to water law in Delaware, the Court has
held that the state has exclusive jurisdiction over construction up to the low-tide
water mark on the New Jersey side of the river based on the conditions of a
1681 lease that King Charles II's made to William Penn of three counties of
what eventually became the State of Delaware." In 2008 the Court held that a
1905 agreement between the two states did not derogate from Delaware's jurisdiction.' This had the effect of allowing Delaware-based on the Delaware
Coastal Zone Act's prohibitions-to stop New Jersey from granting a permit to
British Petroleum to build a liquefied natural gas pipeline and loading dock
adjacent to the New Jersey shore.
Myriad other laws and programs that have only a remote influence water
on use in Delaware are beyond the scope of this examination-including: the
Natural Areas Preservation System Act," and the Conservation and Preservation Easements Act, 7 as well as those that address fin fishing," erosion and sedimentation control," beach erosion control," dredging and management of

development facilities proposed to be developed in the coastal zone must apply for a status
decision."); see also COSTAL REGULATIONS (7.4).
78. Shore 77wilg, supra note 41, at 21; see also COSTAL REGUlATIONS (7.2).
79. See generallyJOSEPH M. DELI'APENNA, DELAWARE AND SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASINS,
4 DE-RB-I WATER AND WATER RIGHTS (Amy K. Keller, ed., 3rd ed. LexisNexis/Matthew
Bender 2016) (discussing federal arrangements for managing water resources of interstate water
basins in the region).
80. About DRBC DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N, http://www.nj.gov/drbc/about/ (last visited
Sept. 18, 2016).
8 1. Id.
82. See generally Applicant & Docket Holder Information, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM'N,
http://www.nj.gov/drbc/programs/projcc/application/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2016).
83. See gencially Comment, Controversy Between States - Border Dispute, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 505 (2008).
84. NewJersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597 (2008).
85. Id.
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, SS 7301-12 (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws, ch. 201).
87. Id. at §§ 6901-06.
88. Id. at §901-43 (discussing Delaware laws related to fin fishing, which influence water use
in the state).
89. Id. at §§ 4001-17.
90. Id. at §§ 6801-12.

Issue 1I

WATER IA WAND MANAGEMENT INDELA WARE

13

lagoons,9 wetlands," subaqueous lands," and minerals in submerged lands."
The same holds for water pollution control, including that for discharges into
streams supplying drinking water," by waterborne vessels" and sewage treatment
plants," and for oil pollution." Further, specific issues and responses to sealevel rise in the state are yet of minimal influence on water law in Delaware, and
are thus beyond the scope of this article."
IV. CONCLUSION
Water law in Delaware is an amalgam that has evolved significantly over
more than four centuries. Much of it revolved around mill works until the latter
half of the Twentieth Century. These days, Delaware stands as an exemplar of
regulated riparian rights, with agency oversight that manages water use, assignment, and development based on reasonable uses. Water law in Delaware is
also influenced by the Delaware Coastal Zone Act, and, to a lesser extent as
pertains to the Delaware River, by the Delaware River Basin Commission and
the U.S. Supreme Court.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at§§ 4301-89.
Id. at§§ 6601-20.
Id. at§§ 7201-17.
Id. at §§ 6101-43.
Tit. 16, §§ 1301-02.
Tit. 7, S 6035.
Id at § 6033.
Id. at §§ 6201-16.
99. See generadlyKenneth T. Kristl, Rishg Sea Levels: A Tidal Wave of Legal Asues? 31
WTR-DEL. LAw. 16 (2014).

EVOLVING WATER IAW AND MANAGEMENT IN
THE U.S.: KANSAS
JOHN C. PECK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Situated in the geographical center of the country, Kansas is a state in the
tier of states from the Dakotas to Texas that mark the transition from the humid
East to the arid West.' Elevation rises from under seven hundred feet above
sea level in eastern Kansas to over four thousand feet in the west.' Rivers generally run from the dry west to the wetter east.' Western Kansas is underlain by
the High Plains Aquifer, which extends its reach to several other states.'
Roughly one-third the state's population resides in the two main population
centers-the Kansas City-Lawrence-Topeka corridor in northeast Kansas and
the Wichita-Salma area in central to south-central Kansas.
This article focuses on the last fifty years of Kansas water allocation management. It excludes water quality and interstate issues. To understand this
period and to place it in context, however, one must view the preceding period
from statehood in 1861 to 1965. After briefly describing this earlier period, this
article examines the fifty years from 1965 to 2015, and then concludes with
some observations about the future.

Connell Teaching Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law.
1. DOUGLAS G. GOODIN ET AL., CLIMATE AND WEATHER ATLAS OF KANSAS 4 (reprint
2004) (1995). Annual precipitation ranges from more than forty inches in southeast Kansas to
around seventeen inches in southwest Kansas. Id. Kansas has an area of 82,278 square miles,
which ranks fifteenth in the country. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

UNITED STATES: 223 (2012) http://www.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/
131ed.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2016). Its population is just over 2.8 million in 2010, ranking
thirty-third, but its population density of 34.9 people per square mile ranks only thirty-ninth. Id.
at 18-19.
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU supra note 1, at 226.
3. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION
SERVICE, KANSAS ANNUAL PRECIPITATION, (Oct. 18, 2007) https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/lnternet/

FSEDOCUMENTS/nrcs l42p2_032018.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
4.

V.L. McGUIRE, CHANGES IN WATER LEVELS AND STORAGE IN THE HIGH PLAINS

AQUIFER, PREDEVELOPMENT TO 2005, at I (May 2007), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2007/3029/pdf/
FS20073029.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
5. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS: KANSAS, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/POP060210/20 (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (stating that the total population for the state of
Kansas onJuly 1, 2015 was 2,911,641); see alsoU.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN FACT FINDER,

http://factinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtnl?src=bkmk (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (stating that the combined population for Kansas City, Lawrence, Topeka,
Wichita, and Salina is 810, 266).
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1965

Kansas achieved statehood in 1861. In both the territorial laws' and the
early state statutes,' Kansas adopted the common law. The state was gradually
settled from the wetter eastern part of the state to the dryer west, which accounts
for Kansas' adoption of the common law water allocation doctrines of the eastern states-riparian rights for riverso and the English rule or absolute ownership
for groundwater." In the late eighteenth century, the legislature enacted statutes
that hinted at moving toward the prior appropriation doctrine of the western
states, " but when actual disputes arose, the Kansas Supreme Court chose not to
recognize the doctrine,. favoring the common law instead.
Floods and droughts prompted Congress to adopt flood control and reclamation acts that impacted Kansas." The 1930's drought in Kansas caused the
governor and legislature to study the situation with a view toward changing the
water allocation rules of the common law. After a 1944 Kansas Supreme Court
case affirming adherence to the absolute ownership doctrine for groundwater,"
the governor appointed a task force to review the law.'" It published its report
in December 1944." The legislature accepted the recommendation of the report task force that Kansas change from common law water-allocation concepts
to prior appropriation, and it enacted the 1945 Water Appropriation Act.
The 1945 Water Appropriation Act fundamentally changed water allocation law in Kansas. It declared all water to be "dedicated to the use of the people
of the state," preserved rights of then-existing water users through "vested
rights,"" authorized all new users of water-except for domestic users-to obtain
"appropriation rights"" through a permit application process," made the chief
engineer of the Division of Water Resources (DWR) the prime water administrator of the state,2 established the "first-in-time, first-in-right" doctrine of the
'

6. An Act for the Admission of Kansas into the Union, ch. 20, S 1, 12 Stat. 126 (1861).
7. Act of 1855, ch. 96, § 1, 1885 Kan. Sess. Laws 469 (adopting the common law as the rule
of action in Kansas).
8. See, e.g, Act of Mar. 3,1868, ch. 119, § 3, 1868 Kan. Sess. Laws 1122 (codified at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 77-109 (2015)) (concerning the general statutes and their effects in Kansas).
9. Greg Bradsher, How the West Was Selded, PROLOGUE, Winter 2012, at 28.
10. See, e.g., Clark v. Allaman, 80 P. 571, 579 (Kan. 1905); Frizell v. Bindley, 58 P.2d 95,
101 (Kan. 1936).

11. See State ex rel. Peterson v. Kansas State Bd. of Agric., 149 P.2d 604, 608 (Kan. 1944).
12. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 19, 1886, ch. 115, S 1, 1886 Kan. Sess. Laws 154 (allowing surface
water rights to be acquired by appropriation).
13. See, e.g., Clark, 80 P. at 571; Fnzell, 58 P.2d at 95.
14. See Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, §§ 1, 6, 9(a)-(b), 58 Stat. 887, 887, 890-91.
15. Peterson v. KansasState Bd. ofAgic., 149 P.2d at 608.
16. See Heny S. Buzick, Jr. et al, The Appropriaion of WteriorBeneficia'lPtrposes,37
J. AM. WATER WORKs Ass'N 601 (1945).
17. Id.
18. Water Appropriation Act, ch. 390, 1945 Kan. Sess. Laws 365 (codified at KAN. STAT.
ANN § 82a-701 (2015)). See Buzick, supra note 16, at 626.
19. Id. at §2 (codilied at KAN. STAT. ANN § 82a-702 (2015)).
20. Id. at %1(d), 4 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 82 a-701 (d), 82a-704a (2015)).
21. kI. at §§1(f), 3, 5 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 82a-701(f), 82a-703, 82a-705 (2015)).
22. Id. at §§11-12 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 82a-711, 82a-712 (2015)).
23. Id. at S 6 (codified at KA N. STAT. ANN S 82a-706 (2015)).
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western states for disputes based on impairment," and provided that water rights
were lost if not used for three successive years without due and sufficient cause."
In several cases, both state and federal courts upheld the constitutionality of the
Act."
The 1957 legislature amended the Act in several important ways. It expressly defined all water rights as "real property."27 It provided that three attributes of water rights could be changed with prior approval of the chief engineer:
the type of use, place of use, and point of diversion." And, it added a section
permitting district courts to order the chief engineer to act as referee to investigate and report on the physical facts of the case and offer an opinion.'
New appropriation permits exploded during the twenty-year period after
the 1945 Act went into effect. The chief engineer approved over 11,500 permits, mostly for irrigation from groundwater." This was the era before strict
well spacing or depletion formulae" that would later slow the rate of DWR approvals of new permit applications. The standard for granting a new permit
was, and still is, whether the proposed diversion would impair an existing right
or adversely affect the public interest.3 2
Prior to 1966, the U.S. Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation
constructed fifteen major reservoirs in Kansas." Congress enacted the Water
Supply Act of 1958, enabling reservoirs to be sized to include water supply storage, if a local entity would agree to reimburse the government for the cost."
Kansas' largest reservoir, Tuttle Creek Reservoir, had originally been designed
as a dry dam to hold flood waters only, but after the drought of 1952-1956,
water supply storage was added.
Water resources planning statutes were spotty prior to 1955. That year, the
legislature created the Kansas Water Resources Board" and in 1963 enacted

24.
25.

Id. at §7(c) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN § 82a-707(c) (2015)).
Id. at §18 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN § 82a-718 (2015)).

26. See, e.g., Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D. Kan. 1956); Williams v. City of
Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 595 (Kan. 1962).
27. Act of Apr. 8, 1957, ch. 539, § 1(g), 1957 Kan. Sess. Laws 1075, 1076 (codified at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(g) (2015)) (relating to appropriation of water for beneficial uses).
28. Id. at § 4 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-708b (2015)).
2
29. Id. at § 25 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. S 82a-7 5 (2015)).
rights search tool. Water Information
water
on
a
data
from
30. This figure can be gleaned
ManMagrnent and Analysis System (WIMAS), KAN. GEOLOGICAL SURVEYS, http://hercules.kgs.ku.edu/geohydro/wimas/index.cfm (last visitedJan. 28, 2016). See infra note 121.
31. These types of rules appeared first in 1979. See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-22- 2
(2016) (regulating well-spacing requirements in the Equus Beds GMD No. 2).
32. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711(c) (2015).
33. KAN. WATER OFFICE, STATE WATER PLAN WATER SUPPLY AND STORAGE PROGRAM,
THE SEVENTH REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISlATURE OF KANSAS 8-9, tbl. 11-1 (1982).

34. Water Supply Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-500, § 301, 72 Stat. 319 (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C.A S 390b (2012)).
35.

History of Tutde Creek Lake, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, http://www.nwk.usace.army.

mil/Locations/District-Lakes/Tuttle-Creek-Lake/History/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2016); see also
KAN. WATER REs. FACE-FINDING & RESEARCH COMM., APPENDIX TO WATER IN KANSAS, 1955,

A REPORT TO THE KANSAS STATE LEGISLATURE at G I to G 2, G 8 to G 9 (1955).

36.

Act of Apr. 14, 1955, ch. 356, § 1, 1955 Kan. Sess. Laws 724.
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statutes that provided for broad, proactive planning efforts." Reacting to Congress' Water Supply Act, Kansas amended its constitution to enable the state to
fund the water supply component of federal reservoirs."
IH. WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE IAST FIFTY YEARS, 1965-2015
A.

INTRODUCTION TO WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE LAST FIVEY YEARS

The last fifty-year period has seen wide-ranging attempts by the legislature,
the courts, and administrative agencies to solve Kansas' water problems. The
legislature has amended numerous sections of the 1945 Water Appropriation
Act and added new ones. Some amendments have been mere tweaks, but many
have made substantial changes in the law. The new sections have provided for
both clarification (such as requirements for sand and gravel pits"and division of
water rights'o) and new programs (such as minimum desirable streamflows,"
multi-year flex accounts,"' and water banking'). The legislature added new statutes outside the Water Appropriation Act that impact water rights, such as the
Groundwater Management District Act in 1972," the Water Plan Storage Act
in 1974," the Water Transfer Act in 1983,` the Water Assurance Program Act
in 1986," and changes in the administrative structure of the DWR in 1995."
The most important of these are discussed below.
Courts, mostly in the latter part of the period, have helped clarify statutory
ambiguities in areas such as water right abandonment, the structure of the
DWR, water right impairment, and appeal powers. At the administrative law
level, the DWR has continued to grant water appropriation permits, but at an

increasingly slower rate." The role of administrative law has grown. The DWR
has promulgated regulations on all aspects of water appropriation rights,"o and
the Kansas Water Office has created policies dealing with water storage in large
reservoirs.5' Groundwater management has helped slow the rate of depletion
of aquifers." Proactive and comprehensive water resources planning efforts of

37. State Water Plan Act, ch. 514, 1963 Kan. Sess. Laws 1174 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 82a-901 to -954 (2015)).

38. KAN. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
39. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-734 (2015).
40. S 82a-742.
41. § 8 2 a-703a to -703c.
42. § 82a-736.
43. § 82a-763 to -771.
44. § 82a-1020 to -1035.
45. § 82a-1301 to -1320.
46. § 82a-1501 to -1508.
47. S 82a-1330 to -1345.
48. Id. at § 74-560. This statute provides that the secretary of agriculture is to be appointed
by the governor. The secretary of agriculture, in turn, appoints the chief engineer of the DWR.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-506(d) (2015). See also Hellebust v. Brownback, 42 F.3d 1331 (10th Cir.
1994); infra text accompanying notes 87-92.
49. The DWR approved almost 30,000 permits before 1980 and about 19,400 since. See
supra, note 30.
50. See KAN. ADMIN. REGs. §S 5-1-1 to -50-8 (2009).
51. See KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §S 98-1-1, 98-5-1 to -5-9 (2009).
52. Wayne Bossert, GroundwaterMangementin GMD4: HasitSucceeded?, 15 KAN.J. L.
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the Kansas Water office began to grow in the mid-1980s."
B.

WATER RESOURCES PLANNING

By the beginning of this fifty-year period, the Water Resources Board had
5
published a series of useful reports, including ones on water law, " and the legislature had adopted the State Water Plan Act." The year 1981, however,
marked the beginning of the modern era of planning when the legislature abolished the board and replaced it with the Kansas Water Office (KWO) and its
director, and the Kansas Water Authority (KWA).6 In 1984, the legislature
changed the name from the State Water Plan Act to the State Water Resources
Planning Act." In 1985, it made the process of amending the State Water Plan
more dynamic and provided more flexibility and proactive planning" by dropping the old idea of a static state water plan in favor of a continuing planning
process.5' The KWO was charged with updating the State Water Plan annually
and presenting it to the legislature with recommendations," and the legislature
could pick and choose what recommendations, if any, it wanted to adopt. Many
substantive changes have resulted from the process, including, for example,
minimum desirable streamflow requirements" and water assurance districts."
C.

WATER RIGHTS

Water rights are defined as "real property rights" in the Kansas Water Appropriation Act." Due to the increasing numbers of filings for water right permit
applications in the 1960s, the recognition of groundwater depletion in the aquifers, and the need of tighter controls," major developments and changes in
& PUB. POL'Y 541, 553 (2006) ("GMD4 has successfully managed its groundwater in twelve different ways. (1) It has stopped new development, and stopped the decline in water levels from
getting worse.").
53. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-901 to -954 (2015) (especially § 82a-906).
54. See e.g., KANSAS WATER RES. BD., BULL. No. 3, REPORT ON THE LAwS OF KANSAS
PERTAINING TO THE BENEFICIAL USE OFWATER (1956); KANSAS WATER RES. BD., BULL. No.
5, REPORT ON THE LAws OF KANSAS PERTAINING TO GROUND WATER (1960). The author of
these reports was Professor Shurtz of the KU Law School, who also wrote KANSAS WATER LAw,
a handbook. KANSAS WATER RES. BD., KANSAS WATER LAw (1967). The first two reports
contained recommendations for changes in the law.
55. State Water Plan Act, ch. 514,1963 Kan. Sess. Laws 1174 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 82a-901 to -954 (2015)).
56. Act of May 13, 1981, ch. 302, §§ 1, 2, 3 & 10, 1981 Kan. Sess. Laws 1180,1180, 1184
(codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-2613 to -2615, -2622).
57. Act of Apr. 6, 1984, ch. 379, § 20, 1984 Kan. Sess. Laws 1810, 1820 (codified at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 82a-947).
58. Act of Mar. 19,1985, ch. 341, §1, 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 1451,1451 (codified KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 82a-906) (concerning water and the multipurpose small lakes program). See also John
C. Peck & Doris K. Nagel, LegalAspects of Water Resources Planning, 37 KAN. L. REv. 199,
211-17 (1989).
59. Peck & Nagel, supranote 58.
60. Id. at 215 (citing to the Act of Mar. 19, 1985, ch. 341, §1, 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 1451,
1451 (codified KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-906)).
61. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-703a to -703c (2015).
62. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1333 (2015).

63.

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 82a-701(g) (2015).

64. John C. Peck, GroundwaterMaagement in Kansas: A Brief History and Assessment,
15 KAN.J. L. & PUB. POL. 441, 443 (2006) [hereinafter Peck, GroundwaterManagementl.
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water rights law have occurred in the last fifty years.
1.

Stricter Rules for Water Diversions and Water Rights

Several significant statutory and regulatory changes have occurred since
1965 that increase state regulation. These involve rules restricting diversion of
water without a permit, requiring reports on annual use and metering, and
providing consequences for violating terms and conditions of water rights.
Combined, these controls have had a significant impact on Kansas water users.
The 1945 Water Appropriation Act established a system for acquiring new
appropriation rights. It did not, however, require entities seeking to divert water
to obtain an appropriation right. Water users who diverted water without a
vested or appropriation right could be enjoined by holders of these rights if the
diversions impaired the rights." The 1977 legislature made it a crime to divert
water without a permit, with a few exceptions including for domestic use."
In 1988, the legislature enacted annual use reporting requirements." Failure to file a report by March 1 of the year following the end of the previous
calendar year can result in a $250 fine." Knowingly filing a document with false
information was made a class C misdemeanor."
Since 2008, the chief engineer has required all new non-domestic wells and
pump sites to be equipped with a water flowmeter." Groundwater management
districts also require meters. For example, Northwest Kansas GMD No. 4 requires meters for non-domestic wells permitted or drilled after 1980."
The 2001 legislature enacted K.S.A. 82a-737," which imposed civil penalties for violations of the appropriation act; violations of orders relating to intensive groundwater use control areas; or violations of terms, conditions, or limitations imposed by the chief engineer. The latter violations include diverting
water from unauthorized points of diversion or onto unauthorized places of use,
failing to comply with terms of conservation plans, exceeding maximum annual
quantities or rates of diversion, failing to install or to maintain water measuring
devices, or using water for other than the permitted type of use." Possible penalties include fines and modification or suspension of water rights."
2.

Minimum Desirable Streanflow

Based on recommendations of the Kansas Water Office in the 1984 State
Water Plan, the legislature introduced specific minimum desirable streamflow

65. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-717a (2015).
66. Act ofApr. 11, 1977, ch. 356, S 2, 1977 Kan. Sess. Laws 1169, 1170 (codified at KAN.

STAT. ANN. § 82a-728) (providing for temporary pennits to appropriate water).
67. Act of Apr. 21, 1988, ch. 395, § 1, 1988 Kan. Sess. Laws 2445, 2445 (codified at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 82a-732 (2015)).

68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
KAN. ADMIN. REGS.

§ 5-1-7 (2016).

§ 5-1-7 (2016).
Act of May 9, 2001, ch. 160, § 14, 2001 Kan. Sess. Laws 1409, 1417 (codified at
STAT. ANN. § 82a-737 (2015)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
71.

72.

KAN. ADMIN. REGS.

KAN.
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(MDS) rates in 1985." The statute designates the streams and rivers covered
and provides monthly MDS in cubic feet per second at specific locations." Water rights with priority dates on or before April 12, 1984 are not subject to
MDS." The DWR has enforced MDS in recent years.
3.

Abandonment of Water Rights

Kansas follows general western water principles regarding loss of water
rights for non-use. The DWR became active in holding hearings to declare
water rights abandoned under K.S.A. 82a-718 and declared many water rights
abandoned." Several recent appellate court cases have helped clarify various
issues.
Dicta in a 2006 case declared Kansas to be a forfeiture state, not an abandonment state, for loss of water rights for non-use, which means that the water
user's intent is not relevant in the determination." The Kansas Supreme Court
in 2009 held that once the DWR files its verified report under K.S.A. 82a-718
claiming forfeiture, the burden shifts to the water right holder to prove "due and
sufficient cause" for the non-use. In 2010, the court of appeals showed deference to DWR expertise and interpretation in upholding the DWR's determination that the taking up of groundwater by alfalfa roots does not constitute a
diversion or beneficial use of water, and thus the water right should be forfeited." In another case, the court of appeals in 2011 held that Kansas statutes
do not authorize partial abandonment of water rights."

75. Act of Apr. 12, 1985, ch. 338, § 2, 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 1446, 1446 (codified at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 82a-703c (2015)). The legislature first provided for MDS in 1980. See Act of Apr.

18, 1980, ch. 332,

S 2,1980 Kan. Sess. Laws 1334, 1334 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN § 82a-703a

(2015)). See also Act of Apr. 6, 1984, ch. 377, § 1, 1984 Kan. Sess. Laws 1809, 1809 (codified
at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703b (2015)).
76. KAN. STAT. ANN. S 82a-703c (2015). For example, the MDS on the Republican River at

Concordia in July is 150 cfs. Kansas Mnimum Desirable Streanflows (MDS), in cubic feet per
second (i3/s), U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., http://ks.water.usgs.gov/table-of-kansas-minimum-desirable-streamflows (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
77. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703b(b) (2015).
78. Over several months in 2012, for example, during a multi-year drought affecting much of
the state, the DWR administered junior water rights on many rivers in favor of MDS. John C.
Peck, Water Law, in 23 KANSAS ANNUAL SURVEY OF LAw 361, 367-68. (2012).
79. The legislature changed the 3-year non-use period to 5 years in 1999. Act of Apr. 17,
1999, ch. 122, § 1, 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 763, 763-64 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-718
(2015)).
80. Hawley v. Kan. Dep't of Agric., 132 P.3d 870, 881 (Kan. 2006).
81. Frick Farm Prop. v. Kan. Dep'tof Agric., 216 P.3d 170, 180-81 (Kan. 2009).
82. Nelson v. Kan. Dep't. of Agric., 242 P.3d 1259, 1267 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010). See also
Frank v. Kan. Dep't. of Agric., 198 P.3d 195, 201 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (giving "substantial def
erence to the agency's interpretation of Ithe statutel."). In a 2015 case upholding a trial court's
finding of impairment by a junior water right holder, appellant American Warrior, Inc., the appeals court upheld the trial court's decision to allow the chief engineer's report filed under KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 82a-725 into evidence without requiring the report's author to testify. Garetson
Bros. v. Am. Warrior, Inc., 347 P.3d 687, 696 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015), peiion fbr cer lied Apr.

30, 2015, petition for cert; deniedJan. 25, 2016.
83.

Wheatland Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Polansky, 265 P.3d 1194,1206 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
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Cases Construing the Water Appropriation Act

In 1981, the Kansas Supreme Court once again ruled on the constitutionality of the Water Appropriation Act."' The court upheld the Act's 1977
amendment requiring permits to divert water, except for domestic use, and
making it a crime to divert water without a permit." The court held that this
amendment was not an unconstitutional taking of private property." In a 1993
case, plaintiffs argued that the law establishing the water rights administrative
structure was unconstitutional under the "one-person, one-vote" principle of
Reynolds v. Sins" because the chief engineer, who controls water allocation in.
Kansas, was appointed by the state board of agriculture, the members of which
were elected by delegates selected from private agricultural associations, not by
the voting public as a whole." Because the state board exercised general governmental powers affecting the lives of all Kansans, including power over the
use and control of water, a federal district court agreed with the plaintiffs and
ordered the entire department of agriculture put in the hands of the governor
as receiver until the legislature could correct the situation." In 1995, the legislature established the Kansas Department of Agriculture with a governor-appointed secretary" and gave the secretary power to select the chief engineer."
Kansas appellate courts decided some other non-constitutional cases. In
2011, for example, the Kansas Supreme Court decided Cochran v. Kan. DepL
ofAg & the City of Wichita," which involved appeal rights under K.S.A. 82a711. K.S.A. 82a-711 appears to limit appeals on water right permit applications
to the applicant: it states that "[alny person aggrieved by any order . .. by the
chief engineer relating to that person's application .

.

. may petition for review

thereof."" Based on reading that section together with the Kansas Judicial Review ActC5 and the Kansas Administrative Procedures Act," however, the
Cochrancourt held that a holder of an existing water right has the right to appeal
the granting of a new permit to a neighbor whose prospective new permit might
impair that right." In another 2011 case, the court of appeals recognized the
DWR's power to limit consumptive use on approving an application to change
a vested right." In 2013, the court of appeals held that the chief engineer has
84. See F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1174 (1981); see also Baumann
v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1956); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 595 (Kan.
1962).
85. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-728 (2015).
86. Gibson, 630 P.2d at 1174.
87. Hellebust v. Brownback, 824 F. Supp 1511 (D. Kan. 1993), atid, 42 F.3d 1331 (10th
Cir. 1994).
88. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
89. Hellebust, 824 F. Supp at 1511, 1524.
90. Id. at 1524.
91. Act of Apr. 28, 1995, ch. 236, § 1,1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 1053, 1053 (codified at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 74-560 (2015)).
92. Id. § 9 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. S 74-568 (2015)).
93.

94.
95.

Cochran v. Dep't of Agric., 249 P.3d 434 (Kan. 2011).
Id. at 411 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-71 1(c)).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-601 to -631 (2015).

96. Id. § 77-501 to -566 (2015).
97. Cochn, 249 P.3d at 441-444.
98. Wheatland Electric Coop., Inc. v. Polansky, 265 P.3d 1194, 1195 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
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no power to retain jurisdiction to make reductions in the approved diversion
rate and annual quantity 'authorized to be perfected." In 2015, the court of
appeals helped define "impairment" in a case of a vested right holder claiming
0
impairment by nearby appropriators."' Absent a clear definition of "impairment" in either the statutes or regulations, the court adopted a common dictionary definition-"impair": "To cause to diminish, as in strength, value, or
quality"-and held that the appropriation right was impairing the vested right.''
5.

Condemnation of Land and Water Rights

In 1997, the court of appeals held that water rights may be the subject of
eminent domain actions.o' In 2009, in a case dealing mostly with standing and
ripeness, the Kansas Supreme Court seemed to recognize that a wholesale water
supply district has the power to condemn a temporary easement to conduct well
testing against the objection of the landowner who held no water rights."' A
Leavenworth district court judge recently had a land condemnation case in
which Suburban Water, Inc., a private water supply company, claimed to have
statutory eminent domain power enabling it to condemn land from several landowners to drill a water well for a point of diversion and construct a treatment
plant.' The Elders-who were defendants along with other landowners in the
condemnation action-then in a separate suit sought and obtained a preliminary
injunction against the company, claiming that the company is not a "hydraulic
company," which is one of the types of private companies given condemnation
power in the statute.o' The Elders subsequently settled both the injunction case
and the condemnation case with Suburban Water, Inc. before a permanent mijunction hearing. As to the other landowner defendants in the condemnation
action, the district court then ruled that Suburban Water, Inc. "meets the definition of a hydraulic corporation, as that term was used in 1871. . . and therefore . .. has the power of eminent domain pursuant to K.S.A. 26-504.""'

99. Clawson v. Dep't of Agric., 315 P.3d 896, 906 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013).
100. Garetson Bros. v. Am. Warrior, Inc., 347 P.3d 687 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015), cerl. denied,
Jan. 25, 2016. See also supra, note 82.
101. Id. at 698 (citing Impair, AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcTiONARY (4th ed. 2006)). A district
court case from Mitchell County in 1972 involved groundwater impairment of an irrigation right
by nearby junior irrigation wells and an industrial well. The judge adopted the chief engineer's
definition from his report in that case: "[tihere is impairment ... when plaintiffs authorized diversion rate is decreased by at least [twenty percent] in addition to the rate reduction caused by
the pumping of plaintiffs irrigation well". File v. Solomon Valley Feedlot, Inc., et al, No. 8831
at Conclusions of Law No. 5 (Dist. CL of Mitchell Cnty. Nov. 29, 1972).
102. Sullivan v. City of Ulysses, 932 P.2d 456, 459 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
103. Shipe v. Pub. Wholesale Water Supply Dist. No. 25, 210 P.3d 105,107 (Kan. 2009).
104. Suburban Water, Inc. v. Elder, No. 2015-CV-75 (Leavenworth Co. Dist. Ct. 2015).
105. Elder etal. v. Suburban Water Inc., No. 2015-CV-203 (Leavenworth Co. Dist. Ct. 2015).
The statute in question is KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-618, first enacted in 1868, and amended in 1871
to give "hydraulic companies" eminent domain power to condemn land.
106. Order Granting Petitioner's Motion for Leave to File its Second Amended Verified Petition, Granting Petitioner's Second Amended Verified Petition and Order Appointing Appraisers, Suburban Water, Inc. v. Elder, No. 2015-CV-75, at 8 (Leavenworth Co. Dist. Ct. 2015).
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DWR Policies and Regulations

The DWR has promulgated regulations since 1978."1 In 1983, under Chief
Engineer David Pope, the DWR also began issuing written "administrative policies" and "administrative procedures."' These policies-like regulations-relied on specific statutory authority, and the DWR used these policies to guide
personnel in decisions about many issues arising on a daily basis, both substantive and procedural.o' Unlike official regulations, however, these policies had
not gone through the official process of approval required for regulations. It
was unclear whether the policies and procedures had the effect of law (i.e., the
status of officially promulgated regulations), and the DWR was adopting many
official regulations at the same time." The legislature changed all this in 1999
when it required the DWR to turn all policies and procedures into regulations."'
Through a months-long process of writing and rewriting polices and holding
hearings, the DWR changed its policies and procedures into official regulations."2
7.

Conservation Plans and Practices

The concept of conservation plans and practices began in 1986 when the
legislature amended K.S.A. 82a-711 to allow the chief engineer to require applicants for appropriation rights to "adopt and implement conservation plans
and practices .

.

. consistent with ...

guidelines developed by ...

the Kansas

Water Office.""0 In 1991, the legislature expanded the requirement to holders
of existing water rights."' Requirements for, and evaluation of, conservation

107. The first administration regulations of the DWR appeared in Kansas Administrative Regulations (1978), v. 1, and contained a total of 16 sections, §§ 5-1-1 to 5-7-3. KAN. ADMIN REGS.
§§ 5-1-1 to 5-7-3 (1978).
108. The DWR placed copies of these policies and procedures in the KU Law School Library,
and they are available for viewing.
109. These policies became quite voluminous and somewhat difficult to find because they
predated the internet, and the practicing bar or others could not readily access official copies. A
typical example included "Administrative Procedure 83-12," which meant the twelfth policy or
procedure adopted in 1983, tided "Time Allowed to Complete Construction of Diversion
Works."
110. In 1993, however, the Kansas Court of Appeals held in Bruns v. Kansas State Bd. of
Tech. Prokssions, that a written internal policy of die Kansas State Board of Technical Professions not filed and published as required by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-425 had "no force or effect."
Bruns v. Kansas State Bd. of Tech. Professions, 864 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
111. Act of Apr. 25, 1999, ch. 130, § 12, 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 832, 839-40 (codified at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 82a-1903 (2015)) (relating to the decision of the chief engineer and the issuance of
certificates).
112. John C. Peck, Waterhl-,a 12 KANSAS ANNUAL SURVEY OF IAw 263, 264-65 (2001).
113. 1986 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 392 § 3. This provision amended K.S.A 82a-71 1, but in 1999,
the legislature amended K.S.A. 82a-711 to move the provision to newly-enacted K.S.A. 82a-733.
SeeKAN. STAT. ANN. S 82a-733 (2015). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-2608(c) (2015) (imposing the duty on the KWO to develop the guidelines for conservation plans and practices and lists
the elements and fIactors to be considered).
114. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-733 (2015); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(g) (2015) (defining a "water right" to include both vested and appropriation rights).
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plans and practices then expanded into areas such as water transfer applications" and applications to purchase water under the state water marketing pro116
gram.
8.

Multi-Year Flex Accounts, and Other Measures

Because the annual quantity of a Kansas water right is fixed once the water
right is certified, the user has little flexibility to vary that amount."' This quantity
restriction can be onerous, especially to irrigators during drought years, and
overpumping can lead to civil penalties." In 2001, the legislature enacted
K.S.A. 82a-736, which allows water right holders to create multi-year flex accounts on a voluntary basis and thus to use over a five-year period water quantities that exceed their permitted amounts in some years and that are less in
other years during the period."'
During the drought of 2011 and 2012, the DWR adopted special rules that
added even more flexibility. Two-year drought emergency permits, which were
for the combined quantity of 2011 and 2012 years, allowed participating irrigators to borrow water from their 2012 quantities to use during 2011. The DWR
processed over 2,250 applications for these permits.
D.

GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT

By the mid-i 960s, policy makers recognized that the large numbers of irrigation wells were causing groundwater mining in western Kansas.' The legislature enacted a statute in 1972 that enabled creation of groundwater management districts (GMDs)."' The express purposes of the act were proper
115. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1502(c)(7) (2015).
116. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1311 a (2015).
117. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-708(b) (2015) (Water right holders may seek permission from
the chief engineer to change only the type of use, place of use, and point of diversion of water
rights. The permitted annual quantity cannot be increased.).
118. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-737 (2015). See also Act of May 9, 2001, ch. 160, § 14, 2001
Kan. Sess. Laws 1409, 1417-18.
119. Act of May 9, 2001, ch. 160, §16, 2001 Kan. Sess. Laws 1409, 1424-26 (codified at KAN.
STAT. AINN. § 82a-736 (2015)). KAN. ADMIN. REGs. § 5-16-3 establishes the procedures for filing
an application for a multi-use flex account Various modifications in the statute occurred over
the years. For example, at first, the statutory language required the participant to suffer a ten
percent loss in the total five-year quantity that would be placed into the account because the DWR
and the legislature attempted to promote conservation. The requirement remained in effect until
2011.
120. Peck, supra note 78, at 367.
121. "The expanding utilization of groundwater in the western part of Kansas for agricultural
and other purposes has in general led to the depletion of the resource. Thus, a 'mining' situation
exists and, given increasing demand, will continue to develop." LAWRENCE F. KELLER, KANSAS
GROUNDWATER PoucY SEMINAR, KANSAS WATER REsoURcEs RESEARCH REPORT 9 (1975).
"It is recognized that the declining water table in much of western Kansas poses serious problems."

STATE OF KANSAS, INTERIM REPORT OF THE GovERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON WATER

RESOURCES 65 (1977) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]. From 1945 to 1950, 334 permit applications were filed; in the 1950s, 5730 applications; and in the 1960s, 6433 applications. See supra
note 30 (data gathered from WIMAS website water rights tool, by trial and error; by plugging in
appropriation right file numbers to determine dates of filing in the various decades, one can determine the number of applications filed by decade).
122. Act of Mar. 17, 1972, ch. 386, 1972 Kan. Sess. Laws 1416 (codified at KAN. STAT.
ANN.§§ 82a-1020 to -1035 (2015)). A 1968 law had attempted to enable these districts. Act of
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management and conservation of groundwater, prevention of economic deterioration, and stabilization of agriculture.'" Basic "water use doctrine" was to be
preserved, presumably prior appropriation under the 1945 Act. Local users
were to "determine their destiny with respect to the use of the groundwater insofar as it does not conflict with the basic laws and policies of the state of Kan""" Though basic water law was to be preserved, the Act permitted some
local autonomy in establishing standards and policies and in recommending
regulations to the DWR. Local water users created five GMDs in the 1970s in
western and south-central Kansas.' Each GMD has its own regulations that
deal with well-spacing, depletion or safe-yield formulae, metering, and other
such matters.' Although most administrative regulations in Kansas are applicable uniformly throughout the state, GMDs are apparently permitted to have
unique regulations that apply only within their geographic areas.' GMDs once
enjoyed the power to have enforceable "standards and policies,"'" but the 1999
legislature forced all GMD standards and policies to be turned into DWR regulations by March 1, 2000, or they would become void. "'
The legislature amended the GMD Act in. 1978 to enable the designation
of intensive groundwater use control areas (IGUCAs) within or outside GMD
boundaries.'" The chief engineer can establish IGUCAs after a hearing and a
determination that groundwater levels were declining excessively."'
In an
IGUCA, the chief engineer has extraordinary powers-including the right to reduce pumping by appropriators without regard to priority date.' The chief
engineer has designated nine IGUCAs in western and central Kansas.' 3
The Walnut Creek IGUCA, established in 1992, is the most significant.

Mar. 20, 1968, ch. 403, 1968 Kan. Sess. Laws 827. However, no districts were formed under
that statute. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 121, at 45.

123. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1020 (2015).
124.

Id.
KAN. GEOLOGICAL SURV., Ground Water ManagementDisticts, http://www.kgs.ku.
cdu/Hydro/gmd.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
126. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-21-1 to -9 (2015), for Western Kansas GMD No. 1; KAN. ADMIN.
REGS. § 5-22-1 to -17 (2015), for Equus Beds GMD No. 2; KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-23-1 to -15
(2015), for Southwest Kansas GMD No. 3; KAN. ADMIN. REGs. § 5-24-1 to -11 (2015), for Northwest Kansas GMD Beds GMD No. 4, and KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-25-1 to -20 (2015), for Big

125.

Bend GMD No. 5.
127. At least that was my conclusion in 1980, despite KAN. CONST. art. II, S 17, which prohibits enactment of special laws when general laws may be made applicable. John C. Peck, Kansas
GroundwaterManagement Disricts, 29 U. KAN. L. REv. 51, 72-73 (1980).
128. See Act of Apr. 14, 1978, ch. 437, §1, 1978 Kan. Sess. Laws 1713, 1713; KAN. STAT.
ANN. S 82a-1028 (1997).
129. Act of May 6, 1999, ch. 130, § 12(b)(2), 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 832, 839-40. The legislature then amended KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1028 to remove GMD power to enforce standards
and policies, and to limit them to administrative standards and policies relating to "management
of the district." Act of May 17, 2002, ch. 137, S 5, 2002 Kan. Sess. Laws 775, 778-80.
130. A governor's task force study of various water policy issues recommended this change.
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 121, at 68 (specifically, recommendation #14).
131. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1036, -1038 (2015).
132. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1038 (b)(3) (2015).
133. Intensive Groundwater Use ControlAreas (IGUCAs), KAN. DEP'T Or AGRIC., https://agr-icultuire.ks.gov/divisions-progr-ams/dwri/maniaging-kanisas-water-resour-ces/initensive-grounidwa-

ter-use-control-areas (last visited Oct. 3, 2016) (describing the histories and functions of these

IGUCAs).
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Located at the eastern end of the Walnut Creek basin in west-central Kansas is
the Cheyenne Bottoms Wildlife Area, a very important migratory bird stopover
point.' The Kansas Fish and Game Commission (now the Department of
Wildlife and Parks) owned surface water rights for water from Walnut Creek
and the Arkansas River, which was diverted through canals to maintain the water
level in the Bottoms.'" In the next three decades, withdrawals of water from
irrigation wells located in the Walnut Creek alluvium, located upstream from
the Bottoms, caused groundwater levels and baseflow to decline on a long-term
basis.'" The chief engineer initiated an IGUCA hearing in Great Bend rather
than order a direct administration of water rights.' Testimony established that
8
the long-term sustainable yield in the basin was 22,700 acre-feet,' and, yet, almost 80,000 acre-feet per year was authorized under vested and appropriation
rights."' The chief engineer's IGUCA order established two groups in order to
achieve sustainable yield: holders of "senior appropriation rights" and holders
of "junior appropriation rights" (i.e., those senior to October 1, 1965 and those
junior to that date, respectively).o He ordered extensive reductions in annual
pumping by the senior irrigation rights group on the basis that these rights, if
used efficiently, did not require as much water as the permits allowed."' He
ordered much greater reductions for the junior irrigation rights group to achieve
sustainable yield." The order was not appealed, leaving unanswered the constitutional question of whether this curtailment amounted to a taking of property
without compensation.
The order curtailing pumping in the Walnut Creek basin put other water
rights holders and regions of the state on notice of the power that the chief
engineer holds under the IGUCA law, which has led to three further developments. In 1994, for example, four entities signed an agreement to attempt to
solve potential problems in delivering water to the Quivira National Wildlife
Refuge: the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which holds a water right for the
refuge similar to that of the state of Kansas for the Cheyenne Bottoms; the Big
Bend GMD No. 5; the Water Protection Association of Central Kansas (WaterPack); and the DWR.'" In 2000, the Rattlesnake Creek Management Program became effective with the goal of stabilizing streamflow and groundwater
134. DAVID POPE, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND ORDER, IN THE MATTER OF THE
DESIGNATION OF AN INTENSIVE GROUNDWATER USE CONTROL AREA IN BARTON, RUSH AND
22 (Dec. 1, 1992), https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/defaultNESS COUNTIES, KANSAS
2
source/igucas/wc1992.pdlsfvrsn= [hereinafter 1992 IGUCA ORDER]. "[Tihe long-term sustainable yield of the aquifer within the boundaries of the proposed control area ... is no more
than approximately 22,700 acre-feet per year." Id. at 96. Yet, almost 80,000 acre-feet per year
were authorized under vested and appropriation rights. Id. at 21.
135. WETLANDS CENTER, The Eacts About Water at Cheyenne Bottoms, (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://wetlandscenter.Ihsu.cdu/the-facts-about-water-at-cheyenne-bottoms/.

136.

1992 IGUCA ORDER at 95.

137. Id. at 1.
138. Id. at 96 ("ITIhe long-term sustainable yield of the aquifer within the boundaries of the
proposed control area ... is no more than approximately 22,700 acre-feet per year.").
139. Id. at 21.
140. Id. at 102.
141. Id. at 109.
142. Id.
143.

See RATTLESNAKE CREEK/QUIVIRA PARTNERSHIP, RATTLESNAKE CREEK MANAGE-

MENT PROGRAM PROPOSAL 5 (2000), https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/bnt--rsc/
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declines.'" Strategies include, inter ala, water right purchases by the state, a
water bank, and flexibility for water right holders in annual quantities diverted."
The next development occurred in 2012 when the legislature encouraged
voluntary action by enabling creation of local enhanced management areas (LEMAs)."' Unlike IGUCAs, in which either a GMD or a group of eligible members in a GMD may initiate the process by recommending it to the chief engineer, a LEMA can be created only at the request of a GMD."" A GMD can file
an application proposing creation of a LEMA, along with proposed geographic
boundaries, goals, and corrective control provisions."' The DWR holds hearings to detennine whether the statutorily prescribed conditions exist, the public
interest requires control measures, and the geographic control measures are
reasonable."' Possible control measures are essentially the same as for
IGUCAs."' In 2012, the DWR approved the Sheridan 6 (SD-6) LEMA in
Northwest Kansas GMD No. 4, the goal of which is to reduce pumping within
the LEMA's boundaries by twenty percent in five years.
Lastly, the 2015 legislature created the possibility of another type of voluntary conservation measure-water conservation areas (WCAs).'` WCAs and
LEMAs are similar, except that WCAs may be established by voluntary acts of
water users. LEMAs require initiation by a GMD and a hearing, while water
users can form a WCA by mutually agreeing to do so and submitting a management plan to the chief engineer. 3
E.

LARGE WATER DIVERSIONS

The 1945 Water Appropriation Act placed no limitations on long-distance
or inter-basin diversions. Likewise, the 1957 amendments, which prohibited
changes in place of use without prior permission of the chief engineer, placed
no express restrictions on the place of use."' The legislature enacted the Kansas
Water Transfer Act in 1983.15 This act required an application, hearing, and
isc_marnagement.pdF?sfvrsn=2 (last visited Oct. 3, 2016); see adsoJardesnake CrcekManagenent

Plan, KAN. DEr. OF AGRIC., https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansaswater-resour~ces/iniformantin-about-kansas-waiter-riesourices/-atldesna ke-cr-eek-maniuagemienit-phmu
(last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
144. BASIN MANAGEMENT TEAM, RAIrLESNAKE CREEK PARTNERSHIP 3, 4 (2009), https://ag-

riculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/bmt-sc/eightyear-review_12_1_09.pdPsfvrsn-2 (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
145. SeeJohn C. Peck, supra note 64, at 452.
146. Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 62, 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws 382 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN.
S 82a-1041 (2015)).
147. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8 2 a-1036, -1041(a) (2015).
148. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(a) (2015).
149. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(b) (2015).
150. The wording varies slightly, but the measures appear to be identical.
STAT. ANN. § 82a-1038(b) (2015) Kqi KAN. STAT. ANN. S 82a-1041(1) (2015).

151.

Compare KAN.

A LEMA proposed to include an entire county in Western Karnsas GMD No. 1, however,

was rejected by voters there. It would have reduced pumping by twenty percent in six years. See
WESTERN KANSAS GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRIcE No. 11, http://www.gmd1 org/in-

dex.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
152. Act of Apr. 15, 2015, ch. 37, S 1, 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 386, 386-88.
153. Id.; KAN. S-rAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(a)-(b) (2015).
154.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-708b (2015).

155.

Act of May 9, 1983, ch. 341, 1983 Kan. Sess. Laws 1541 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN.
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approval for diversions of one thousand acre-feet or more of water a distance
of ten miles or more,' modified in 1993 to two thousand acre-feet of water a
distance of thirty-five miles or more.' An application is first reviewed at a hearing by a hearing officer, followed by review by a three-person panel consisting
of the chief engineer, the director of the KWO, and the secretary of the Kansas
Department of Health and Environment.'" Statutory factors to be applied include, mt/er alia, "the economic, environmental, public health and welfare and
other impacts of approving or denying the transfer of the water."'" No transfer
is permitted if it would reduce present or future water needs of the basin of
origin unless "the benefits to the state of approving the transfer outweigh the
benefits to the state for not approving the transfer.""o
Johnson County Water District No. 1 was successful in obtaining approval
of the one Water Transfer Act transfer attempted to date."' The city of Hays
owns a ranch sixty-five miles south of the city and in June 2015 filed change
applications for 7500 acre-feet of irrigation water rights tied to that ranch to
initiate a transfer. 6 2 In January 2016, it filed a Water Transfer Act application
to move the water to Hays and Russell.'
F.

RIVERS AND RESERVOIRS

Several events set the creation of the Kansas Water Marketing Program in
motion: construction of large federal reservoirs, enactment of the federal Water
Supply Act of 1958, and amendment of the Kansas Constitution to enable the
state to "be a party to ... works for the conservation or development of water
resources."'" The legislature enacted the Water Plan Storage Act in 1974 under
which the state could obtain storage rights to waters entering federal reservoirs
and sell the water to municipal and industrial (M&I) users." For example, M&I
users, such as the cities of Lawrence and Baldwin and rural water districts in
Douglas County, have water supply contracts with the KWO under the Kansas
Water Marketing Program.
§§ 82a-1501 to -08 (2015)).
156. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1501(a)(1).
157. Act of Apr. 16, 1993, ch. 219, § 1, 1993 Kan. Sess. Laws 851, 851-853 (codified at KAN.
STAT. ANN. S 82a-1501 (2015)).
158. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1501a (2015).
2
159. KAN. STATr. ANN. § 82a-150 (c) (2015).

160. Id. at § 82a-1502(a).
161. Water Dist. No. I v. Kan. Water Auth., 19 Kan. App. 2d 236 (1994).
Press Release from Big Bend Ground Water Management District No. 5, GROUNDWATCities ofHays & Russel/?9 Ranch, (lan. 2016) (on file with author); see also Mike
Corn, Hays Makes Ffrst Filing to Use Ranch Water, HAYS DAILY NEWS (July 13, 2015),
http://www.hdnews.net/news/local/hays-makes-first-filing-to-use-ranch-water/article_15465b42870f-55b2-8746-2c6ca7dd7c77.htnl; Mike Corn, Hays, Russell Get CloserLook at Water TransIcr Plan, HAYS DAILY NEwS (June 24, 2015), http://www.hdnews.net/inews/local/hays-russell-getcloser-look-at-water-transfer-plan/article_317163ae-c3b2-525d-b381-f8dc06e3bc61.html.
162.

ER HI-LITES,

163. Big Bend Ground Water Management District No. 5, supra note 162.
164. KAN. CONST. art. XI, S 9.
165. Act of Mar. 22, 1974, ch. 452, §§ 1-20, 1974 Kan. Sess. Laws 1514,1514-20 (codified
at KAN. STAT. ANN. S 82a-1301 to -1315 (2015)). By 1982, 97 applications to purchase water
had been filed. KAN. WATER OFFICE, supra note 33, at 19-21, tbl. 111-2.
166. KAN. WATER OFFICE, KANSAS-LOWER REPUBLICAN RIVER BASIN at 3-4 (2009),
http://www.kwo.org/Water)20Plan/KWP2009/RptKLREntireBasin_Section_KWP_
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The slow pace of water marketing contracting coupled with the annual repayment requirements of the state to the federal government led to the enactment of the Kansas Water Assurance Program Act in 1986.' The legislature
sought to provide another basis for obtaining funds and providing more secure
water supplies to M&I users.' Users with water rights from both the river and
the groundwater alluvium could establish water assurance districts (WADs)
downstream from a federal reservoir and fund operations with user fees and
bonds."' Instead of obligating themselves with the forty-year, take-or-pay contracts used in the marketing program, a WAD could agree to pay KWO for the
establishment of designated streamflows at specific locations, to be made up of
the natural streanflow and releases from reservoir storage.'
IV. WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE NEXT FTFIY YEARS

Twenty years have elapsed since I wrote a fifty-year anniversary perspective
of the 1945 Kansas Water Appropriation Act."' In the conclusion to that article, I left some questions open about the next fifty years: Will the Water Appropriation Act last that long, or will it have been repealed or replaced? Will
Kansas have adopted the Public Trust Doctrine, strict protection of private
property rights, or some reasonable compromise between the two? Will our
aquifers have been depleted? Will water be moved around the state for irrigation or municipalities? Will Wichita be moving water from Milford Reservoir
to Wichita? Will the federal reservoirs have filled with sediment? Will Kansas
still be litigating with Colorado and Nebraska? Will Kansas be marketing water
to other states or importing water from Canada? These questions are still relevant, now twenty years later.
Coincidentally, in 2014 when my co-authors and I were preparing our panel
presentations for the national conference, Governor Brownback announced "A
Long-Term Vision for the Future of Water Supply in Kansas," in which he
issued a call for action for the next fifty years. After a year of study, drafts, and

2009.pdf.
167. Water Assurance Program Act, ch. 391, § 1-12, 1986 Kan. Sess. Laws 2023, 2023-28
(codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1330 to -1338 (2015)).
168. KAN. WATER OFFICE, KANSAS WATER PLAN, MANAGEMENT SECTION, SUB-SECTION:
LARGE RESERVOIR MANAGEMENT 2 (1985).
169. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1360 to -1368 (2015) (allowing WADs to take advantage of revenue bonds issued by the KWO); seeJohn C. Peck, Kansas Water Assurance Disbics, 40 U.
KAN. L. REV. 903, 919 (1992).
170. Peck, supra note 169, at 919. Three WADs have formed, serving 1,153,000 Kansans,
just less than half the state: Kansas River Water Assurance District No. 1, Maris des Cygnes
Water Assurance District No. 2, and Cottonwood/Neosho River Basins Water Assurance District No. 3. The KAnsas River WaterAsswance DistictNo. I and 7Le Cottonwood andNeosho
River Basins Water Asswrance DisiictNo. 3: Hearing on H.B. 2685 Before the S. Comni. on

NaL Res., 2012 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2012) (statement of Galen E. Biery, Conferee), http://www.kslegislature.org/li2012/b2011_12/committees/misc/cttes_natres_ 1_20120302 07 other.pdf.
For the Kansas River WAD, target flows at two locations on the Kansas River are provided by
releases of assurance water. These help provide minimum desirable streaniflows on this river in
lieu of having MDS provided by statute as is done for other rivers and streams.
171. John C. Peck, The Kansas Water Appropliation Act A iy- Year Peispective, 43 U.
KAN. L. REV. 735 (1995).
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hearings, the governor unveiled the report in November 2014, and it was finalized in early 2015.' It covers many subjects, addresses many problems, and
proposes some solutions. Interestingly, however, one key aspect of Kansas water law-that of priority under the Water Appropriation Act-was deleted from
consideration. "Voluntary, locally driven and market-based solutions" would
be the focus.'" Skeptics might argue that wholly voluntary solutions by water
users themselves will never solve our current groundwater depletion situation
and that more effective action is required to curtail groundwater pumping in the
future, such as: direct state regulatory action, like IGUCA orders throughout
western and south-central Kansas; judicial or legislative imposition of the Public
Trust Doctrine; legislatively enacted phased-in pumping reductions; or impairment lawsuits by holders of senior water rights. But at the very least, the idea of
at least studying "first-in-time, first-in-right" should not be discarded.
There are still thirty years to go to answer the questions posed in 1995. But
some of these questions can be addressed now. The Appropriation Act appears
to be safe; at least, its basic tenets appear to be safe. The legislature has
amended the Act over the last fifty years in the numerous ways described
above-by massaging many sections of the Kansas Water Appropriation Act, as
well as introducing new concepts such as minimum desirable streamflow,
groundwater management districts, intensive groundwater use control areas, water assurance districts, multi-year flex accounts, and dynamic water resources
planning. First in time, first in right remains the guiding principle in obtaining
and administering water rights.'" However, lack of a statutory definition of "impairment" makes it difficult to predict outcomes and decide cases.'" The basic
concept of water rights as property rights seems secure. But Kansas also maintains the usual differences between water rights and regular property rights in
land that makes water rights less firmly entrenched than land rights. For example, water rights can be lost for non-use. Pumping may have to be curtailed in
deference to senior water rights and water rights may be suspended for violations of terms and conditions. Despite the fact that the legislature enacted legislation in 1995 that ostensibly protects private property rights from excessive
regulation,"' developments in the last fifty years have lessened the strength one
assumes of regular real property rights through reduction of annual quantities
in an IGUCA' situation,' imposition of conservation plans and metering requirements on existing water rights,' and imposition of civil penalties for violating the Water Appropriation Act or any rule and regulation, or for violating
On January 2015, the Kansas Water Authority approved changes from earlier drafts. See
WATER OFFICE, http://www.kwo.org/The-Vision.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2016). See also Memo from Vision Team, Kan. Water Authority to All (Jan 30, 2015), http://www.kwo.org/Vision/mcno_ChangesMadetoFinalVision_013015_sm.pdf (regarding changes made to the vision document).
173. Tracey Streeter & Jackie McClaskey, Guest Colnn: Kansas Water Vision-Developnzent of the Second Diai, KAN. AG NETWORK (Oct. 13, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://kansasagnetwork.com/2014/guest-column-kansas-water-vision-development-of-the-second-draft/.
174. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-707(b), (c) (2015).
175. See Garetson Bros. v. Am. Warrior, Inc., 347 P.3d 687 (Kan. CL App. 2015); see also
supra note 101 and accompanying text.
176. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-701, etseq. (2015).
177. See supra notes 134-36.
178. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-733 (2015).
172.

Vision for the Future of Water Supplyin Kansas, KAN.
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an IGUCA order.' The constitutionality of these results has not been tested
in Kansas courts. In regard to recognizing the Public Trust Doctrine as California did in 1983 NationalAudubon v. Superior Court,' the Kansas Supreme
Court had a chance to do so in a stream-access case in the 1991, Meek v. Hays,
and it refused to do so in that context.'
Kansas may experience long distance movement of water if the water transfer project of the cities of Hays and Russell is approved and implemented.'"
Yet, the rebirth of a possible pipeline from the Missouri River to southwest
Kansas appears to have been tabled, at least for the present.'" Wichita has
dropped its idea of obtaining water from federal reservoirs in the Kansas River
Basin, relying instead on conservation efforts and more water from the Equus
Beds created by its aquifer storage and recovery (ASR) project.' Sedimentation
in federal reservoirs is a concern and is being addressed in the Governor's
Fifty-Year Vision.' Water marketing by Kansas to other states seems unlikely
given our own water supply problems, and while many large water diversions
are often suggested in the press, like ones from the Great Lakes or Canada, they
seem unlikely as well, given the costs involved, other demands on federal spending, proprietary claims of local users, and uncertainties due to climate change.
Kansas has hopefully reached the end of further litigation with Colorado and
Nebraska.'"
Other opportunities and challenges may present themselves in the next fifty
years. More reuse of water, such as the Dodge City wastewater reuse project,87
is possible, although reuse itself creates issues in prior appropriation states like
Kansas.'" New innovations in irrigation and conservation techniques may be
developed or invented. Recent legislative developments in state spending and
tax reform could potentially lead to further cuts or even elimination of departments, including the DWR and the KWO. Nothing is certain except that the
179. KAN. STAT. ANN § 82a-737(b) (2015).
180. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
181. State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1357 (Kan. 1990).
182. See supia notes 162-63 and accompanying text; see also Kathy Hanks, A Tale of Two
Cities - MuniCopal Water Issues Plague Hays, Russell, HUTCHINSON NEWS (July 26, 2014),
http://www.kansasagland.com/news/stateagnews/a-le-of-two-ciies-myiunicipal-water-issues/arti-

cle_75b9b704-17e6-5908-8bcb-ac42045cbf42.html.
183. Associated Press, Water Of/ice: MissouriRiver Aqueduct inhkely to be Buit, TOPEKA
CAPITAL-JOURNAL ONLINE (March 19, 2015), http://m.cjonline.com/news/2015-03-19/water-office-missoui-river-aqlueduct-unlikely-be-built#gsc.tab=0.
184. CITY OF WICHITA, WICHITA AREA FUTURE WATER SUPPLY: A MODEL PROGRAM FOR
OTiER MUNICIPALITIES (2015), http://www.wichita.gov/Government/Departnents/PWIJ/
UilitiesDocunents/WICHITA%20AREA%20FUTURE%20WATER%20SUPPLY.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2016).
185. KAN. WATER OFFICE, A LONG-TERM VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF WATER SUPPLY IN
KANSAS 14 (2015), http://www.kwo.org/Vision/rptKansasWater Vision_%2OFinal_%2ODraft
%20012815.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
186. See Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98 (2009); see alsoKansas v. Nebraska, 135 S.Ct. 1042
(2015).
187. Wastewater 7eatment, DODGE CITY, http://www.dodgecity.org/index.aspxPNID=114
(last visited Nov. 16, 2016); Roy Slatteri & Sarah Unruh, New $17-Million Wastewater Plant
Completed at Dodge City, KAN. LIFELINE (March 2012), http://www.krwa.net/portals/krwa/lifeline/1203/018.pcf (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
188. Jay F. Stein et al., Water Use and Reuse: The New Hydrologic Cycle, 57 ROCKY MT.
MIN. L. INSTI. 29-1 (2011).
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next fifty years in water resources management in Kansas will likely be as interesting and challenging as the last fifty years.

EVOLVING WATER IAW AND
MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S.: MONTANA
IRMA S. RUSSELL*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The availability of water or the lack thereof has influenced the evolution of
each state and the laws of each state. The development of water law naturally
grew from the realities of water and other resources in different areas of the
country and the need for water for industry, agriculture, and other enterprises.
The evolution and development of water management in Montana provides a good example of water management in the western United States. From
the beginnings of Montana and of the West as a region, water sat at the top of
the list of essentials for human occupancy and use of the area. Indeed, water is
arguably the defining characteristic of the West. In his overview of geography
and water, Stephen Grace memorably emphasized the irreducible impact of
water in his book DAM NATION: How WATER SHAPED THE WEST AND
WILL DETERMINE ITS FUTURE:
Though the United States as a whole has a wealth of freshwater, the resource
most vital to life is not distributed evenly throughout the nation. The 100'
meridian ... provides a dividing line for rainfall.... Land west of the line,
with the exception of a strip of temperate rainforest along the Pacific Northwest coast and scattered patches of lushness on mountain slopes, receives less
than twenty inches of precipitation-not enough for crops to flourish without
irrigation. Simply put, the West begins where moisture tapers off and dryness
takes over.
While all know Mark Twain's alleged line about drinking whiskey and
fighting over water,' evidence of the competition for water pre-dates Twain.
Water has been recognized as a vital resource throughout the history of humankind. In fact, the Latin root for rival, rivalis, means "one using the same stream
as another."' The word signals the dependency of people on water and the

* Professor and Edward A. Smith/ Missouri Chair in Law, the Constitution, and Society, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the capable
research assistance of Katelyn Hepburn, Traci Hayes, Isaac Straub, and Ryan Hohl.
1. STEPHEN GRACE, DAM NATION: How WATER SHAPED THE WEST AND WILL DETERMINE ITS FUTURE at xi (2012).

2. Whiskey Is lor Dnikhag; Water Is for Fkhang Ovei; QUOTE INVESTIGATOR,
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/06/03/whiskey-water/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2016) (explaining
that, although Twain died in 1910 and the quote "Whiskey is for drinking and water is for
fighting" cannot be found until the secretary of South Dakota Department of Water and Natural
Resources says it in 1983, the quote is often attributed to Twain).
3. GRACE, supra note 1, at 39.
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dramatic nature of the competition for water. Early in the history of the United
States, the move toward a comprehensive approach to water planning failed to
gain support despite the efforts of the legendary explorerJohn Wesley Powell.
Powell warned that a water plan was essential to manage the conflict over water
in the arid West. However, Congress rejected the idea of managing development through creating small communities.' Instead, it encouraged private development and launched ambitious federal projects that made use of diverted
water to deserts and plains.
American water law, including the important issue of allocation of water
resources, is largely a matter of state law. Despite the fact that western states
have similar approaches to water, there are differences among the states, which
are not wholly attributable to precipitation levels. Law and policies vary significandy from state to state and region to region. This point is illustrated powerfully by Stephen Grace:
Wade in a stream in Montana, and as long as you stay within the high water
mark, no one should bother you because it is your right according to the Montana Supreme Court. But cross the border into Wyoming and set foot-or
even drop anchor from a boat-on the bottom of a river, and you could find
yourself being prosecuted for trespassing tinder Wyoming state law. Paddle
down a river in Colorado and you might get wrapped around barbed wire
strung tightly across the current: a common practice of landowners in the state
to keep the public from floating streams commercialized for private ranching
and fishing.'
Although state law is the dominant force in water law and water allocation,
federal law has played a significant role in the development of the laws of the
states. Federal law controls disputes and claims related to reserved federal rights
and reserved Indian water rights. State management of water rights stems from
the inclusion of water as a public resource in the constitutions and statutory law
of many of the western states.!
State appropriative water rights and federal and Indian reserved water rights
differ in origin and definition. Generally, water rights are created and governed
by state law, but Indian reserved water rights and federally reserved water rights
are created by treaties, federal statutes, and executive orders. State courts hear
claims on both types of rights."o Treaties and federal rights preempt state law by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause." Federal law has affected the availability of
4. Howard Berkes, The Vision offJohn Wesley Powell, NPR (Aug. 26, 2003), http://www.
npr.org/programs/atc/features/2003/aug/water/partl.html.
5. Id.
6. GRACE, supi-a note 1, at xviii.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 38.
9.

See JOHN A. FOLK-WILLIAMS & JAMES S. CANNON, WATER FOR THE ENERGY MARKET

19 (1983).
10. See State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 758 (Mont. 1985) (holding Water Use Act was adequate to adjudicate federal and Indian reserved rights and federal reserved water rights).
11. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
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useable water. Under the authority of the Commerce Clause, Congress passed
the Clean Water Act, asserting federal jurisdiction to prohibit the discharge of
a pollutant into the waters of the U.S. and requiring a permit for dredge and fill
of wetlands." In so doing, the federal law has extended significant protections
and has enhanced usable water. Similarly, the Safe Drinking Water Act protects the quality of water, enhancing the availability of usable water." Federal
courts have recognized the duty of the state to act as a fiduciary and to hold
properties such as submerged lands, and waters in trust for the people under
the public trust doctrine." Attempts have failed to state a right to a clean and
healthful environment in the United States Constitution," but certain states have
articulated the right of persons to a clean environment."
II. THE HISTORY OF WATER IN MONTANA AND THE WEST
The importance of water to the history and development of Montana can
hardly be overstated. Montana's first irrigation statute was passed by the Territorial legislature over two decades before Montana achieved statehood in 1889."
In 1865, Montana's first irrigation statute limited diversions to riparian landowners and provided for local commissions to apportion water in times of scarcity.'" Also, in 1885, Montana enacted a statute to simplify the process for establishing water rights." The statute intended to create a record of the right
"both for the security of the appropriator and for the benefit of others who
might desire to invest in subsequent appropriations and who would need to
know the nature of prior rights to which new appropriations would be subject.""
The procedure required the posting of a notice at the point of intended diver-

state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.'9); see Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 (1979).
12. JAY E. AUSTIN AND D. BRUCE MYERS JR., ANCHORING THE CLEAN WATER Acr:
CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF POWER TO PROTECT THE NATION'S WATERS 2

2
(2007), https://www.acslaw.org/files/Clean%2OWater%2OAct%20Issue% OBrief.pdf; Section 404
(last visited Oct
http://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/section-404-permit-program
EPA,
PermitProgram,

9,2016).
13. 42 U.S.C. SS 300f-300j (2012).
14. See District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083-84, (D.C. Cir. 1984);
see also, National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983).

15.

Mary Ellen Cusack, Judicial Iterpretationof Stale ConstitutionalRights to a Halthfid

Environrmen4 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 173, 174 (1993) (noting that attempts to amend the
U.S. Constitution in 1968 and 1970 failed).

16. See Sylvia Ewald, State Court Adjjudication of Environmental Rights: Lessons fiom the
Adjudication of the R4ht to Education andthe Riht to Wlare, 36 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 413,
420-21 (2011) (discussing varying constitutional declarations of Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Montana, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island to a healthy environment, a clean environment, natural resources).
17. Proclamation No. 7, 26 Stat. 1551 (1891); DONALDJ. PISANI, WATER, LAND, AND LAW
IN THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC POLICY, 1850-1920, at 17 (1st ed. 1996).

18.

Id.

19. Albert W. Stone, ProblemsArising Out ofMontana 's Law of Water Rihis, 27 MONT.
L. REV. 3 (1965), http://scholarship.law.umtedu/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle= 1124&context-mir
[hereinafter lioblems Arishigj.

20.

Id.
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sion, including information about the diverter, and, within twenty days thereafter, filing a notice of appropriation with the county clerk." According to Professor Albert Stone," this statutory system was inadequate and allowed for selfserving filings that overstated the use made of listed water and led to "endless
litigation" over the rights."
Like other Western states, Montana's system of water allocation developed
from the legal doctrine of prior appropriation." Also like other states, the system is more complicated than the simple label of "prior appropriation" may
convey." The Montana Constitution of 1889 declared that "The use of all water ... and the right of way over the lands of others .. . shall be held to be a
public use."" Author DonaldJ. Pisani notes the variations among western states
in their approach to prior appropriation law, specifically addressing the attempt
to balance riparianism and appropriation by Utah, Idaho, Montana, Colorado,
and Wyoming."
The legislatures of Montana and other western states embraced the prior
appropriation doctrine, codifying the common law doctrine in the belief that
the doctrine would stimulate productive enterprises such as mining and irrigation." The prior appropriation doctrine was first articulated by the California
Supreme Court in the 1855 mining case of Imnl* v. Phip2js." The right of prior
appropriation announced in Phillips rested on the principle that "courts are
bound to take notice of the political and social condition of the country, which
they judicially rule."" The court notes established norms of diversion and appropriation of water, stating that "a system has been permitted to grow up by
the voluntary action and assent of the population, whose free and unrestrained
occupation of the mineral region has been tacitly assented to by the one government, and heartily encouraged by the expressed legislative policy of the other."
The court also noted the reliance interest of those who diverted water "by costly
artificial works" 2 and the public nature of the property involved." Each western

2 1. Id.
&

22. See David L. Pengelly, In Menorian Professor Albert W Stone, 18 PUB. LAND
REsOURCEs L. Ryv. 1 (1997) (describing Professor Stone as "pinary architect" of Montana's
water law).
23. Pioblems Aliing, supianote 19, at 4.
24. Donald D. MacIntyre, The Ptior Appropriation )octrine in Montana: Rooted in MidNineteenth Centiy Goals-Responding to Twenty-hrst CenturyNeeds, 55 MONT. L. Rrv. 303,

303-04 (1994).
25. See geneidaly id.
26. MONT. CONST. art. III, § 15 (1889), http://www.umt.edu/mediaVlaw/libraiy/Montana
Constitution/Miscellaneous%20Documents/1889_const.pdf.
27. PISANI, supra note 17, at 17.
28. See Reed D. Benson, Alive butIrrelevant:The PriorAppropiajtionDoctrie in Today's
Western Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REv. 675, 676-80 (2012).
29. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (Cal. 1885).

30. Id.
31.

Id.

32.
33.

Id.
Id.
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state holds public or state ownership of the water resources within its boundaries." Accordingly, the rule of prior appropriation from Phillips applies generally to water resources in these states without regard to whether the water is
accessed on private or public lands.
III. GROUNDWATER AND STREAMS - PRIOR APPROPRIATION
Montana's prior appropriation doctrine has evolved over time. The origin
of the appropriation system in Montana developed largely from the dominance
of mining in the early history of the state." The "Colorado doctrine," as prior
appropriation has been called, came out of the mountain states, primarily Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana."
Under the appropriation doctrine, the key factor is that amount of water actually
needed for the specified beneficial use." Recognition of a right to water use
resulted in new property and a new market. In Montana, water rights attach to
the land upon which the water is used and, like other property rights, can be
sold or transferred." The saying "first in time, first in right," describes the foundational principle of prior appropriation:"
A water right carries with it a priority date which is usually the date that the first
act is done to initiate the right. An appropriation having a prior right in time
has precedence over water rights with a later priority date. In other words,
"first in tirne is first in right.""
Montana waters in all forms belong to the state on behalf of its citizens."
Under the Montana approach, "beneficial use" of water is "the basis, the measure, and the limit of [a water] right."" As in other western states, the requirement of beneficial use of water is crucial to the creation and enforcement of
34. See LawrenceJ. MacDonnell, IriorApproprialion:AReassessment, 18 U. Denv. Water
L. Rev. 228, 287 (2015) (citing GEITCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 84-86 (4th ed. 2009)).
35. See Elizabeth Arnold, The 3attle over Water Rights, NPR (Aug. 28, 2003), http://www.
3
npr.org/prograns/atc/features/2003/aug/water/part .html.
36.

ALBERT W. STONE, MONTANA WATER LAW FOR THE 1980s 20 (1981) (citing Mettler v.

Ames Realty Co., 201 P. 702 (Mont. 1921)) Ihereinafter MONTANA WATER LAW FOR THE
1980sl.
37. See id. at 58-59; see also High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, 120 P.3d 710, 717 (Colo. 2005).
38. WRIGHT WATER ENG'RS, INC. & FRANKJ. TRELEASE, MONT. DEP'T OF NAT. RES. AND
CONs., WATER RES. Div., A WATER PROTECTION STRATEGY FOR MONTANA: MISSOURI RIVER
BASIN, at 1-5 (1982), https://archive.org/details/6CF44514-F33D-41A4-B57F-CCOAD3555C58

Ihereinafter
39.

TRELEASEI.

See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Prior Appropriation: A Reassessment, 18 U. DENV.

WATER L. REv. 228, 280 (2015); see alo Charles F. Wilkinson, PriorAppropiation1848-1991,
21 ENvTL. L. v., at vi (1991).
40. TRELEASE, supra note 38, at 5.

41.
(2014),

MONT. DEP'T OF NAT. RES. & CONSERVATION ET AL., WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA 1

http://leg.mt.gov/content/Publications/Environmental/2014-water-rights-handbook.pdf

[hereinafter 2014 WATER RIGHTS HANDBOOK].
42.

UNIV. OF MONTANA SCHOOL OF LAw LAND USE & NAT. RES. CLINIC, WATER RIGITFS

IN MONTANA 5 (2014), https://courts.mt.gov/portals/1 13/water/UMWaterRightsStudy.pdf
Ihereinafter WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA 20141; see also Reed D. Benson, Alive but Irrelevant:
The PriorAppropriation )octrne in Today's Western Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 675,

680 (2012).
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water rights."' In contrast to the riparian rights doctrine established in eastern
states," the prior appropriation doctrine places the burdens and risks of water
scarcity on junior interests." Because the doctrine required no document filing,
there were no clear or reliable records of the water use or the claim of right,
and disputes were supported by oral testimony.
After persisting for generations, the concept of water allocation in Montana
changed when the state congress passed the Water Use Act in response to the
adoption of a new constitution in 1972." Prior to the passage of the Water Use
Act in 1973, Montana's water users faced little impediment to water appropriation. Laws relating to water rights presented a permissive approach free from
strict statutory requirements. To acquire a right, an appropriator simply diverted water and applied it to beneficial use.' Early statutes referred to recording water rights with the state district courts, but the recording was voluntary
rather than required." As a result, factual uncertainty about water rights presented numerous problems and delayed the process of establishing the modern
system.
Montana recognizes the right of all people to a clean and healthful environment, including uncontaminated water." Montana is one of a few states that set
forth the right in the constitution rather than in a statutory declaration.' In fact,
movements to amend the United States Constitution to declare the right to a
clean environment have been unsuccessful." After much debate among the
delegates to the Montana Constitutional Convention, the convention passed the
1972 Montana Constitution which stated that persons have a right to a clean
and healthful environment:
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include
the right to a clean andhealthfulenvironmentand the rights of pursuing life's
basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health and happiness in all lawfil ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding responsibilities.53

The Constitution also recognizes existing rights and, additionally, rights of
the public to water." Before the 1973 Water Use Act, some cases suggest that
to establish a valid appropriation, a user needed to show evidence of a diversion

43.

See Benson, supra note 42, at 681.

44. Id. at 680.
45. See GRACE, supra note 1, at 39 (noting that "damage caused by the region's frequent
droughts is distributed disproportionately" to those with junior water rights).
46. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3; WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA 2014, supranote 42, at 5.
47. See WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA 2014, supra note 42, at 5.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Montana Env. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Env. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1249 (Mont.
1999) (holding discharge of arsenic-containing water implicates the right to a clean and healthful
environment).
51. MONT. CONSr. art. II, § 3.

52. See Cusack, supra note 15, at 174.
53. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
54. Id. art. IX, § 3.
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from a "watercourse" as opposed to temporary waters.". The distinction between natural watercourses and temporary water in Montana led to "cases involving damages caused by diversions or obstructions which resulted in flooding
neighboring land."" In a 1965 law review article, Professor Stone described the
statutory method of establishing water rights and disputed the distinction, stating
that "it should make no difference, in the appropriation of water, whether the
source of supply is a 'watercourse.""' The Water Use Act abrogated the distinction between watercourses and surface waters" and clarified the law of the
area by defining "water" as "all water of the state, surface, and subsurface, regardless of its character or manner of concurrence, including ... geothermal
water."'9
IV. MONTANA'S MODERN APPROACH
The modern approach to water management in Montana is generally regarded as beginning fifty-two years ago. The 1972 Constitution recognized private, existing water rights." Additionally, it recognizes rights of the public to
water." Article IX provides that "[tihe use of all waters ... land] right-of-way
over the lands of others for all ditches .

.

. shall be held to be a public use.""

Section 3 of Article IX states that all waters ". . . are the property of the state for
the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law."' Subparagraph 4 of section 3 directs the legislature to provide
for the administration and regulation of water rights, as well as a system of centralized records of ownership and use to supplement already-existing system of
local records."
On July 1, 1973, the Water Use Act became effective in Montana." The
Act did not destroy the basic prior appropriation concept. Rather, it required
certain procedures for changing and acquiring new water rights post-1973."
Montana's definition of "waters" is inclusive, in that it encompasses "all water
of the state, surface and subsurface, regardless of its character or manner of
occurrence, including but not limited to geothermal water, diffuse surface water,
and sewage effluent."6 ' Montana law limits the acquisition of water rights, declaring that "[alfter July 1, 1973, a person may not appropriate water except as
provided in this chapter."" To emphasize the point, the statute reiterates: "A
right to appropriate water may not be acquired by any other method, including
55. See Meine v. Ferris, 247 P.2d 195, 196 (1952) (citing Popham v. Holloron, 275 P. 1099,
1102 (1929)).
56. MONTANA WATER LAW FOR THE 1980s, supra note 36, at 30-31.
57. ProblemsArising; supra note 19, at 8.
58. See id. at 19.
59. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(26) (2015).
60. MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 3.1.
61. Id. art. IX, § 3.3.
62. Id. art. IX, S 3.2.
63. Id. art. IX, § 3.3.
64. Id. art. IX, § 3.4.
65. See 2014 WATER RIGHTs HANDBOOK, supra note 41, at 2.
66. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-301(1)-(4) (2015).
67. Id. § 85-2-102(26).
68. Id. § 85-2-301(1).
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by adverse use, adverse possession, prescription, or estoppel. The method prescribed by this chapter is exclusive."" The statute also makes clear that all appropriation of water within the state requires beneficial use." Beneficial uses
include, but are not limited to, "agriculture (including stock water), domestic,
fish and wildlife, industry, irrigation, mining, municipal, power, and recreation.""
Montana defines groundwater by statute as any water "beneath the ground
surface."" The fundamental management concepts that apply to surface water
also apply to groundwater. The Montana Department of Natural Resources
and Conservation (DNRC) plays a central role in water resource management
and adjudication." The DNRC oversees the process of water allocation." The
DNRC's 2015 Montana State Water Plan summarizes the work of regional Basin Advisory Councils in Montana's four main river basins in order to address
water management issues on a statewide basis."
The Water Act of 1973 required that water users file with the DNRC to
declare new rights by diversion to put the water to beneficial use." After the Act
came into effect, documentation of water rights arising after the day the Act
came into effect are subject to this requirement.77 As a practical matter, the Act
presented new problems, as it overlooked hundreds of thousands of valid water
rights created prior to the passage of the Act. There was no formal accounting
of rights acquired before the Act, making enforcement of the rights problematic.
To address the problem, the state launched a massive state-wide adjudication
of pre-1973 water rights in an effort to establish with certainty the existing water
rights in Montana." This adjudication included all pre-1973 water rights, and
claims to those pre-1973 water rights had to be filed with the DNRC by April
30, 1982.7' Those asserting ownership submitted over 200,000 claims by the
deadline." The Act declared that failure to file a claim by this deadline would
result in abandonment of the right."' However, the legislature later re-opened

69. Id
70. Id.

85-2-301(3).
85-2-301(1).

71. TRELEASE, supranote 38, at1-3.
72. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(13) (2015).
73. See WaterJesoUres,MONT. DEP'T NAT. RES. & CONSERVATION, http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/water (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) [hereinafter WaterResources.
74.

See MONT. DEP'T NAT. RES. & CONSERVATION, MONTANA STATE WATER PLAN 18

(2015), http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/water/nanagement/state-water-plan/2015
pdL

mt-waterplan.

75. Id. at 2.
76.

MONT. DEP'T OF NAT. RES. & CONSERVATION ET AL., WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA 27

(2008), http://Ieg.mt.gov/content/Publications/environmental/2008waterights.pdf.
77. 2014 WATER RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 41, at 3-5.
78. MONT. DEPT or NAT. RES. & CONSERVATION, WHAT IS WATER RIGHTS ADIUDICATION? 1 (2015), http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/water/ranagement/docs/training-and-education/7
what is-water-righ tsadjudication.pdf 1hereinafter WHAT IS WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION].
79. Id.
8 0. Id
8 1. Id.
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the filing period to allow these pre-existing water users to file." The filing deadline for late claims was July 1, 1996-an extension of 14 years." After this extension, the DNRC accepted no further claim filings with the exception of some
unusual subordination provisions beyond the scope of this discussion."
In 1979, the state legislature created the Montana Water Court and tasked
it with adjudicating water rights and Indian and Federal reserved water rights."
The court had over 200,000 claims to resolve." The court is a special district
court with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the characteristics of existing water
rights, including claims of abandonment." Although the original conclusion of
the adjudication was expected by the mid-1990s, the current projected completion date is 2028."
The Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court appoints a Chief Water
Judge from a list of nominees submitted by the Montana Judicial Nomination
Committee." In addition, division water judges are designated in each of Montana's four major water divisions: (1) the Lower Missouri River, (2) the Upper
Missouri River, (3) the Yellowstone River, and (4) the Clark Fork River." At its
creation, the court had one water judge ("Water Judge") and five water masters
("Water Masters"). Today, the Associate Water Judge (Judge Douglas Ritter)
joins the Chief Water Judge (Judge Russell McElyea).m Additionally, twelve
Water Masters, appointed by the Chief Water judge, and several clerks and
support staff join in this work." Water Masters and support staff are assigned
to particular basins around the state."
V. ADJUDICATION OF WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA
Of the 84 water basins in Montana, only five have final decrees." As part
of the process, the DNRC has examined the rights of each basin, considered
objections and counter-objections, issued remarks and objections, and the court
has issued a final decree relating to the basin. The remaining basins are now
undergoing or awaiting adjudication. Some are the subject of Preliminary or
Temporary Preliminary Decrees and await the issuance of a Final Decree, such
82. TEDJ. DONEY MODIFIED AND UPDATED BY C. BRUCE LOBLE, BASIC MONTANA WATER
LAw 7 (2010), https://courts.mt.gov/Portals/ 13/water/guides/basicaw.pdf.
83. 2014WATER RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 41, at 9.
84. MONT. CODE ANN. S 85-2-221(4) (2015).
85. See generally Water Courts, MONT.JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://courts.nt.gov/water (last
visited Oct 4, 2016) [hereinafter Water Courisl.
86. 2014WATER RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supranote 41, at 8.
87. Water Courts, supranote 85.
88. MONT. LEGIs. AUDIT Div., WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION (2010), http://Ieg. mtgov/
conteniiPublications/Audit/Sumnary/09P-09-summary.pdf [hereinafter Water Adjudicationl.
89. Water Courts, supra note 85.
90. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 3-7-101 to 102 (2015).

91.

Water Courts, supra note 85.

92. MONT. STATE BAR, GUIDE TO THE COURTS 5-6 (2012), https://courts.mt.gov/portals
/113/library/guides/guidetomtcourtpdf.
93. See 2014 WATER RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supranote 41, at 7.
94. See UPPER CLARK FORK RIVER BASIN STEERING COMM., How WILL COMPLETION OF
THE ADJUDICATION AFFECT WATER MANAGEMENT IN MONTANAP 2 (2006), http://leg.mt.gov/
content/Committees/Intein/2005_2006/environmental qualitycouncil/staffnemos/watennanagement.pdf.

WA TER IA WJEVIEW

44

Volume 20

as the Two Medicine river basin." In the majority of cases the court has yet to
begin the adjudication process. As the discussion above suggests, the adjudication of each basin takes many years.
Different divisions within the DNRC and other agencies work together on
aspects of water management, including the Montana Water Rights Division,"
the Montana Water Adjudication Bureau," and the Montana Reserved Water
Rights Compact Commission." The Divisions of Conservation and Resource
Development helps citizens, local governments, and state agencies to develop,
protect, and manage the natural resources of the state through financial and
technical assistance." The Conservation Districts Bureau is responsible for financial and technical assistance relating to water management including assisting
with the Montana Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act, which focuses
on protection of water resources for beneficial purposes."' The Financial Bureau issues loans for public projects, including water projects, and the Resource
Development Bureau runs a grant and loan program that helps with water management."' The Water Resources Division compiles data on water flow
throughout the state, maintaining twenty-four dams and 250 miles of irrigation
canals."' The Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission negotiates water
rights, giving citizens a voice in the drafting of water compacts."' Other Montana
agencies also impact water management. For example, the Montana Board of
Oil and Gas Conservation regulates oil and gas activities in the state, investigating oil and gas operations" and monitoring underground drinking water resources under The Safe Water Drinking Act and EPA regulations regarding
wells."
As part of the adjudication process, the DNRC reviews the history and
95. MONT. WATER CT., NOTICE OF ENTRY OF PRELIMINARY DECREE AND NOTICE OF
AVAILABILITY FOR THE IWO MEDICINE RIVER 1 (2015), http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/water/ ad-

judication/basin-documents/notice
MISSOURI

41m.pdf;

MONT.

WATER CF., PRELIMINARY

DECREE

RIVER, BETWEEN BULLWHACKER CREEK & MUSSELSHELL RIVER BASIN 401J

ABSTRACT OF WATER RIGHT CLAIM 1 (2014), http://dnrc.nt.gov/divisions/water/adjulication/
basin-documents/40ej-part6.pdf.
96. Water Resources, supra note 73.
97. WaterAcludication, supra note 88.
98. Reserved Water Rights Compact Conmission, MONT. DEP'T NAT. RES. & CONSERVATION, http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/eserved-water-rights-conpact-commiiission (last visited Oct. 8,

2016).

99. ConservationandResource Development, MONT. DEP'T NAT. RES. & CONSERVATION,
http://dnrc.nt.gov/divisions/cardd (last visited Oct. 6, 2016).
100.

See MONT. DEP'T NAT. RES. & CONSERVATION, MONTANA'S NATURAL STREAMBED

&

AND LAND PRESERVATION Act (2012), http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/water/operations/docs/floodplain/training/seminars/2012/310 peimitting.pdf; Conservationand Resource Development, supra note 91.
101. Renewable Resource Loans to Pivate Entities, MONT. DEP'T NAT. RES.
CONSERVATION, http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/cardd/resource-development/renewable-resourcegrant-program/i-enewable-resource-loans-to-piivate-entiies (last visited Oct. 6, 2016); Conservation and Resouree Development, supra note 91.
102. Directors Office, MONT. DEP'T NAT. RES. & CONSERVATION (Jan. 2013),
http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/directors-otlice.
103. RIeserved Water I?ghts Compact Commission, supra note 98.
104. Director'sOffice, supra note 102.
105. Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conseration, MT.GOV, http://bogc.dnrc.mt.gov/Boaud
Summaries.asp (last visited OcL 8, 2016).
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rights of a water basin, including pre-1973 water rights claims.o' After review,
7
the DNRC sends to the water court its summary of water rights in that basin.
The Water Court reviews this information, publishes it, and provides notice to
all water right holders in the basin."' This publication begins the first objection
period in which water users review claims and state objections to information
included about their claims and about other claims in the basin they see as inaccurate based on current or historical uses of water."' In addition, and in many
cases, the DNRC places "issue remarks" on the abstract based on the evidence
that it finds about the water right that may contradict what the user originally
claimed.' After the objection period closes, the Water Master assigned to the
basin in question organizes and consolidates claims, noting objections and issue
remarks." All issue remarks and objections must be resolved for every claim
in the basin before the court can issue a final decree, determining all pre-1973
water rights in the basin."'
Typically, Water Masters are able to assist parties in coming to some kind
of agreement, or they may instruct a party to work with the DNRC to provide
additional evidence to resolve issue remarks."' Most cases are resolved by settlement, although some go to hearing. Once parties resolve issue remarks and
objections, Water Masters write Masters Reports, which are essentially recommendations to the Water Judge about what the water right should be based on
the evidence presented at trial, or on a stipulation submitted to the court by the
parties."' Parties have an opportunity to object to the Master's Report."' If
there are no objections, the Water Judge typically issues an Order Adopting the
Master's Report."' If a party objects to the report, the case goes to the Water
Judge for review."' Appeals to a final order go to the Montana Supreme
Court."'
VI. INDIAN & FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS
Indian water rights occupy a special category of rights, trumping all other
water rights with the exception of federal reserved rights. Each reservation in
Montana has a compact with the state, which is set forth in the Montana Code,

106. See Water Resowres, supra note 73; Water Adjudica6on, supra note 88; see also Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, supra note 98.
107. See Water ?esources, supra note 73.
108. WHAT IS WATER RIGHTS ADJUDIcATION, supra note 78.

109.

Id.

110.

UnderstidingAbstractsfor Statements ofClaim in Montana, MONT. DEP'T NAT. RES.

& CONSERVATION, http://leg.mt.gov/content/Sessions/64th/Infonnational-Meetings/CSKr-Com
pact-Documents/Understanding-Abstracts-for-Statenents-of-Claimn-in-Montana.docx (last visited
Oct. 8, 2016).
111.

See id.

112.

WHAT IS WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION, supranote 78.

113.
114.
115.

MONT. WATER RT. ADT. R. 12(a)-(b) (2008).
See MONT. WATER RT. ADJ. R. 3 (2008).
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Title 85 chapter 20. These compacts modified or abrogated original treaty provisions,"'9 and the rights of the tribes may be further defined by litigation. The
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana serves as an example of such
rights by compact. In June 1898, on behalf of the Fort Belknap Reservation,
the Reservation's agent filed for water from the Milk River arguing that the tribal
water rights were reserved when the reservation was created:'
"IT] he waters of the Milk River were 'part and parcel' of the reservation...
and never became pubhlic waters subject to appropriation by any person under
state or federal laws. The Indians, [the tribe's lawyer] maintained, were riparian owners with the right to demand an unimpeded flow in the river, andciting the Rio Grande case-he insisted that the United States had, in creating
the Indian reservations, 'reserved' as much water as necessary to develop
them."'
In August 1905, the Montana District Court granted an injunction blocking
diversions from the Milk River that infringed on the Indian right, and upstream
farmers promptly lodged an appeal that eventually reached the U.S. Supreme
Court in the case of Witers v. UnitedStates.'' In addition, water users posted
notices of appropriation to alert senior appropriators of additional water rights
sought to irrigate crops on the Milk River."' The Supreme Court held that the
rights of the tribes on Fort Belknap reservation pre-existed the right to prior
appropriation by water users, and the later admission of Montana into the Union did not abrogate the tribal rights to water necessary for use on the reservation despite the equal footing doctrine. The Court's determination relied upon
its interpretation of treaties in favor of Indians and the reality that the reservation
lands were arid and essentially valueless without irrigation from the river."'
Indian water rights existed despite the fact that the tribes never filed for
water rights under state or territorial law, nor had the tribes ever used the water." The solicitor general of the United States explained, "It]he Indian case is
exceptional and their rights antedate [the] modern evolution of the law of waters."'. The Court concluded that water rights were implied in favor of the
Indians on the Fort Belknap reservation from an agreement of 1888, in which
the Indians ceded to the United States all their lands except a small tract of
reserved land."' In its decision, the Court noted that the power of the federal
government to "reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under

119. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1901. "The Parties expressly reserve all rights not
granted, recognized or relinquished in this Compact, including but not limited to the iight to the
continued exercise by members of the Tribes of Tribal off-Reservation rights to hunt, fish, trap
and gather food and other materials, as reserved in Article III of the Hellgate Treaty of July 16,

1855 (12 Stat. 975)."
120.
121.

PIsANI, supranote 17, at 46.
Id.

122. Id.
123.
124.
125.

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 569 (1908).
Id. at 576-77.
Donald J. Pisani, State vs. Nation, 51 PAC. HIST. REv. 265, 277 (1982).

126. Id.
127. See Wl'ntcrs, 207 U.S. at 577 (upholding power of Montana government to reserve waters
for use of Indians under treaty and exempt lands from appropriation).
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the state laws is not denied, and could not be." 28
VII. STATE COMPACTS
The quantity of water available to Montana users depends on a variety of
2
factors, including the need for water in other states." For example, in Montana
v. Wyomnng, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an appropriator may increase
water consumption "so long as he makes no change in acreage irrigated or
amount of water diverted.".. The Court held that appropriators in Wyoming
did not breach the Yellowstone River Compact between Montana and Wyoming when they altered irrigation techniques to use water more efficiently by
reducing runoff and seepage back into the river.'"' Overruling Montana's exception to the Special Master's report, the Court held that Montana failed to
state a claim, finding that the Compact did not prohibit the new, more efficient
system as long as the water conserved was used for the same acreage as in 1950,
the time of the compact.' The compact incorporated rights of the users of the
river system under the Doctrine of Appropriation."' Montana claimed that Wyoming increased its water use by switching from flood irrigation to sprinkler
irrigation and that less water reaches Montana because the sprinkler irrigation
system increased crop consumption of water, decreasing the runoff back into
the river.'"

VIII. MINIMUM STREAM FLOW
Although prior appropriations did not offer protection of in-stream flows
in water ways, modern law has begun to offer such protection in the West.
Moreover, the history of Montana reveals a philosophy and tradition of protecting in-stream flows in the waters within its borders. The Montana Constitution
played a significant role in providing protection for wildlife, in-stream flows, and
public access of waterways. Persistent disagreement between wildlife and recreation advocates who want to protect in-stream flow and appropriators shows
that issues of use go beyond whose claim is senior. The disagreements include
philosophical debates about the best use of resources and the legal doctrines
that effectuate these uses. For example, beneficial use under the prior appropriation approach does not focus on benefits to society but, rather, on benefits
to the individual seeking to use the water. Leaving a resource untouched in its
natural setting seems to be harder than active consumptive use, as the protections of in-stream water flows is a fairly recent development.
Historically, the West's water laws and practices evolved to promote "offstream use"-taking water out of stream channels. The laws were weighted
toward the individual's right to remove water from a stream for private gain,

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 372, 378 (2011).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 371,383.
Id.
Id. at 370 (2011).

135.

GRACE, supra note 1, at 150.
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which often came at the expense of the public good of leaving water in rivers
to support ecological, aesthetic, and recreational values. As economies across
the West surged, screams were dammed, ditched, and diverted until their beds
were nearly bare. Many rivers became toxic trickles because they didn't carry
enough volume to dilute poisons and flush themselves clean."
The Montana Supreme Court recognizes the Montana Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks' duty to "represent the public interests in regard to recreational use of Montana waters."1 7 The court noted the Montana Constitution's
recognition of in-stream, recreational use of Montana waters, by quoting the
Constitution's statement that "[a]ll ... waters within the boundaries of the state
are the property of the state for use of its people."'" In 2011, the Montana
Supreme Court articulated an even more emphatic statement of the rights of
Montanans to use the waters of the state for recreation in Montana 7out Un33
lmited v. Beaverhead Water Company.
The court stated that the people own
the waters of the state, "[the waters in Montana are the property of the State of
Montana for the use of its people. Under the Montana Constitution and the
public trust doctrine, the public owns an instream, non-diversionary right to the
recreational use of the State's navigable surface waters."'"
Numerous provisions of Montana law mention in-stream flows." For example, the code extends statutory protection of in-stream flows in some cases
to "protect, maintain, or enhance streamnflows to benefit the fishery resource"'
and a "temporary change in appropriation rights to maintain or enhance instream flow to benefit the fishery resource.".. The Montana Supreme Court
recognizes the right to access waters for the purpose of recreation such as hunting and fishing."' Complementarily, the state protects the public's right to access
rivers.'" For example, bridge crossings on the Ruby River allow the public to
access waters for fishing and floating."' The Montana Supreme Court also recognizes the use of water as a public use under the state constitution." In the
1897 case Fitzpatick v. Mongomery, the court upheld a jury award of $150
($4,199.25 in 2016 dollars)' 8 against a miner who allowed waste to ruin a stream
designated for agricultural purposes."' Defendant operated a placer mine above

136.

GRACE, supra note 1, at 150.
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plaintiffs property.' Plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently operated
the mine, causing debris to flow down and destroy his agricultural property.'
The court held the miner violated a common law principle against destruction
of neighboring land by debris' because use of water resources is not allowed
3
for uses that destroy the lands of others.' The court recognized that appropriated use of water does not amount to ownership because "the use of water in
3
this state is declared by the constitution to be a public use."' Again, the court
reasoned that doctrine of appropriation in Montana limits the beneficial use of
water to uses that have a useful purpose, and a negligent, harmful use falls out55
side the appropriation doctrine.
In Montana Trout Unhmited v. Beaverhead Water Co., the court addressed whether an entity other than the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife
and Parks had standing to object to a water right by citing the amount of water
available for recreational use."' In its discussion, the court reinforced the public's constitutional right to access water in Montana."' The court held that since
the waters of Montana are held in public trust for the benefit of the people of
the state, Montana Trout Unlimited "has a sufficient ownership interest in water
or its use to demonstrate 'good cause' to require the Water Court to hold a
hearing or hearings on its objections under § 85-2-223, MCA."
IX. PUBLIC TRUST DoCTRINE

&

'

The public trust doctrine is an ancient principle of Anglo-American law'
that recognizes the fiduciary duty of the government to its citizens to protect
water resources and other resources.' Professor Joseph L. Sax heralded and
garnered attention for the doctrine in the United States, beginning with his famous 1970 article in the Michigan Law Review, "The Public Trust Doctrine in
6
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention."
The Montana Constitution and the Montana Supreme Court recognize the
public trust doctrine. In Galt v. State by & through Dep't of Fish, Wildlife
Parks, the court held that the trust grants public ownership in water except for
water in the beds and banks of streams."' The court also noted that "the public
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Trust Doctrinein lubhc Land Law, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 269, 315 (1980)).
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has the right to use the water for recreational purposes and minimal use of underlying and adjoining real estate essential to enjoyment of its ownership in water, there is no attendant right that such use be as convenient, productive, and
comfortable as possible."6 3 Judicial decisions and scholarship developed the
concept of the Public Trust Doctrine, which establishes that "navigable waters
are preserved for the public use, and that the state is responsible for protecting
the public's right to the use."'. Generally regarded as a matter of state law," the
doctrine presents a general principle of protection of waters, even to the point
of unwinding transactions shown to be contrary to the public interest.' Professor Michelle Bryan detailed the evolution of state public trust doctrines and
recommended steps for Western states to bring water laws into alignment, suggesting that "agencies must assess how proposed water appropriations will impact the public trust, and appropriators must understand that the trust limits
their private rights of use."'6
X.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

Montana grappled with the issue of short supply of water well before it
achieved statehood. Not surprisingly, the intricacies and inconsistencies of judicial, legislative, administrative, and constitutional considerations continue to
pose challenges for the people and the economy. The prior appropriation doctrine has drawn criticism, often on the issue of waste, with opponents finding:
The problem is that the appropriation doctrine seemingly rewards inefliciency
or at least does not reward efficient use. Although the prior appropriations
doctrine does not grant an irrigator right to waste water, efficiency has never
been the standard. Under the traditional understanding of the prior appropiation doctrine, no incentive to conserve existed at the time the initial diversion
was made. Since the water was free, appropriators had no reason to build efficient irrigation systems. 168
Today, the demand for water farexceeds the demand of the 1850s.'" Moreover, the supply of water is dwindling, raising concerns about the supply of clean
drinking water"' The need for in-stream flow to protect endangered species and
water quality adds pressure for the modern water appropriation schemes, as:

163. Id.
1%hht TustDoctrme, BIACK'S LAw DIcTiONARY (9th ed. 2009).
165. See Alec L. v.Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012), al'dsubnon. Alec L. ex rel.
Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
166. See Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 461-65 (1892) (holding common-law
164.

doctrine of Public Trust establishes ownership of lands under tide waters also applies to lands
beneath navigable waters is not within the legislative power of the state to abdicate by a grant
surrendering the property and control over the lands).
167. Michelle Bryan Mudd, Hitchig Our Wagon to A Dim Star: Why Outmoded Water
Codes and "ubhlic Interest"Review CannotProtectthe Puhc 7ustji Westerin Water LaW, 32

STAN. ENvrL. LJ. 283, 286, 288 (2013) (arguing that aflnmative steps are necessary to bring the
West's water laws into better alignment with the public trust).
168. MacIntyre, supranote 24, at 311.
169. See Climate Change, Wate, and Risk, NAT'I. REs. DEF. COUNCIL (July 16, 2010), http://
www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/watersustainability/.
170. Id.
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Strict adherence to the prior appropriation doctrine can and has resulted in a
water development scheme that at times dries up a source of supply or diverts
most of the flows of a stream to another region. Under this scheme, one rarely
finds a balance struck between water development and the value to society of
instream flows, endangered species, water quality, or the needs of the area of
origin.
XI. CONCLUSION
Most of the West has been facing drought for years, straining the supply of
water despite advances in policy and techniques for conservation. The risk of
insufficient water supplies is both real and sobering. For example, California
has over-allocated surface waters, with the result that the water rights exceed the
average runoff, in some cases, rights exceed the water available by five to ten
times.'
The current challenges in the Western United States are likely to continue.' Despite the beauty of green mountain scenery and clear brooks on rock
riverbeds, the reality is that Montana, like the Western water system in general,
faces increasing challenges to water supply and effective water resource management. Water management will always be an important function of state govm
ernment and will continue to pose challenges for water managers meeting the
need for a sustainable economy and a clean and healthful environment.

171. MacIntyre, supra note 24, at 310.
172. Bettina Boxall, Rights to CaliforniaSurlace Water Er Greaterthan Average Runoff L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-california-waterrights-20140819-story.htnl.
173. GRACE, supra note 1, at xix (noting Tree ring data showing the 20' century to be one of
the wettest centuries in the last live hundred years and asserting thatdevelopmentof the urbanized
West was based on a fluke); see abso Michael Wines, Ariona Ciuies Could Face Cutbacks In
Water Fron ColoradoRiver, Oflichds Say, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/06/18/us/arizona-cities-could-face-cutbacks-in-water-from-colorado-river-officials-say.html? r=0.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Interstate compacts govern more than ninety-five percent of the available
freshwater in the United States.' The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over sister-state suits regarding the enforcement and interpretation of these
agreements.! In the past, the Court has used principles of both contract law'
and statutory interpretation' to resolve compact disputes. In Kansas v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court ordered the State of Nebraska to pay partial disgorgement damages for breaching its compact with the State of Kansas in one
such dispute, but declined to grant an injunction against future violations.' The
Court also held that the states had to revise an ancillary technical agreement
specifying how water usage is calculated under the compact to ensure accuracy.
While each of these holdings is supported by precedent and public policy, the
way the Court reached its decision on the technical agreement and denial of the
injunction is problematic. In reforming the technical agreement, the Court articulated a rule that could apply to future cases and clarified previously confusing precedents. To set damages and deny the injunction, however, the Court
1.

Noah D. Hall, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts and Climate Change Adaptation, 5

ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'YJ. 237, 239-40 (2010). See generallyJosephW. Giradot, Note,
Towarda Jationa/Schemeofiterstate Water CompactAdjudication,23 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM

151, 151 & n.5 (1989). Rarely, Congress or the Court has allocated water use for the states by
statute or equitable apportionment, respectively. Id.
2. See L. Elizabeth Sarine, Note, The Supreme Court's ProblematicDekrence to Special
Masters in Interstate Water Disputes, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 535, 545 (2012).

3. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico (Texas IH, 482 U.S. 124, 131 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 351-52 (2010).
5. 135 S. CL 1042, 1057, 1059 (2015).
6.

Id.atI1062n.10.
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relied on broad equitable powers and a misapplication of contract law, rather
than establishing a consistent water-compact jurisprudence. The decision provides little guidance for states in future compact disputes which makes it harder
for them to efficiently negotiate solutions, which in turn makes it more likely
that they will occupy the Court with costly litigation.
II. DESCRION OF THE CASE AND OPINIONS
The Republican River and its tributaries drain a 24,900-square-mile basin
("the Basin") across Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska.! In 1943, those states,
with Congress's approval, negotiated and adopted the Republican River Compact ("the Compact"),' which allocates the "virgin water supply" of the Basin as
it would be if "undepleted by the activities of man" and specifies how much
water each state can take from the river system.' The Compact worked well
until the 1980s when the states clashed over whether water extracted from the
Basin by Nebraska's numerous groundwater wells, which decreased river flow
downstream to Kansas, counted toward Nebraska's allotment.o In 2000 the
Court ruled that this groundwater extraction did count toward Nebraska's allotment, and a series of negotiations produced the 2002 "Final Settlement Stipulation" ("the Settlement"), which involved adopting a computer model for calculating each state's water use ("the Accounting Procedure")." The Settlement
also clarified that in-Basin use of water imported from outside the Basin would
not count toward a state's consumption."
New problems emerged when Nebraska "substantially exceeded" its water
allocation in 2005 and 2006." Arbitration failed to resolve the dispute," and
Kansas petitioned the Court to enjoin further violations and award it "the
greater of Nebraska's gain or Kansas's loss" in damages.1 Nebraska counterclaimed that the Accounting Procedure erroneously included some imported
water during dry years." The dispute gave rise to the case of Kansas v. Nebraska
and the Court referred the matter to a Special Master ("the Master").
The Master found that Nebraska had taken inadequate steps to limit its
water use and thereby "knowingly exposed Kansas to a substantial risk" of

7. The river begins in Colorado, passes through northwestern Kansas into Nebraska, flows
through southern Nebraska, and finally cuts back into northern Kansas. Id. at 1049.
8. Id. Congressional approval of water compacts is widely seen as necessary under Article
I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. See Giradot, supranote 1, at 151 n.5.
9. Act of May 26, 1943 (Republican River Compact), ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86 arts. II, III.
10. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1050; Aaron M. Popelka, The Repubhcan River Dispute:An
Analysis of the Parties'CompactIntepretation
and FinalSetlement Stipulation, 93 NEB. L. REV.

596, 601-02 (2004).
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
Orig.)
dispute
16.
17.

See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1050.

Id
See id.
Idatl050-51.
Report of the Special Master at 9, Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015) (No. 126,
Kansas also sued Colorado, which played a "minor part" in the case, but the primary
was between Kansas and Nebraska. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1051 n.3.
See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1050-51.
Id. at 1051.
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breach." He estimated that Kansas's economic loss was $3,700,000," but he
added that because of local farming conditions Nebraska's gain was likely larger
than that by "more than several multiples."' He did not, however, recommend
granting Kansas all of the remedies it sought. Although he concluded that disgorgement was appropriate to promote future compliance and offset noneconomic harms,' the Master recommended only $1,800,000 of disgorgement and
no injunction because Nebraska had improved its behavior and was on track
for future compliance." The Master also found that the Accounting Procedure
had unfairly included some imported water in Nebraska's allocation, contrary
to the Compact's intent." Thus, he recommended that the Court adopt Nebraska's proposed changes to the algorithm to fix the oversight." Both states
filed exceptions to the report. Nebraska objected to the finding of "knowing"
breach and to the disgorgement award, citing Section 39 ("Section 39") of the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment ("the Restatement"),
which allows disgorgement only for a "deliberate"-but not a "knowing"breach." Kansas wanted a larger disgorgement and opposed reforming the Accounting Procedure.
The Court adopted the Master's recommendations and overruled all exceptions." Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan" first noted that the Court's
authority in cases between states is "basically equitable in nature."" She next
asserted that the Court was empowered to use flexible equitable remedies to
ensure compliance with water compacts for two reasons." First, because states
make compacts as a substitute for enforceable equitable apportionment by the
Court, they presumably do so with the assumption that the Court is empowered
to hold the parties to their agreement." Second, because compacts are federal
laws approved by Congress they trigger the Court's "full authority to . . . promote compliance with ... public law.""
Accepting the Master's factual findings," the Court held the breach warranted disgorgement. Reasoning that some areas of law treat knowingly reckless

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See Report of the Special Master, supra note 15, at 111-12.
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 178.
See id. at 132.
See id. at 112-16, 179, 183.
Id. at 15.
See id. at 23-25, 32-37, 43-57.

25.

Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1056 (2015) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (AM. LAw INST. 2011)).
26. Id. at 1051.
27. Id.
28. Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined the majority opinion. Id. at
1047.
29. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1051 (2015) (citing Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 648 (1973)).
30. Id. at 1052.
31. Id. (citing Texas v. New Mexico (Texas 11, 462 U.S. 554, 567 (1983)).
32. Id. at 1053 (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981)).
33. See, e.g., id. at 1053-55.
RESTITUTION AND
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conduct as deliberate" and that the Restatement only meant to preclude disgorgernent in cases of "inadvertence, negligence, or unsuccessful attempts at
performance,"" the Court held that Nebraska's conduct satisfied Section 39."
Disgorgement would also provide a disincentive against future breaches, the
Court concluded, given that the "higher value of water on Nebraska's farmland
than on Kansas's ... is nearly a recipe for breach."" Noting that the aforementioned flexible equity principles allow awarding partial disgorgement, the Court
agreed that Nebraska's credible commitment to future compliance justified the
Master's small award." Justice Kagan denied the injunction on similar grounds,
citing the lack of a requisite "cognizable danger of recurrent violation" and noting that the threat of future disgorgement awards "will adequately guard" against
a relapse.
The Court also accepted the Master's suggestion to reform the Accounting
Procedure to comport with the states' intention when they signed the Compact
and Settlement, relying on two precedents where the Court had modified "subsidiary technical agreements" to water compacts." The unfairness of the oversight primarily bothered justice Kagan, who remarked that the large mistake
cost Nebraska more than one million dollars and argued that an undetected
error in Kansas's favor could not have been a quid traded for some dickered
quo in Nebraska's favor." She also worried that the unreformed Accounting
Procedure violated the Compact-and thus federal law-by effectively reducing
the amount of the virgin water supply that Nebraska could use."
Justice Thomas's partial concurrence criticized the majority for deviating
from established principles of equity to administer "abstract justice."" He argued that, to preserve state sovereignty, courts should interpret state compacts
more narrowly than private contracts and should use equitable remedies "only
rarely" in interstate disputes." Therefore, he believed that the majority's precedents equating recklessness with deliberateness in certain distinguishable contexts did not justify a nonliteral reading of Section 39 against Nebraska.' He
also criticized the $1,800,000 figure as a misapplication of disgorgement, characterizing it as an arbitrary number that " just feels like not too much, but not

34. Id. at 1056 (citing Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013) (holding that the bankruptcy code's exclusion for defalcation includes a requirement of intentionality
and that intentionality is satisfied by gross recklessness)).
35.

Id. at 1057 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJusT ENRICHMENT

§ 39 cmt.

f (AM. LAw INST. 2011)).
36. See id. at 1056-57 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT S 39 cmt. f (AM. LAw INST. 2011)).

37. Id. at 1057.
38. See id. at 1058-59.
39. Id. at 1059.
40. See id. at 1061-62 (citing Texas v. New Mexico ( Texas l), 446 U.S. 540 (1980) and Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas 14, 543 U.S. 86 (2004)).
41. Id. at 1060-61.
42. See id. at 1062-63.
43.
44.

Id. at 1065 (Thomas,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1065, 1067 (citing Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 351-53 (2010)).

45. See id at 1068-69.
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too little."' Finally, Justice Thomas opposed changing the Accounting Procedure because contract law only permits reformation in cases where the document does not accurately reflect what the parties actually agreed to-not to a case
where the parties agreed to something but were surprised by its consequences.4
The extent to which the error diminished Nebraska's allocation should be
chalked up to the inherently approximate nature of mathematical modeling and
so did not undermine the Compact.'
ChiefJustice Roberts joined the majority on the partial disgorgement award
and the denial of the injunction, but he agreed with Justice Thomas that the
Court could not reform the Accounting Procedure."
justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas's partial concurrence but also wrote a
brief opinion to criticize the Court's use of restatements."o Because restatement
authors have "abandoned" their original mission of presenting "an orderly statement of the general common law" in favor of stating "what the law ought to be,"
he said that their works should be viewed with suspicion and are no more authoritative than any other secondary source.

m.

CRTTIQUE

Each of the three remedy holdings in Kansas-technical reformation, partial
disgorgement, and denial of the injunction-can be supported by the Court's
precedent and may be sound public policy. Justice Thomas correctly stated
that the majority deviated from established contract law, but that departure is
not necessarily a bad thing. The Supreme Court should be empowered to advance the common law of original jurisdiction cases by fashioning new legal
doctrines." This is especially true in the area of water compact disputes, which
are a relatively new kind of case." Rather, the real problem arises when the
Court neither adheres to an existing principle nor fashions a new one. Opinions
rooted only in vague equitable powers are analytically suspect in terms of their
legitimacy" and are of little help in resolving future disputes in terms of their
utility.

46.
47.
48.

See id. at 1070-71.
See id. at 1071-72.
See id. at 1074.

49.
50.

Id. at 1064 (Roberts, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

51.

Id.

52. CA Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (declaring that to
merit a preliminary injunction harm must be "likely" and not merely "possible"); Savage v. Boies,
272 P.2d 349, 350-51 (Ariz. 1954) (allowing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
without physical injury in Arizona); Gassner v. Lockett, 101 So. 2d 33, 33-34 (Fla. 1958) (granting
disgorgement remedy for breach of a real estate contract for first time in Florida); Attorney Gen.
v. Blake, 120001 UKHL 45, 120011 1 AC 268 (appeal taken from Eng.) (allowing disgorgement
damages for breach of contract for the first time in England).
53. The Court's first water compact case was Texas v. New Mexico (Texas 1, 446 U.S. 540
(1980). See Sarine, supranote 2, at 544.

54. Kevin C. Kennedy, EquitableRemedies andIrincipledDiscretion: The Michgan Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. Rrv. 609, 609-10 (1997) ("A decision that rests solely on 'equity'
is an analytically naked, and analytically suspect, decision.").
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TECHNICAL REFORMATION

On the question of technical reformation, Justice Kagan applied a new principle of equity, plausibly supported by Court precedent, that provides transparent guidance to future water compact disputants. This is an improvement to
the Court's inconsistent jurisprudence about the extent to which compacts
should be read literally. In contrast, the Court's refusal to recognize water compacts as unique legal instruments forced it to shoehorn flexible remedies into
the rigid mold of established contract law. This produced a confusing and inconsistent ruling that makes it hard to predict what the Court will do in similar
future cases. As populations grow and changing weather patterns interfere with
water resources, conflicts like the one in Kansas will only become more common. The Court should facilitate negotiated settlements by giving clear, predictable guidance to states about what will happen should they litigate."
To change the Accounting Procedure, the Court for the first time articulated a rule that its "authority to devise 'fair and equitable solutions' to interstate
water disputes encompasses modifying a technical agreement to correct material
errors in the way it operates and thus align it with the compacting States' intended apportionment."" This doctrine diverges from general contract law, but
the Court's precedent supports it, and it may be a good rule for water compact
cases. Most significantly, though, the doctrine is an important step toward resolving conflicting Court precedent about how narrowly or broadly to interpret
compacts.
At common law, as Justice Thomas noted, the general rule is that once a
deal is made "equity cannot make a new contract for the parties," even if the
outcome may differ from what the parties expected." In entering a contract the
parties allocate the risk of such surprise; that the parties had mistaken expectations about how that risk would work out does not change the deal that they
made." Two Supreme Court precedents cited by Justice Kagan in Kansas, however, suggest that this rule might not apply to water compact cases. In Texas I,`
Texas and New Mexico had allocated a river's waters according to the "1947
condition," expressly defined to mean. the condition as described in a contemporary engineering report." When the states later discovered that the report

55. See generally Hall, supranote 1.
56. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1062 (2015) (internal citations omitted).
57. Edwin H. Abbot,Jr., Mistakc ofactasa GroundbrAinmativeEquitable ?ehel, HARV.
L. REv. 608, 610 (1910); accordKennedy, supranote 54, at 645-46; see adso, e.g, Lenawee Cnty.
Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 208, 211 (Mich. 1982) (enforcing "as is" clause in
land sale even though defects unknown to either party made the property essentially worthless);
Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42, 42-43, 45 (Wis. 1885) (upholding a sale of a gemstone that
turned out to be much more valuable than parties expected). But see Sherwood v. Walker, 33
N.W. 919, 923-24 (Mich. 1887) (demonstrating that courts sometimes allow such a surprise to
void a contract under the doctrine of mutual mistake).
58. See Kennedy, supia note 54, at 640-41; cf Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the parties understood their agreement to include some imprecision in
measurement).
59. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas l), 446 U.S. 540 (1980).
60. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas Il, 462 U.S. 554, 559 (1983) (describing the history of the
dispute and the Texas Iholding).
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was erroneous, however, the Court held that the provision should be reinterpreted to refer to the actual conditions in 1947." Similarly, in Kansas If' the
Court replaced a compact's one-year formula for calculating water consumption
with a more accurate ten-year one, holding that even if the change ran contrary
to the signatories' intended methodology, reformation would serve their
broader purpose: accuracy." Although Justice Thomas distinguished those
cases from Kansas,"JusticeKagan's rule is at least a plausible extension of them.
Kansas is an important step toward clarifying the Court's inconsistent precedents about how courts should read compacts. Although Texas land Kansas
Ilindicate that courts should interpret compacts more flexibly than private contracts, another line of cases suggests just the opposite. For example, the Court
held just a few years ago in Alabama v. North Carohina`that courts should read
compacts narrowly to preserve state sovereignty and, therefore, should not read
6
into them a duty to perform in good faith usually implied in private contracts.
The Court has also previously said that its equitable powers in interstate disputes do not extend to overriding explicit agreements holding, in New.Jersey v.
New York' and other cases, that it lacked authority to rewrite a boundary agreement between two states "no matter what the equities of the circumstances might
otherwise invite.""
These two lines of cases show that there are good arguments for both broad
and narrow readings of compacts. The important thing is that the Court should
take a consistent approach, either by choosing one standard or making clear
when it will read compacts literally and when it will reform them. In the past,
however, the Court has alternated confusingly between the two. A series of
cases between Texas and New Mexico illustrates this vacillation. As discussed
above, the Court in Texas Ireinterpreted the meaning of the phrase "1947 condition," despite explicit language to the contrary. In Texas II, however, the
Court took a much narrower approach and refused to appoint a third-party tiebreaker to a deadlocked river commission because it could not give relief inconsistent with a compact's "express terms."" Yet in the dispute's final chapter,
Texas III the Court appointed a river master to manage ongoing disputes, asserting without explanation that such an order was consistent with the same
compact even though it contained no provision allowing a river master."o Thus
if the reformation doctrine expressed in Kansas is consistently followed, it will
provide at least some clarity about how compacts will be read.
61. Id. at 559-63, 573-74.
62. Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas 1), 543 U.S. 86 (2004).
63. Id. at 99, 101-03; see also Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 244-46 (1991)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (describing the majority's reinterpreting of an explicit compact term
to avoid what they perceived as an absurd result).
64. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. CL 1042, 1073 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 351-52 (2010).
66. Id. at 352.
67. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767 (1998).
68. Id. at 811; see idso, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963), overuled on
othergrounds byCalifornia v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674 (1978) ("[Clourts have no power
to substitute their own notions of an 'equitable apportionment' for the apportionment chosen by
Congress."); Washington v. Oregon, 211 U.S. 127, 135 (1908).
69. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas Il), 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983).
70. See Texas v. New Mexico (Texas III), 482 U.S. 124, 134-35 (1987).
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In addition to being reasonably supported by precedent, technical reformation is also a sensible rule. The long-term nature of water compacts" and
the inherent limits of human foresight ensure that compacts will sometimes
need to be modified, both in response to technological advancement and changing circumstances." For example, many early water compacts treat water as a
commodity and may be ill-suited to modern views of rivers as ecological and
cultural resources." Ideally, states should make necessary changes through negotiation, and sometimes they do. But when negotiations fail, as they did in
Kansas, states turn to the Supreme Court." Allowing the Court to arbitrate may
be the least bad option."
B.

PARTIAL DISGORGEMENT

In contrast to Justice Kagan's clear statement of the principle behind reformation, the Court's monetary award in Kansas is confusing because although
disgorgement may have been appropriate in principle, the amount actually
awarded was either a misapplication of it or some other kind of damages masquerading as disgorgement. Disgorgement seems appropriate for two reasons.
First, the majority's reading of Section 39 fits with the Restatement's focus on
the promisor's culpability. The commentary clarifies, for example, that only
the breach, not the resulting profit, need be deliberate." And, as Justice Kagan
noted, the commentary also indicates that only "inadvertence, negligence, or
unsuccessful attempts at performance," which are less within the promisor's
control, preclude disgorgement." In terms of blameworthiness, Nebraska's
knowing breach seems more analogous to a deliberate one than to an inadvertent one.
Second, while disgorgement is a rare remedy for contract breach," water
compacts might be an area where it is generally good public policy. In commercial contexts, contract scholars disagree over whether "efficient breach" is
desirable: society may be better off if A can sell goods promised to B at a higher
price elsewhere and compensate B for his actual loss." With water compacts,

71. Some are almost 100 years old. Popelka, supra note 10, at 597; RobertW. Adler, Revtisiting the Colorado River Compact: Time lbr a Change, 28 J. LAND REsOURCES & ENvrL. L. 19,
19, n.3 (2008).
72. See Sarine, supra note 2, at 545.
73. See Douglas L. Grant, Iteistate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence Becomes de Vice ofInflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 105, 105-07 (2003).
74. Sarine, supra note 2, at 539.
75. CJonathanHorne, On Notlesolidng InterstatcDisputes, 6 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 95,
97 (2011) (characterizing original jurisdiction sister-state suits as a substitute for civil war).
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. b
(Am. Law Inst. 2011) ("[T]here is no requirement ... that the claimant prove the motivation of

the breaching party."); id. at cmt. f (requiring that the "breach be deliberate" (emphasis added)).
See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1056-57 (2015) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
§ 39 cmt. f (AM. LAw INST. 2011)).
78. See Eyal Zamir, ContractLawand Theory: Three Views ofthe Cathedral 81 U. CHI. L.
REv. 2077, 2110-11 (2014).
79. See, e.g., Peter Linzer, On dhe Amorality of C'onactRemedies-Eiciency,Equi and
the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 111, 114-16 (1981). Sce generalyRESTATEMENT
77.

oF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

(TIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 39

cmt. h (2011).
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however, public policy favors performance over compensation for the two reasons Justice Kagan identified: to preserve states' sovereignty over their natural
resources and to effectuate statutes passed by Congress. Yet as she noted, a
situation where water is worth more in an upstream state than in a downstream
one is practically a "recipe for breach."" Disgorgement solves this problem by
making it no longer profitable for the upstream state to take more than its fair
share." The Court embraced similar logic in Porter v. WarnerHoldng Co.
when it required a landlord to disgorge its profits from violating a rent control
statute in order to remove its incentive to break the law." The Court has also
previously recognized that disgorgement uniquely protects a promisee's noneconomic interests." Nebraska's breach imposed large noneconomic costs on
Kansas, including the undermining of its autonomy and the forgone ecological
and cultural benefits of having the river, even though those factors may have
been included in the initial bargain." These costs are hard to value directly, and
expectation damages based on the price of water would undercompensate a
downstream state for such losses." By promoting compliance over compensation, disgorgement avoids the problem of valuation.
The problem with the Court's award in Kansas, however, is that it was disgorgement in name only. The majority said that it affirmed the amount because
the Master properly weighed Nebraska's incentives, along with past and present
behavior, to reach an appropriate amount," but that is not what the Master actually did. His analysis made no weighing of Nebraska's incentives: nowhere
does he state why, or even that, this amount will promote future compliance.
Moreover, the Master considered improper factors, writing that his award turns
Kansas's damages "net of reasonable transaction costs, into an amount that approximates a full recovery for the harm suffered."" Thus rather than properly
focusing on the promisor's incentives, the Master calculated "disgorgement"
based on the promisee's loss." Finally, other than mentioning these factors, the

80. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1057.
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39(2) (AM.
LAw INsT. 2011); Caprice L. Roberts, RestitutionaryDisgorgeinentibrOpportunisticBreach of
Contractand Mikadon ofDanages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 131, 139 (2008) (quoting Judge Posner that disgorgement aims to remove the profitability from breach). But see Marco Jimenez,
Remedial Consdience, 62 EMORY L.J. 1309, 1314 (2013) (arguing that the primary purpose of
disgorgement is to punish, and that contract stability is an incidental benefit).
82. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946).
83. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514-16 (1980).
84. CEH. David Gold, Supreme CourtStruggles with DamageAssessnentin WaterDispute
as Interstate Compact Breaks Dowsn, 29 EcOLOGY L.Q. 427, 429-30 (2002) (arguing the Court's
decision in Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) shows the compact's inability to "meet its
stated objectives" and to account for the noneconomic aspects of water and state sovereignty).
85. See Linzer, supra note 79, at 116-17; see also Gold, supranote 84, at 429-30.
86. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. CL 1042, 1059 (2015).
87. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 15, at 179 (saying only that the award "represents a disgorgement of the amount by which Nebraska's gain exceeds Kansas' [sic] loss").

8 8.

Id.

89. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1070-71 (Thoras, J. dissenting) (characterizing the amount as
either an "arbitrary penalty" or a circumvention of the "American Rule" that the loser does not
usually pay the winner's legal fees); ct Zamir, supranote 78, at 2113-14 (arguing thata promisor's
unjustified gain is not inherently a loss to the promisee).
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Master gave no explanation of how he weighed them to reach a number." Of
course the difference between $1,800,000 and, say, $1,900,000, might be inarticulable, but the Court should have at least given a rough sense of how the
factors should be weighed to produce a number far below the "more than several multiples" by which Nebraska's profits exceeded Kansas's loss."
Calling the award disgorgement also appears inconsistent with the denial of
injunctive relief. As discussed above, Justice Kagan relied on the situation's
being a "recipe for breach" to support the disgorgement award." That makes
sense since the promisor's incentives only need to be altered when there is a
risk of nonperformance. At the same time, however, she also asserted that the
likelihood of future breach was lowto justify making the award small and denying an injunction." The apparent contradiction is not irreconcilable; the Court
may believe that the probability of future breach is generally low but just high
enough to merit a small nudge. This approach would be unusual but not illogical." If that is the case, however, the Court should take special care to explain
why $1,800,000, of all numbers, provides the right amount of deterrence instead of rubber-stamping the Master's analysis that made no such calculation.`
It is also possible that the award was intended to do something other than adjust
Nebraska's incentives. Perhaps the Court agreed with the Master that Kansas
should be compensated for its transaction costs. Or maybe the Court intended
the damages to be punitive; dicta in Texas III hinted that the most culpable
breaches might merit "additional sanctions."" If the Court had either of these
aims, however, it should have said so clearly instead of distorting contract law
by calling its award disgorgement.
C.

STANDARD FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Finally, the Court's opinion does nothing to clarify the appropriate standard
for injunctive relief in interstate disputes. Although Justice Kagan implied that
compact cases would require the same "cognizable danger of recurrent violation" as other injunctions, she did not explain how strict that standard is or how
it should be applied in an interstate water case." The Court's opinion leaves
unresolved a pair of seemingly contradictory precedents. In North Dakota v.
Minesota, the Court held that sovereignty concerns preclude an Interstate injunction unless the complainant state establishes a threat of "serious magnitude"
by clear and convincing evidence." In Texas III, however, the Court issued an
injunction requiring New Mexico to comply with the reformed compact even

90. See Report of the Special Master, supranote 15, at 179-80.
91. See id. at 178.
92. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1057.
93. Id. at 1059.
94. Cf Roberts, supranote 81, at 139 (suggesting that elTective disgorgement must completely
eliminate the profitability of breach).
95. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1056-58.
96. Texas v. New Mexico (Texas Ill), 482 U.S. 124, 132 (1987).
97. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1059 (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,
633 (1953)).
98. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923) (quoting New York v. New Jcrsey,
256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921)).
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though New Mexico had acted in good faith up until then." By failing to either
overrule Texas Illor explain why that case satisfied the "cognizable danger"
standard while Kansas did not, the Court has left future disputants without guidance on when a state suffering compact breach is entitled to an injunction.
The majority in Kansas based its holdings on broad powers of equity in
interstate disputes, violating the principle that modern equity is subject to constraints by rules and standards. But the Court could have reached the same
results by clarifying general principles for fesolving water compact cases. The
Court partially did this on the question of compact interpretation, adopting a
rule that ancillary technical agreements can be reformed to fit the compact's
intended allocation."o The Court should have similarly explained its damages
award-either by establishing a balancing test for flexible disgorgement remedies
based on the threat of future breach or by classifying the damages as something
other than disgorgement-and should have clarified the standard behind its denial of injunctive relief, especially by either distinguishing or overruling Texas
III
IV. CONCLUSION
The Constitution's compact clause encourages states to settle their disputes
through peaceful negotiation.'" Predictability in how the Court will enforce
those agreements is necessary for states to make informed decisions about how
to maintain and modify them as circumstances change.o' Had the Court officially embraced or repudiated technical reformation earlier, a major part of the
Kansas suit could have been settled well before trial. Its adopting such a rule in
Kansas is a step toward creating a coherent water compact jurisprudence. Until
the Court does the same on the questions of damages and injunctions, the justices will continue to face lawsuits between states that cannot make informed
decisions to settle water disputes out of court.

99. See Texas III, 482 U.S. at 129, 133 (1987).
100. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1062.
101. Allan Erbsen, HorizontalFederalism, 93 MINN. L. REv. 493, 534 (2008).
102. Decisions that rely on standardless equity powers give parties out of possession an incentive to sue rather than negotiate. See Home, supra note 75, at 102-03 (discussing the "perverse
logical madness" incentivized by the Court's "erratic results" based on "equity" in water compact
cases); see also Sarine, supranote 2, at 546.
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ABSTRACT
The southwestern United States, which produces a lageportion of the nation'slbod supply, continues to experience severe waterscarcitychallenges. Although some olthis scarcityis due to persistent drought condkions, much of the
problem is attributableto shortcomings in the county's watermanagementpolicies. Governments in the region micreasingly adopt laws seeking to compel
residentialwater users to cut back on water use, yet manl armers continue receiving sisable crop insurance subsidies that effectively encourage wasteful irigationpractices. This Article examines the prinaiypolicy factors contributing
to the growingseverity andpersistenceof water scarcilyproblems in the southwestern UnitedStates and examines how the kderalEvrm Bil and water rikhts
laws aflect water use in the Southwest. The Article then proposes potential
means for addressingthese challenges, including revisions to agriculturalsubsidyprogramscapable ofincentivizmg greaterwater conservation and strategies
for adjusting water rights laws to betterpromote water-ellicientirrigationprac-

tices.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, California, suffering under extreme constraints on water
supplies, began adopting aggressive policies to encourage or compel residents
to cut back on water usage.' Although El Niflo conditions struck California with
great force in the beginning of 2016, bringing some additional moisture into the
region, it is increasingly evident that this spike in heavy rainfall will not be
enough to remedy the effects of years of ongoing drought.! Unless governments
embrace substantial policy changes capable of addressing this growing problem,
the Southwest's water challenges could ultimately reduce the quality of life for
millions of Americans and weaken the United States' economy.
Water scarcity has long been a challenge throughout much of the southwestern United States, a region with a naturally arid climate and relatively few
large rivers capable of supporting sizeable populations." Accordingly, those who
settled the Southwest more than a century ago had to find creative ways to make

1. Exec. Order No. B-29-15 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/4.1.15_ExecutiveOrder.pdf; Matt Stevens ct al., Emergency 25% cut in California cities' water use appove,
L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-water-regulations20150504-story.htnl; Adam Nagourney, CabomiaImposes MrstMandatoiy WaterResiictions
To Deal With Drought, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/us/california-imposes-first-ever-water-restrictions-to-deal-with-clrought.htnl?_r=0.
2. See Anne Brice, The State, the Droughtand El Nino-A Complicated Relationshio,
PHYS ORG (January 15, 2016), http://phys.org/news/2016-01-state-clrought-el-ninoa-complicated.html (explaining that California's groundwater resources are so depleted that higher-thianaverage precipitation from storrnwater will not restore hydrological systems to drought-resistant
levels).
3. See Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Colorado River Basin Water
Supply and Demand Study 3 (Dec. 2012) (hereinafter Colorado River Basin Water Supply],
available at http:// www.usbr.gov/lc/region/prograins/crbstudy/finalreport/Executive%20Summary/CRBS_ ExecutiveSummaryFINAL.pdf; see also Glen M. MacDonald, Water climate
chuige, andsustainabilityiqdie southwest, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. AM. 21256, 21256,

21258 (2010).
4.

See Colorado River Basin Water Supply supra note 3.
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the limited availability of water meet their needs.' As populations in the region
grew and California's agricultural sector matured over time, its irrigation of the
limited resource intensified.! This discrepancy between water supply and demand could affect the national economy, because California is the leading agricultural state in the country.! Population growth, combined with ongoing
drought conditions and unsustainable practices, have culminated in a crisis
throughout the Southwest that requires proactive governmental intervention.
This Article explores what governments can do to better confront the water
scarcity crisis facing California and its neighboring states, and ultimately argues
that action should be taken on both the federal and state levels to better prepare
the Southwest for risks associated with perpetual drought. Part I describes the
severity and primary causes of the water crisis in the southwestern United States,
with particular focus on California and the impacts of its agricultural sector on
the country's economy. Part I also examines how the federal Farm Bill encourages water waste by insuring farmers against drought-related losses.
Part II explains how amendments to the federal Farm Bill could promote
greater water conservation in southwestern farming operations. It specifically
highlights four possible policy strategies: limiting some types of crop insurance
coverage; creating "droughtbuster" provisions that offer less aid to farmers that
grow water-intensive crops in drought-stricken counties; offering grants to farmers who make water-efficient agricultural investments; and establishing "virtual
water" import and export standards to monitor improvements in water efficiency. Part III discusses how policy changes could better incentivize agricultural water users to implement water-reducing irrigation practices.
I. A GROWING WATER CRISIS
It is difficult to pick up a newspaper or news magazine today without reading about water challenges in the Southwest. But how did the water situation in
California and its surrounding states become so dire? This section describes
many of the factors that led to the water crisis and how this threatens the regional
and national economy.
A. SEVERE DROUGHT IN AN ALREADY ARID REGION

The agricultural industry is an essential sector of the American economy
that supports millions of jobs, especially in the southwestern United States. A
recent Census of Agriculture conducted by the United States Department of
Agriculture ("USDA") found that nearly $300 billion worth of farm products
were sold in 2007, and the near half-million farms across the nation employ
approximately 2.5 million people.!
5. Discover our Shared Heritage American Southwest, National Park Service (Dec. 21,
2016), https://www.nps.gov/Nr/travel/amsw/intro.htm.
6. ALAN L. OLMSTEAD & PAUL W. RHODE, CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE DIMENSIONS AND
ISSUES 3 (Jerry Siebert ed., 2003).
7. Cash Receipts by Conmodity, State Ranking, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE (Aug. 30,
2016), http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/farm-income-and-wealth-statistics/cash-receipts-bycommodity-state-ranking.aspx.
8. See Paul Janda, Fire, Flood, Famine, and Pestience: Climate Change and FederalCrop
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From 1950 to 2000, the population in the United States grew by almost
90%.' To support the rapidly increasing population, agricultural production
skyrocketed, acres of farmland increased by almost 148%," and total water withdrawals rose by nearly 12%." In 2000, the estimated water use for irrigation was
137,000 million gallons daily." Although the demand for water is high, the
farms responsible for the majority of water withdrawals for irrigation are located
in western climates that are unable to depend on precipitation to grow crops.
Despite its unsuitable climate, the agricultural industry in California boomed in
large part because its population has almost doubled since 1950." Before the
1988 drought, dubbed one of the most "costly natural disasters' in United
States' history, 80% of the available water consumed in California was used for
agriculture."
In recent years, mismanagement and overuse of water resources in southwestern states have imposed additional strain on the region's water supply, and
California is again experiencing exceptional drought." In 2013, California received less precipitation than any year previously recorded," and 2014 ended
as its third driest year. This is likely part of a long-term drought, and relying
on groundwater supplies will not be an option.'" Despite groundwater pumping
efforts, there will still be an extreme net water shortage and groundwater pumping costs will escalate." Additionally, the drought will cause estimated losses of
Insurance, 26 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENvTL L. REV. 81, 84 (2015).
9. See Nisha D. Noroian, PriorAppopnaion,Agriculture and the West: Caughtin a Bad
Romance, 51 JURIMETRICsJ. 181, 182 (2011).

10. See id.
11.

See id. Total water withdrawals include surface and groundwater. Id.

12. See id. (citing See SUSAN S. HUTSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ESTIMATED
USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2000 at 7, tbl. 2. (2004), http://pubs.usgs.

gov/circ/2004/circl268/pdf/circularl268.pdf.
13.

See id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, UNITED STATES USING L ESS WATER THAN

35 YEARS AGO (Oct. 29, 2009)), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2009_10_29 release.cfm). See also AC. 101: IRRIGATION, EPA's AG. CENTER, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/agl01/cropirrigation.htil (last updated Sept. 9, 2009).
14. See Amir AghaKouchak, David Feldman, Martin Hoerling, Travis Huxman, &Jay Lund,
Recogmze Anthropogenic Drought4 NATURE, vol. 524, issue 7566, 409 (Aug. 26, 2015).
15. SeeJanet C. Neuman, Drought Proofing Water Law, 7 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 92, 99
(2003). The most severe part of the drought lasted from 1987 to 1989; total losses from 1988
alone cost over $39 billion, and agricultural relief payment cost more than $7 billion. Id.
16. US. DroughtMonitorCalilbrnia,UNITED STATES DROUGHT MONITOR (Nov. 11, 2016)
http://www.droughtmonitor.unl.edu/Home/StateDroughtMonitor.aspx; see AghaKouchak, supra note 4, at 409.
17. See Stephanie C. Herring, Martin P. Hoerling, Thomas C. Peterson, & Peter A. Stott,
Erplainihg Extreme Events of 2013 lrom a Cihate Perspective, BULLETIN OF THE AMER.
METEOROLOGICAL SOC'Y S4-5 (Sep. 2014).

18. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CalilorniaDiought: Water Supply and Conveyance Issues
(Oct. 22, 2014), at 1.
&

19. See RICHARD Howrr,Josut MEDELLIN-AZUARA, DUNCAN MACEWANJAY LUND,
DANIEL SUMNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 2014 DROUGHT FOR CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE

2-3 (July 15, 2014), https://watershed.ucdavis.edu/fles/biblio/DroughtReport_23July2014_0.
pdf. (A 2014 study finding the current drought will cause a "6.6 million acre-foot reduction in
surface water," which will need to be replaced in part by pumping groundwater at an increase of
five million acre-feet for agricultural use.)
20. See Howitt, supra note 9 at 3, 10. There was estimated to still be a net water shortage of
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over $200 million in dairy and livestock, and approximately $810 million in
21
crop revenue.
As California's severe drought continues into 2017, it may lead to even
lower groundwater levels, further overdraft of aquifers, increased costs to pump
water, depletion of wells, and land subsidence." Replacing approximately five
million acre-feet of surface water with groundwater cost an estimated $447 million dollars in the Central Valley in 2014 alone and an estimated $6.3 million
in other parts of California.' If this trend continues, the costs for the Central
Valley could rise to almost $460 million for 2016." Additionally, mining the
state's groundwater could deplete the aquifers, leaving the state with little
groundwater resources for the future." Relying solely on the state's groundwater
supplies instead of reducing water use is a short-sighted practice."
B. OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

In addition to drought, there are many factors that contribute to the problem of water scarcity. Climate change, animal agriculture, outdated prior appropriation, inefficient irrigation techniques, and the current state of the Farm
Bill all hinder efficient water management in the region.
1. Climate Change
Climate change presents a unique challenge to water use and management
in arid climates, because dry regions are already vulnerable to irregular water
supplies and other inconsistencies that may be amplified by the climate phenomenon." Although the ultimate effects of climate change on California's
drought are uncertain, higher temperatures and lower precipitation associated
with global warming will likely contribute to droughts in the future." Droughts
in the region occur regularly, but dendrochronology suggests that the current
drought is the worst California has faced in a thousand years." Droughts and
climate change are undeniably worse together than their effects would be if they
occurred alone. " The southwestern United States is particularly prone to

1.6 million acre-feet," and groundwater pumping costs of $454 million from 2014. Id.

21. Id. at ii.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at ii and 3. Robert Howitt estimates these two dry years will cost the California farming
industry $1 billion each year and cost the state $2.2 billion with over 17,000 jobs losses.

25. See generallyJanny Choy and Geoff McGhee, Groundwater:Ignore It, andIt Mht Go
Away, STANFORD UNIV., http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/groundwater/overview/ (last updated
Dec. 19, 2014).

26. See generillyid.
27.

See Neuman, supra note 15, at 98.

28.

Sce id. at 96-97.

* 29. See Julia Fahrcnkamp-Uppenbrink, Cahfornia drought worst im the past millennium,
SCIENCE (Feb. 6, 2015).

30. See Reed D. Benson, Federal Water Iawandthe "Double Wianny", How the Bureau
ofReclamation Can Help the West Adapt to Droughtand Climate Change, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1049, 1050 (2012); see also CidlTojnda DroughtLinked to Hunans, NATURE, Vol. 529, Issue
7498 at 10.
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drought, and with the additional impacts of climate change, there is an urgent
need for more comprehensive preparation for potential "megadroughts" in the
region's future."
2. Animal Agriculture
Water practices in animal agriculture, especially in California-the third
highest producer of livestock products in the country"-contribute significantly
to the Southwest's water problems.' Livestock production-including the production of eggs, meat, and milk-uses one third of the world's fresh water."
Global meat production per capita has grown by over 60% since the 1960s as
both a cause and a consequence of industrial-scale livestock production.'
Large-scale meat production facilities efficiently serve the increased demand for
meat, but have environmental consequences that can catastrophically deplete
water reserves."
Animal agriculture, when practiced unsustainably, threatens ground and
surface water largely due to runoff pollution from animal waste." Raising and
preparing livestock for consumption requires substantial quantities of water, and
a recent study concluded that producing just one pound of meat requires almost
1,800 gallons of water." This figure includes water consumed for growing feed
to sustain livestock, for drinking water, and other water used in production." In
comparison, growing an apple requires eighteen gallons of water.' The current
high demand for water-intensive foods such as meat is unsustainable. A wider
look at trends in agricultural production suggests that consumer incentives, such
as true-cost pricing and labeling, could help to drive the market towards alternative food products." Lowering the demand for products derived from animal
agriculture may lead to more sustainable levels of production.
3. Prior Appropriation
The doctrine of prior appropriation is another major contributing factor to
problems of water use and conservation in the Southwest. Prior appropriation

31. Seeid.at1079.
32. CALIFORNIA
AGRICULTURE
STATISTICAL
REVIEw
2014-2015,
CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF FOOD AND AGRICUI;EURE 85 (2015). Texas and Iowa are ranked first and
second in the United States for production of livestock products.
33. HEATHER COOLEY ET AL., CALIFORNIA'S WATER FOOTPRINT 3 (2012).

34. See Bryan Walsh, 77e Triple WhopperLnbironmental knpact of GlobalMeat Poducdon (Dec. 16, 2013), TIME, http://science.time.con/2013/12/16/the-triple-whopper-environnental-impact-of-global-meat-production/.
35. See David Tilman, et al., Agncultial Sustainabity and Intensive Poduction Practices,
418 NATURE 671, 674 (2002).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 674-75.
38. See Betty Hallock, To make a bwge, first you need 660gIdlons of mater. . ., LA TIMEs
(Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.Iatimes.com/food/dailydish/la-dd-gallons-oflwater-to-nake-a-burger-

20140124-story.html.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Tilman, supianote 35, at 675.
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began as a way to award water rights to users who put water to a beneficial and
productive use, such as irrigation, mining, and even generating hydropower."
This system of water allocation can result in appropriators ignoring the actual
economic and environmental consequences of their actions."
Water users subject to prior appropriation have a disincentive to decrease
water use. Prior appropriation water rights are subject to abandonment or forfeiture depending on the jurisdiction." Abandonment requires that an owner
intend to abandon water rights and actually abandon them." Under the rule of
forfeiture, an owner simply needs to fail to use the water for a statutory period.a
This 'use it or lose it' policy encourages water rights holders to use their entire
allocated amount to prevent their water rights from being diminished or lost.
Western agricultural users are thus encouraged to maintain current and often
wasteful irrigation practices despite the existence of numerous technologies and
practices that allow for more efficient water use.
4. Wasteful Irrigation Practices
Another contributing factor to the Southwest's water scarcity crisis is an
abundance of inefficient irrigation practices in the region. Flood irrigation, the
most common method of irrigation used in the United States, is also the most
inefficient, and is the single greatest consumer of fresh water." The nation's
second most common type of irrigation is sprinkler irrigation, which is more
efficient than flood irrigation but remains vulnerable to extreme weather conditions such as hot and dry or windy weather.- In contrast, micro-irrigation and
drip irrigation are the most efficient and sustainable irrigation systems available,
but are utilized by less than 7% of total irrigated acres in the United States."
These systems provide water to crops in optimum quantities and reach up to
98% efficiency rates, but there are few existing incentives for farmers to invest
in adopting them over their current irrigation practices.50

&

42. See Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Idaho 1974)
(holding the doctrine of beneficial was historically favored certain uses over others, but the definition of beneficial use is not exhaustive); see also Noroian, supra note 9, at 192-93, 201, 203.
43. See Noroian, supra note 9, at 183.
44. See Lin Fehlmann, Introduction to Anlzona Water Rights: Basic Terms, Concepis
Picesses, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 17 (July 20, 2013), https://eplanning.blm.gov/eplfront-ollice/projects/lup/36503/43977/47328/lntroduction toArizonaWaterRights-_rev.
07-15-13_(2).pdf.

45. See id.
46. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 983 F.2d 1487, 1495 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that "[tlhe only requirement to prove forfeiture of water rights is to show a failure to use the
water beneficially for five successive years"); see alsoFehlmann, supranote 44, at 17.
47. See Norioan, supra note 9, at 184-85 (explaining that flood irrigation represents approximately 47% of total irrigated areas, with only 60% to 70% efficiency rates) (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 185-86 (explaining that Sprinkler irrigation represents an estimated 46% of irrigated
agriculture, with efficiency rates of approximately 80% to 95%) (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 186. California agriculture makes up 72% of this total, but largely due to the fact
that it is the country's biggest producer of tree nuts, fruits, and vegetables.
50.

Id.

(citing HEATHER

COOLEY

ET AL., PACIFIC INST.,

SUSTAINING

CALIFORNIA

AGRICUITURE IN AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 39-40 (2009), http://pacinst.org/app/uploads/
2014/04/sustaining-california-agriculture-pacinst-full-report.pd) (stating that the one of the disadvantages to converting to a drip system is the initial investment. However, the costs can be offset
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Implementing existing water-reducing irrigation technologies could greatly
reduce the amount of water used in southwestern agriculture. Three practices
that could be adopted are subsurface drip irrigation, tailwater return systems,
and irrigation scheduling.
i.

Subsudace DripIgation

Subsurface drip irrigation ("SDI") has great potential to reduce water waste
in southwestern agriculture. SDI is between 25% and 50% more water-efficient
than traditional flood irrigation." SDI uses polyethylene tubing or tape to slowly
apply water to the crop root zone.2 SDI systems require less water than sprinkler or surface irrigation because water is applied at the root rather than the
surface, so minimal water is lost to evaporation or runoff." The method also
makes it possible to safely irrigate with wastewater by preventing human contact," thus lessening demand for potable water resources. SDI not only uses
less water, but can even increase crop yields." Additional potential agricultural
benefits associated with the practice include reduced labor costs, energy, and
fertilizer and pesticide requirements. 51
SDI has been used in the Southwest for over thirty years, 7 but its adoption
has been slow.' Unfortunately, SDI requires major up-front investments of financial and other resources." Also, SDI systems require specialized knowledge
to function over an extended period time."o But with proper management, SDI
systems can function for ten or more years."' Financial and information assistance would likely help individual farmers overcome these barriers and boost
the adoption of SDI.
ii. TaiwaterReturn Systems

Tailwater return is another water-efficient irrigation technology that could
by a reduction in operating costs and/or increase in crop revenue as a result of targeted, efficient
irrigation applications).
51. See T.L. Thompson et al., The Potenzd Contribuon ofSubsufice Dri' higation to
Water-SavngAgriculturein the Western USA, 8 AGRIcULTURAL SCIENCES IN CHINA 850, 851

(2009).
52. See R. Troy Peters, Drip frriation for Agricudtural lHoducers, WASH. STATE U.,
http://irrigation.wsu.edu/Seconduy Pages/liTFactSheets/DripIrrForAgProducers.pdf.
53. See Josi 0. Payero et al., Advantages and Disadvantages of*Subsurhe Dip Irrgation,
U. oF NEB. LINCOLN EXTENSION (2005), http://extensionpublications.unl.edu/assets/pdf/
ec776.pdf.
54. SeeT.L. Thompson etal., supra note 51, at 851.
55. SeeJosc 0. Payero et al., supra note 53.
56. See Robert F. Bevacqua et al., Dr lInigation 1or Row Crops, N.M. STATE U. (Aug.
2001), http://aces.nmsu.edu/pubs/_circulars/CR573.pdf; Jos6 0. Payero et al., supra note53.
57. J.E.Ayars et al., Subsurt&ce Dui hcrigalion in Calirnia-Here to Siay?, 157
AGRICULTURAL WATER MANAGEMENT 39, 39 (2015).

58. Id. at 46.
59. See T.L. Thompson et al., supra note 51, at 851.
60. See id.; Considerationsfor Subsuwface Drip frigation Application i Humid and Subhumid Areas, UNIVERSIFY OF GEORGIA, EXTENSION (Apr. 22, 2013), http://extension.uga.
edu/publications/detail.cfinPnumber-C903.
61. See T. L. Thompson et al., supia note 51, at 851; Considerationsfor Subsuraee Duk
IrtigationApplication in Humid andSub-hunid Areas, supia note 60.
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reduce agricultural water consumption in the Southwest. Tailwater is water that
"accumulates or runs off the tail end of fields."" A tailwater recovery system is
"[a] facility to collect, store, and transport irrigation tailwater for reuse in a farm
irrigation distribution system."" Tailwater return allows farmers to reuse runoff
irrigation water. By capturing runoff water rather than allowing it to escape,
these systems enable farmers to reuse water that would otherwise be wasted.
Tailwater recovery systems can also reduce the adverse environmental impacts
of agriculture by reducing the amount of water running off from farmlands."
However, high installation, maintenance, and operation costs may prevent farmers from adopting tailwater return systems.
i. IrrgationScheduling

Regardless of irrigation method, agricultural water users can reduce water
consumption by creating irrigation schedules. Unlike subsurface drip irrigation
and tailwater return systems, irrigation scheduling does not require installing
irrigation infrastructure. Irrigation schedules improve water efficiency by determining the ideal amount of water to use and the ideal time to irrigate to prevent
the adverse effects of insufficient soil moisture." Some growers determine soil
moisture by feeling the soil, but this is time consuming and can result in a yield
loss, even if the grower has a good eye." While irrigation scheduling does not
require new infrastructure, infrastructure like soil moisture sensors can create a
more precise irrigation schedule and this infrastructure has fewer up-front costs
than implementing a new irrigation system; this is not to say, however, that it is
without cost. Soil moisture sensors can be expensive," and creating the irrigation schedule is information intensive. Financial assistance, as well as assistance
gaining necessary information and expertise, will promote the agricultural use
of irrigation schedules."

62. Irrigation System, TMiwater Recovery, USDA, NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION
SERVICE, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSEDOCUMENTS/nrcsl43_026532.pdf.

63.

Id.

64. See L. Schwankl and E. Swenson, Th'iwater Return Systems, http://apps.co.merced.
ca.us/dwnm/documents/DairyTailwaterReturn.pdf.
65. See Blaine Hanson, Larry Schwanki & Allan Fulton, Scheduling Irriations:When and
How Much Water to Apply, U. OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS (1999), http://www.energy.ca.gov/process/agiiculture/ag-pubs/schedulingirr.pdf.
66. See Edward C. Martin, Methods of Measuring for Irigation Scheduling- WHEN,
ARIZONA COOPERATIVE EXTENSION (Jan. 2009), http://extension.arizona.edu/sites/extension.arizona.edu/files/pubs/azl220.pdf.
67. See id Some soil moisture sensors utilized include neutron probes (approximately
$6,400), tensiomcters (ranging from $30 to $2000), or Time-Domain Reflectometry (TDR
probes), Capacitance (C-Probes), and Frequency-Domain Reflectometers (FDR) (ranging from

$5,000 to $10,000). Id.
68. The University of Arizona has developed the Arizona Irrigation Scheduling System program to assist in designing an irrigation schedule. See Edward C. Martin et al., Arizona Irrigation

Scheduling System (AZSCHED), THE U. OF ARIZ. COOPERATIVE EXTENSION (Jan.
2003), http://ag.arizona.edu/crop/irrigation/azsched/azsched.html.
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5. The Federal Farm Bill
The federal Farm Bill has played a substantial role in the Southwest's current water crisis. Subsidies payable under the Farm Bill effectively insure farmers in the Southwest against agricultural losses caused by drought, creating little
incentive to alter water-wasting practices. Specifically, crop insurance policies
under the Farm Bill indemnify farmers from losses that occur during a crop
year, including losses stemming from adverse weather events such as drought."
Due to these protections, farmers in drought-stricken California can afford to
risk growing water-intensive crops in their arid climate. For example, California
still produces 95% of the United States' broccoli and 99% of its walnuts, despite
the water-intensive nature of those crops."
Under the Farm Bill, the federal government is broadly authorized to provide both insurance and reinsurance to agricultural producers for losses caused
by drought and other natural disasters." First, the government provides "catastrophic risk protection" to indemnify the farmers when drought causes loss of
yield." This protection applies when the producer suffers a 50% loss in yield,
and the government provides farmers who suffer that loss with 55% of the commodity's market price." In 2001, the Bill began providing price protection for
farmers, which covers the farmers in the event of a national drop in demand
that negatively affects their crop." In exchange for this protection, a farmer must
pay a $300 administrative fee per crop.'" Importantly, the government "may
limit catastrophic risk coverage in any county or area, or on any farm, on the
basis of the insurance risk concerned."" The farmer may also apply for additional coverage through this program. " If no insurance company is willing to
accept the risk that the drought represents, the federal government will directly
insure the farmer." The government can also limit additional coverage in any
county or area on the basis of insurance risk."
The government collects an insurance premium from farmers enrolled in
these programs to ensure an expected loss ratio that is no greater than 1.0."

69. See USDA RISK MGMT. AGENCY |"RMA"j, History of thc Crop Inswnce Progwiam,
http://www.rmna.usda.gov/aboutrma/what/history.html (last visited October 26, 2016).
70. See Ryan B. Stoa, Droughts, Floods, and Wldlires: Paleo Perspecives on Disaster Law
in the Anthropocene, 27 GEO. INT'L EN'vTL. L. REv. 393, 417 (2015) (citing Alex Park & Julia
Lurie, It 7akes How Much Water to Grow an Ahmond. Mother Jones (Feb. 24, 2014, 6:55
AM), http:// www.motheijones.com/environment/2014/02/wheres-californias-water-going).
It
takes five gallons of water to produce each head of broccoli and each walnut.
71. 7 U.S.C.A. §1508(a)(1).
72. §1508(b)(1)(A).
73. §1508(b)(2)(A)(ii).
74. See §1508(3)(B)(ii). See generally §9016 (discussing the provisions of price loss protection).

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

§1508(b)(5)(A).
§1508(b)(7).
§1508(c)(1)(B).

Id.
§1508(c)(9).
§1508(d)(1)(C).
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However, the government also covers portions of the catastrophic risk protection and additional protection premiums to ensure broad participation." The
government also pays the entire premium for catastrophic risk protection." Depending on the amount of coverage purchased, the federal government may
cover an additional 38% to 67% of the premium." The government also provides reinsurance to insurance providers who cover agricultural commodities."
If the Farm Bill did not provide such generous protections against drought
risk, it is unlikely that a region with such a categorically unfit climate would
house such a large agricultural economy." Indeed, nearly 66% of the country's
crops grow in its most arid regions." To compensate for the lack of naturally
occurring moisture, western agricultural producers largely rely on irrigation to
support crops, whereas eastern producers depend mostly on precipitation." In
2000, such irrigation withdrawals accounted for the use of approximately
137,000 million gallons of water per day, with 86% of the withdrawals occurring
in western states." And, as stated above, flood or "surface" irrigation remains
the predominant method of irrigation in the West," even though it is also the
most inefficient and most wasteful method." Although California is the nation's
leading user of water-efficient micro-irrigation techniques, the state is also the
2
leading participant in wasteful surface irrigation practices.
Given the Farm Bill's generous provisions, it is hardly surprising that the
scope and costs of these programs are growing quickly. The government now
pays approximately 62% of all premiums for participating farmers." These programs enjoy high participation rates that are rapidly increasing." In 1998, the
government insured two-thirds of all crops under the Farm Bill." That figure

.

81. §1508(e)(1).
82. §1508(d)(2)(A).
83. § 1508(e)(2)(B)(i); § 1508(e)(2)(G)(i).
84. §1508(a)(1).
85. See Abrahm Lustgarten & Naveena Sadasivam, Holy Crop, PROPUBLICA (May 27,
https://projects.propublica.org/killing-the-colorado/stoy/arizona-cotton-drought-crisis.
2015),
According to Lustgarten and Sadasivam, "No American law has more influence on what, where
and when farmers decide to plant. And by extension, no federal policy has a greater ability to
directly influence how water resources are consumed in the American West."
86. See Neuman, supra notc 15, at 104.
87. See Noroian, supra note 9, at 182.
88. See HUTsoN ET AL., supra note 12, at 20.

89.

Id.

90.

See Norian, supra note 9, at 184-5.

91. See SUSAN S. HUTSON ETAL., U.S. DEP'T OFTHE INTERIOR, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER
IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2000 at 40, tbl. 14 (2004), http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2004/

circl268/pdf/circularl268.pdf; see also Noroian, supra note 9, at 186.
92. See Ron Nixon, Record Txpayer Cost is Seen for Crop Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
20
13/01/16/us/politics/record-taxpayer-cost-is-seen-for-crop16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
insurance.html.
93. See USDA RMA, supra note 69.
9 4. Id.
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increased to 80% in 2006."' In 1998, the governments total liability for American crops was $28 billion." In 2013, that number swelled to $117 billion."
These indemnities cost taxpayers $10.8 billion in 2011," while agricultural producers received $1.90 for every $1 of premium paid." These subsidies are set
to cost $94 billion over the next ten year.' Meanwhile, despite the historic
drought, in 2012, farming income reached its second highest level in thirty
years. o' Although President Obana proposed cutting crop insurance subsidies,
crop insurance still remains politically popular in the legislature.o2 One scholar
even commented that of all the Farm Bill provisions debated in 2012, crop
insurance was "immune from challenge."'o
These generous Farm Bill protections arguably encourage farmers to engage in riskier behavior-an effect known as the moral hazard problem.' This
risky behavior is perhaps most evident in the case of cotton-a water-intensive
crop-which accounts for nearly one-fifth of all farm acreage in Arizona.o Arizona's significant cotton farming industry exists largely because insurance subsidies cover almost all risk that farmers otherwise face when growing a water-intensive commodity in an arid region."' The federal government covers the
difference in yield that a drought causes, even where water resources are severely limited and farmers might normally lose money."' Moreover, the federal
government lends farmers money to cover their losses without expecting full
repayment when farmers cannot sell cotton at a profit." Thus, in situations
where market price signals would normally incentivize farmers to stop growing
cotton in drought-prone areas or switch to less water-intensive crops, farmers
instead continue to grow cotton in the desert.
Concededly, market indicators from the drought have led a small number
of farmers to switch crops.'" In Kansas, for instance, some farmers are beginning to farm sorghum instead of corn because sorghum requires one-third as
95.
2006),
html.
96.
97.
98.

Gilbert M. Gaul et al., Aid Is a Bumper Crop br Faners, WASH. PosT, (Oct. 15,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/aricle/2006/10/14/AR20061014008 07.
See USDA RMA, supra note 69.
Janda, supia note 8, at 87.
Nixon, supra note 92.

99. See Joseph W. Glauber, The Growth of the Fede-al Cvp InsUrance Programn, 19902011, 95(2) AM.j. AGRIc. EcON. 482, 486 (2012).
100. Nixon, supra note 92.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See Glauber, supra note 99, at 482.
104. See R.L. HEATHCOTE, DROUGHT AND THE HUMAN STORY 179 (2013) (noting that individuals alfected by a drought may expose themselves to greater risk because any loss or injury will
be compensated by government aid).
105. Lustgarten, supra note 85.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id
109. See Janda, supra note 8, at 98-99 (citing Dan Charles, Heal, Dhought Draw Eurmers
Back to Soighum, die 'Carnel ofl'rops' Nat'l Public Radio (Oct. 31, 2013, 4:56 p.m.), http://
www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/10/31/231509864/heat-drought-draw-lanners-back-to-sorghumthe-camel-olcrops.)
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much water."o Although corn can bring larger profits, sorghum serves many of
the same uses at a lower environmental cost."' According to Gebisa Ejeta, who
won the World Food Prize in 2009 for his work on sorghum, if farmers had to
limit irrigation or pay the true market price for water, sorghum would be the
rational crop of choice in several areas of the United States."' Unfortunately,
federal subsidies shield farmers from facing this reality because they do not have
to bear the full cost of their decisions, and thus, the subsidies discourage such
rational adaptation."'
The Farm Bill has been used in the past to implement conservation-oriented policies." In 1985, Congress added the highly erodible land conservation
("sodbuster") and wetland conservation ("swampbuster") provisions to the
Farm Bill." The sodbuster provision withholds government benefits, including

disaster payments and loans, for crops produced on natural grasslands in North
Dakota and its surrounding states."' The swampbuster provision withholds government funds from an agricultural producer unless they agree to not convert
wetlands for crop production."' In 2Q14, Congress decided that federal crop
insurance subsidies should also be withheld if a farmer violates the sodbuster
and swampbuster provisions." Thus, Congress has utilized the Farm Bill to
preserve lands the federal government wished to protect."' Here, if the threat
of drought becomes severe enough, Congress could consider similar measures
necessary to protect lands in the region from permanent damage.
II. INCORPORATING WATER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS INTO SUBSIDIZED
CROP INSURANCE PROGRAMS
Federal crop insurance policies arguably contribute to the severity of the
drought and ensuing water crisis by focusing too much on the reimbursement
of losses and not enough on water conservation.' In particular, some programs
directly compensate farmers or provide subsidized crop insurance programs to
farmers affected by drought."' Such policies shield agricultural producers from
drought-based price signals'" and fail to create optimal incentives to use more
water-efficient agricultural technologies.' Ideally, federal policies should do the
opposite, promoting drought preparedness and incentivizing agricultural users

110.
1 11.

Charles, supra note 109.
See id.

112.

Id.

113. Janda, supra note 8, at 99.
114. Megan Stubbs, Conservation Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bil, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, 2 (Apr. 24, 2014), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R43504.pdf.
115. Id.

116.

See 7 U.S.C.A. §1508(o)(2)(A); §1508(o)(3).

117.

See Stubbs, supra note 114, at 2-3.

118.

See id. at 2-3.

119.

See Lustgarten, supra note 85.

120.
121.

See Neuman, supra note 15, at 105.
See id.

122.

SeeJanda, supra note 8, at 98.

123.

See id.
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to abandon otherwise low-value uses of water."" Adjusting federal agricultural
policies to better promote water conservation in the Southwest could be a tremendously valuable first step towards a more water-sustainable agricultural
economy.
In 2006, the Congressional Budget Office urged Congress to reconsider the
subsidies provided under the Farm Bill, asserting that the subsidies misrepresented price signals and hindered "the transfer of water sources to higher value
uses.""' When a western farm relies upon government aid to make its operation
economically feasible, it impedes innovation and adaptation towards resource
conservation.1 6 This is demonstrated by the continued and unsustainable reliance on irrigation withdrawals and the slowness to adopt more efficient technologies or grow alternative crops.' Thus, the federal government's strategy is at
odds with the serious threat the drought presents to the southwestern states."
A state that wanted to employ a market-based solution to agricultural water
waste, such as increasing the market price of water, would be thwarted by the
safety net that subsidized insurance provides.'"
The Southwest relies heavily on federal agricultural subsidies and this subsidy system allows an inordinate amount of water-intensive crops to be grown
in the most arid parts of the United States. These policies lead to inefficiencies
in the market, frustrating any proposed market-based solution that is designed
to promote the agricultural conservation of water. The following section discusses how to amend the Farm Bill to eliminate these inefficiencies, which
would result in more water conservation and prepare an agricultural economy
for droughts.
Fortunately, Congress does not need to restructure the Farm Bill to address
these problems. Under §1508(b)(7) and §1508(c)(9), the government may already limit insurance coverage in specific areas and counties with increased insurance risk.'" Furthermore, as seen in the sodbuster and swampbuster provisions, Congress has previously amended the Farm Bill in response to
conservationist movements."' Congress could adopt a similar provision that
withdraws benefits from certain water-intensive crops grown in specific counties.
Additionally, Congress could shift to a "carrot" rather than "stick" policy that
rewards farmers who demonstrate reduced water use or who implement efficient technologies. This policy would place farmers who did not follow such
practices at a disadvantage, thereby discouraging wasteful practices.

124.

See AghaKouchak, supra note 14, at 411.

125. CONGRESSIONAL, BUDGET OFFICE, How FEDERAL POLICIEs AFFECT THE ALLOCATION
OF WATER 13 (Aug. 2006), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/re-

ports/08-07-waterallocation.pdf.
126. Seeid.atll-13.
127. See id. at l, 18-19.
128. Seeid.atll-13.
129. See id.
130. See §1508(b)(7) (discussing the USDA's ability to limit catastrophic risk coverage based
on insurance risk); § 1508(c)(9) (discussing the USDA's ability to limit additional coverage based
on insurance risk).
131. USDA, AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION EASEMENT PROGRAM (2014), https://www.nrcs.
usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/prog-rams/easemeins/acep/.
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A. LIMITING INSURANCE COVERAGE AND TRANSFERRING MORE RISK TO
THE FARMERS

Introducing risk into agricultural policy incentivizes farmers to adopt more
water-efficient practices. Congress could accomplish this by compelling agricultural producers to pay crop insurance deductibles and by establishing insurance
rates that more accurately reflect actual water-related risks.'" While crop insurance is certainly necessary to shield farmers from extreme weather events out
of their control, farms that purportedly experience perpetual disasters arguably
should not be allowed to repeatedly cover losses through government protections.'" This is particularly true for farms experiencing drought in historically
arid areas.'" Congress could pass more water-related risks to farmers in these
areas by scaling back insurance benefits as authorized by §1508(b)(7) and
§1508(c)(9).'"
Re-measuring "insurance risk" for drought-stricken areas could take many
forms. For farms suffering losses from drought, the government could require
that farmers meet minimum water-efficiency standards.'" Alternatively, the government could require farms meet certain minimum yields over several harvests. This may seem to frustrate the purpose of crop insurance,' but it would
identify farms that perpetually take from the insurance program and potentially
subsist on federal benefits. Furthermore, this gives farms an incentive to maximize yield and productivity, which could promote the adoption of water-preserving technologies. If regulations allocated more water-related risk to these
farmers, they would face more accurate cost-benefit decisions and many might
be incentivized to grow alternative crops more suitable to the environment, to
relocate, or to close their operations entirely. The government could ease this
process by offering subsidies or grant programs that encourage crop switching,
such as offering payments for newer irrigation technology to farmers that switch
from corn to sorghum, or from cotton to cauliflower.
Of course, there would be heavy opposition to any such changes. For instance, orchard farmers could particularly suffer.'" Perennial crop producers
such as orchard farmers are particularly reluctant to relocate because their crops
demand extraordinary amounts of time and money.'" Growers of these crops
could need a special carve-out from any efficiency or yield requirement to avoid

132.

SecJanda, supranote 8, at 101.

133.

See id. at 102.

134. See Fahrenkamp-Uppenbrink, supra note 29 (discussing how the drought may be the
worst in the past millennium).
135. See §1508(b)(7) (discussing the USDA's ability to limit catastrophic risk coverage based
on insurance risk); § 1508(c)(9) (discussing the USDA's ability to limit additional coverage based
on insurance risk).
136. See §1508(b)(1)(A). The government could also consider the implementation of irrigation practices discussed in Part 1I to be valid risk mitigation.
137. The major purpose of crop insurance is to protect the farmers when crop yield is down.
138. See Kenneth Thompson, Location and Relocation of a Tree Crop-English Walnuts in
Cailrnia,EcONoMic GEOGlWPHY. Vol. 37, No. 2 (Apr., 1961) 133, 148-49 (1961).
139.

See id.
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financial ruin."' On the other hand, the eventual closure of many walnut orchards may ultimately be a cost-efficient adjustment as California's water supplies become ever more precious."' The closing of that industry in an arid state
could create incentives for the planting of new walnut orchards in more sensible
locations.""
B. REDUCING BENEFITS FOR WATER-INTENSIVE CROPS GROWN IN ARID
REGIONS

In addition to transferring more insurance risk to farmers, the government
could take the approach seen in the sodbuster and swampbuster provisions of
the Farm Bill"' and create a "droughtbuster" program. A droughtbuster would
establish areas where certain crops cannot be grown if the farmer wishes to receive federal benefits. This may be the strongest measure to increase drought
resilience because it would essentially "relocate" water-intensive crops to other
parts of the country that can support them."" At the same time, this is the most
controversial method, as the western states with agricultural economies would
likely accuse the federal government of favoring the economies of eastern and
midwestern states." Unlike the states affected by the sodbuster and swampbuster provisions, California, Arizona, and Texas may not want to "conserve"
their deserts, and voters in southwestern states may conclude that they receive
no benefit from the droughtbuster. However, the "buster" provisions are aimed
at conserving natural resources,"' which undoubtedly includes water."' Thus,
while western state politicians may hesitate to support the change, they may internally rejoice; these politicians do not have to make the politically risky move
of "injuring" their own agricultural economy to save their natural resources.
With the addition of a droughtbuster, states can attack drought without the additional problems associated with subsidized farms.
The droughtbuster approach may be unacceptable to many because it involves the government making market decisions with respect to which crops can
be grown in particular locations. The government is arguably not in the best
position to consider all of the market factors of such decisions. Instead, these
choices may be better left to individuals in the agricultural sector to decide
where and when to grow their crops. However, the droughtbuster would actually reduce market inefficiency. The current market cannot be called "free"
because some farms are kept alive by subsidy instead of market performance.
A droughtbuster policy would not make it a criminal offense for a farmer to
140.

Seeid. at 149.

141.

See id.

142. See id.
143. See supia text accompanying notes 114-19.
144. See Stoa, supra note 70, at 436.
145. See Neuman, supm note 15, at 106 ("Although it is sacrilege to ask, would we be better
off as a nation, investing in redeveloping the eastern and midwestern agricultural industry rather
than continuing to subsidize growing cotton and cows in the desert?")
146. See Stubbs, supra note 114, at 2.
147. See genenally USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service, Waci, http://www.nrcs.
usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/water/ (last accessed Feb. 16, 2016) (discussing water as
a natural resource and the USDA's interest in implementing conservation practices).
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grow cotton in a drought area-it would merely remove the federal safety nets
previously protecting such activity.
C. CREATING INCENTIVES FOR WATER CONSERVATION

A droughtbuster program would likely invoke strong political opposition
from agricultural stakeholders. One potential means of mitigating that opposition could be to structure such programs as providing "carrots" rather than administering "sticks."" Specifically, officials could create long-term financial "incentives for adaptation," such as rebates or tax credits for investments in watersaving technologies."' Such a policy approach may be more politically palatable
to drought-stricken agricultural states-it could keep agricultural activities intact
and reduce water consumption, while the federal government foots most of the

bill.
Among other things, the government could establish grant or loan programs
that promote the best practices of irrigation capable of improving drought-readiness. For example, when drought struck California in 1991, some farmers reduced water consumption by 10% without sacrificing yield just by consulting
irrigation experts on irrigation scheduling."o The farmers achieved these results
despite relying on surface irrigation, even when a growing number of other farmers in the state moved to more efficient irrigation methods."' Thus, if the government was able to make the costs of adopting such technology lower for the
farmers, the state could appreciate a decrease in water consumption.`
The subsidized crop insurance program complicates these incentives. Despite the drought and falling yields, the agricultural industry is still making record profits.' If southwestern farmers accept the grant program, it may improve
their yields but interfere with their ability to collect federal insurance."' The
rational farmer would be left with a dilemma: increase the efficiency of his farm
and perhaps fail to recover some of the benefits afforded to him by the Farm
Bill, or reject the grant program, recognize a reduction in yield, and recover
insurance.
The federal government could conceivably create financial "lures" for farmers to grow water-intensive crops in other areas of the country. However, without a change to the current crop insurance program, such an approach could
send mixed messages to farmers. On one hand, the government would be subsidizing price-protection policies to keep the farms afloat in the Southwest. On
the other hand, it would be fostering competition by supporting those same
148. Janda, supra note 8, at 106 (A "carrot and stick" program incentivizes one behavior ["carrot"I and discourages other behaviors l"stick"I).
149. See id. at 101.
150. See David Zilberman, Arid Dinar, Neal MacDougall, Madhu Khanna, Cheril Brown,
and Frederico Castillo, Individual And InstitutionalResponses To The DroughI: The Case Of
'aidorniaAgricuhure, 121 S. ILL. U. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH AND
EDUCATION 17, 19 (2002).
151. Seeid.at22.
152. See id.
153. See Nixon, supranote 92 ("Farmers' net income for 2012 is expected to be $114 billion,
down 3% from 2011 but still the second highest in 30 years.")
154. See id. Loss of yield triggers the insurance payouts.
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crops in other parts of the country. The result might well be an increase in

supply that could trigger price-protections for the Southwest. In that scenario,
the government would effectively pay to both save and kill southwestern farms.
D. INCORPORATING VIRTUAL WATER INTO WATER-RELATED
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS

Water is necessary to create all agricultural and non-agricultural commodities. The water embedded in the production of these commodities is known as
"virtual water."'
Water is embedded in everything from your jeans to your
lunch. Shipping water-intensive products into a different water basin, county,
state, or even country necessarily ships water outside of the area."' It follows
that the trading of water-intensive crops is also the trading of this virtual water.'7
Agricultural areas can lessen the stress on their water supplies by recognizing that all products have water value, incorporating virtual water into their trade
practices, and importing more water-intensive products. For instance, an almond requires one point one gallons of water to reach maturity.' In 2014, this
statistic sparked a trend known as "almond shaming" and prompted people to
make comparisons of crops based on the water necessary to produce them.
While some of these arguments fail to incorporate market value, area suitability,
and demand for crops, they do touch on one key point: water is required in all
agriculture, and growing crops in certain areas requires value-based decisions.
The USDA could determine that arid areas that operate as net exporters of
water are insurance risks. The USDA could then limit the subsidies in areas
that ship virtual water through water-intensive crops without offsetting the exported virtual water through imports. This would require farmers to internalize
the costs of shipping virtual water outside of the arid region. This command
and control model might prompt a coalition effort among farmers and local and
state governments to consider the area's trading practices' net water impact.
However, this solution may not be reasonably tied to an individual farmeF's
practices. If the individual farmer's actions do not directly affect the outcome,
there may be no proper incentive to utilize efficient irrigation practices.

155. SeeJ.A. (Tony) Allan, Virtual Water - the Watei; Food, and Thade Nexus Useld Concept or Mislcadmg Metaphor?, 28 WATER INT'L 4, 5 (2003) ("Virtual water is the water needed
to produce agricultural commodities. The concept could be expanded to include the water
needed to produce non-agricultural commodities.").
156. See generallyRhett Larson, The Case of CanadianBulk Water Exports, U. CALGARY
SCH. PUB. POL'Y, Aug. 6, 2015, http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/canadian-bulk-water-exports.pdf.
157. Seeidat4-5.
158. SeeJulie Lurie & Alex Park, It 7akcs HowMuch Water to GrowanAhnond?. MOTHER
JONES (Feb. 24, 2014, 6:55 AM), http://www.mnothejiones.com/environment/2014/02/wherescalifornias-water-going; but see U.S. Env. Prot. Agency, Turn Offtie ip., http://www3.epa.
gov/watersense/kids/tap-offhtnml, for a public service program requesting children consume less
water when brushing their teeth.
159. SceJustin Fox, Amid a Drought, Cue the Aimond Shammng, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Apr. 7,
2015, 3:51 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-07/california-s-almond-faners-have-become-a-target; Eric Holthaus, Stop Viblijq4 Almonds, SLATE (Apr. 17, 2015, 7:17
PM), http://www.slate.com/aricles/business/moneybox/2015/04/almondsin_california they
use up-a_lot of water but they-deserve_a_place.html.
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Alternatively, the USDA could use a cooperative federalism model to incorporate virtual water into its insurance program. Under this option, the
agency would create a virtual water import and export standard for each state.
States would then have the opportunity to create their own plans to implement
these standards or adopt a federal implementation plan created by the agency.
This solution would require an information-intensive study of states' current
agricultural and trade practices.
A cooperative federalism model allows the USDA to consider which states
are in the best position to import or export a greater amount of water-intensive
products. Individual states would still retain control as to how to meet those
needs. This model protects states' interests in water conservation while promoting trade between states. Absent federal control, arid states could create
more comprehensive trade plans that incorporate virtual water and encourage
the importation of water-intensive products. If a state becomes a net water importer, it could have more freedom to choose which crops it produces.
In summary, there is a wide array of potential policy strategies for better
incentivizing drought preparedness in agriculture. The best approaches would
likely involve some combination of minimum water efficiency standards,
changes to insurance benefits, and grant programs to incentivize farmers' investments in water conservation technologies.
III. DRIVING FARMERS' ADOPTION OF WATER-EFFICIENT IRRIGATION
PRACTICES
Despite the severity of the water scarcity problem in the Southwest, many
of the most efficient irrigation technologies that already exist are not widely implemented. Determining the appropriate water-efficient agricultural irrigation
practice requires a climate, crop, and land-specific analysis. As discussed in
Part I(B)(4), some possible techniques for irrigation in the arid Southwest include subsurface drip irrigation, tailwater return systems, and irrigation scheduling. Creating incentives to adopt water reducing irrigation practices through
government programs and private partnerships can help to solve water scarcity
in the Southwest.
Obviously, if a farmer can use a technique to produce the same yield while
using less water, that technique should be utilized. However, these techniques
are not widely implemented for two reasons. First, the costs may be prohibitively expensive. Second, adopting water-saving techniques may cause the user
to lose water rights under prior appropriation. Creating solutions to these two
issues will promote the adoption of water-efficient irrigation practices.
A. GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
As emphasized in Part II, the USDA could help agricultural water users
overcome the financial burden of implementing water reducing irrigation practices by providing federal loans or grants. Doing so would stimulate the adoption of these expensive technologies. The Southwest plays an important role in
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the United States' food production,' and the federal government might be interested in subsidizing water-reducing technologies to ensure agricultuie continues to thrive in the region and prevent increased dependency on foreign crops.
Even without federal intervention, states themselves can implement loan or
grant programs to help finance efficiency technologies. The California Department of Water Resources currently offers financial assistance for various water
projects."' As of January 27, 2016, these now include Agricultural Water Use
Efficiency Grants."' These grants seek to fund projects that would improve water efficiency and water quality, reduce energy requirements, and provide environmental benefits."' Examples of eligible projects include "water use efficiency
planning, research and development, feasibility studies, pilot, or demonstration
projects," "water use efficiency training, education, or public education progranms," and "water use efficiency technical assistance programs"m The current
California model does not provide direct assistance to private agricultural water
users, as the grants are only available to "local agencies, joint powers authorities,
public water/irrigation districts,.. . Indian tribes, nonprofit organizations, land]
other political subdivisions of the state involved with water management."' 3
However, it is conceivable that a state could provide direct assistance to private
users for the benefit of the public. In exchange for financial assistance in the
form of a grant or loan, private users could turn over a portion of their prior
appropriation water rights to the state, divert less riparian surface water in California, or pump less groundwater. Leaving more water in the stream helps instream uses, like recreational and environmental uses, and helps relieve evaporation issues that affect other beneficial uses.
B. PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Efficient irrigation technologies can also be promoted through private partnerships. Water rights owners and parties seeking water can create private partnerships through short-term leases."' Under a leasing program, agricultural water users retain their water rights instead of selling them. A lease may involve
traditional monetary compensation for the water rights holder. The financial

160. Joe Satran, This Is Where Amefica Gets Ahnost All Is Wiver Lettuce, HUFFPOST
TASTE, http://www.huffingtonpost.con/2015/03/04/yuma-lettuce_n 6796398.html.
(Almost
90% of all the winter leady vegetables in the United States are produced in the Yuma, Arizona
area.); secJulic Lurie & Alex Park, supra note 158 (California produces 95% of broccoli, 92% of
strawberries, 91% of grapes, and 90% of tomatoes in the United States.)
161. See All Funding Topics, CAL. DEP'T. OF WATER RESOURCEs (Nov. 17, 2015),
http://www.water.ca.gov/nav/index.cfntid=103.
162. See Water Use Elliciency Giants and Loans, CAL. DEP'T. OF WATER RESOURCES (Jan.
28, 2016), http://www.water.ca.gov/wuegrants/index.cfm.

163.

Id.

164. Agzicultual Water Use Efliciency 2015 Giants, Proposition 1 Guidelines andProposal
Soliciation PackAge, CAL. DEP'T. OF WATER RESOURCES 5 (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.water.ca.gov/wuegrants/Final-2015-PSP-Exhibits-1-27-2016.pdf.
165. Water Use Efficiency Grants andLoans, supra note 162.
166. Jeanine Jones, Calibmia Perspectives - Water Tansfers, DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES (July 2011) (Most states, including California, currently allow for short-term transfers.); but see Fehlmann, supia note 44, at 17 (Arizona, an important agricultural southwestern
state, does not participate.)
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incentive may encourage agricultural users to engage in more efficient irrigation
practices.
Alternatively, under the right set of conditions and rules, farmers could conceivably take a more market-oriented approach. For instance, a farmer could
purchase and maintain water-efficient irrigation technologies and then lease the
water conserved through those investments to someone else. Under that sort
of arrangement, parties are incentivized to implement the best water saving technology, up to the point where it is no longer economically cost-justified, while
water rights holders are able to maintain their rights. Such arrangements could
do much to promote efficient water use practices while still preserving western
agriculture.
Unfortunately, there are numerous barriers to forming these sorts of private
arrangements. Proposals for severance and transfer, change in diversion point,
or change in use can face high transaction costs such as navigating various state
water rights regimes, separating surface water from groundwater, and defeating
notice and comment processes involved with changes in use or diversion. Uncertainty over water entitlements only adds an additional layer of cost and difficulty to making these arrangements.'
All too often, the transaction costs associated with creating these private
partnerships can become too high to allow for efficient outcomes.'" It is difficult
to match private water rights owners with private parties seeking water. Fortunately, there are means of addressing this problem. Recently, the National Science Foundation funded research that led to the development of Mammoth
Trading, a company that seeks to match water resource buyers and sellers.'"
Marimoth also helps users navigate regulations and reach a fair price.' Although Mammoth currently only focuses on sales of groundwater in Nebraska,"'
it is conceivable that a similar system could close the gap between buyers and
sellers of western water leases. Determining the efficient irrigation technology
to implement also requires a high level of information and expertise. Additionally, agricultural users may not have access to water lawyers to represent their
interests in the partnership. Like many legal situations, there is a possibility that
the less sophisticated party will be disadvantaged. Closely related, small water

167. See Gila River andLilde ColoradoRiver GeneralStreamAdjudications, ARIZONA DEP'T
OF WATER RESOURCEs (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.azwater.gov/AzDWR/SurfaceWater/Adjudications/GilaRiverandLittleColoradoRiverGeeralStreamAdjudications.htm, for an example of
solution to this problem through Arizona's current process of two general stream adjudications,
which seek to involve all water rights holders within a basin and adjudicate their relative priority,
use, diversion points, and flow to eliminate the uncertainty and risk that hinders the water market.
168. See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Libility Rules-A
Coiment, 11 J.L. & Econ. 67, 68 (1968) (According to Guido Calibresi's interpretation of the
Coase theorem, "if one assumes rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to
bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the market by bargains"; therefore where there are no transaction costs, the market will generate eflicient resource allocations,
regardless of how property rights are divided) (emphasis in original).
169. See Marlene Cimons, Sellihng and Bupg Water Rights, NATIONAL SCIENCE
FOUNDATION (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.nsf.gov/mobile/discoveries/discsumm.jsp?cntn-id=
133173&org=NSF.
170. See id.
171. Seeid.
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rights owners in agricultural communities may distrust private businesses. An
imbalance of information may prevent agricultural water users from potentially
beneficial partnerships.
Most states have bifurcated water regimes, distinguishing between surface
water and groundwater. In Arizona, groundwater is treated as a separate entity
from surface water.' While surface water may be bought and sold independent
of the land, groundwater is typically appurtenant to the land.' However, the
distinction between surface water and groundwater is unclear,' further complicating possible water transfers on a river segment. However, a bifurcated water
system does not pose as many complications to parties wishing to use groundwater on the original tract of land or to parties who have their surface water
delivered via canal.
If the party seeking to obtain surface water rights does not wish to use them
for a beneficial use, the lease could fail. Surface water in Arizona,'" Colorado,'
New Mexico,'" Nevada,' and Utah'" is subject to prior appropriation and limited to beneficial uses. Surface water uses in California must be "reasonable

172. Layperson's Guide to Arizona Wsde, WATER EDUCATION FOUNDATION, (2007)
http://www.azwater.gov/AzDWR/IT/documents/Layperson'sGuide toArizonaWater.pdf.
173. See Fehlmaun, supra note 44, at 28.
174. See generally In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River
Sys. and Source, 857 P.2d 1236, 1238-39 (1993) ("Gila II") (Noting that a bifurcated legal system
does not mirror the intermihgling between groundwater and surface water and that subflow, while
underground, is still surface water); see also In ir the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in Gila River System and Source, 344 P.3d 1069, 1083 (2000) ("Gila IV").
175. Suface Water Rjihts, ARiz. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES (Mar. 27. 2014).
http://www.azwater.gov/AzDWR/SurfaceWater/SurfaceWaterRights/SurfaceWater FAQ.htm.
(In Arizona, beneficial use includes domestic or municipal purposes, irrigation, stockwatering,
hydroelectric power, recreation, wildlife including fish, nonrecoverable water storage, and mining).
176. Water Rghts Dictionary, COLO. DIvISION OF WATER RESOURCES, DEP'T OF NAT.
RESOURCES, http://water.state.co.us/SurfaceWater/SWRights/Pages/WaterRightsTeninology.
aspx. ("Beneficial use is the use of a reasonable amount of water necessary to accomplish the
purpose of the appropriation, without waste. Some common types of beneficial use are: irrigation,
municipal, wildlife, recreation, mining, household use."); see also, PriorAppropriation Law,
COLO. DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, DEP'T or NAT. RESOURCES, http://water.state.
co.us/SurfaceWater/SWRights/Pages/PriorApprop.aspx.
177. N.M. CONST, art. XVI, § 3. ("Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit
of the right to the use of water" in the state of New Mexico.); Glossaiy of Water Terns, N.M.
OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER, INTERSTATE STREAM COMMISSION, http://wWW.ose.
state.nm.us/WR/glossary.php. (Beneficial use in New Mexico is "the use of water by man for any
purpose which benefits are derived, such as domestic, municipal, irrigation, livestock, industrial,
power development, and recreation.").
178. NEV. REV. STAT. S 533.035. ("Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit
of the right to the use of water" in the state of Nevada.); Nevada WaterLaw 101, NEV. DEP'T OF
CONSERVATION AND NAT. RESOURCES, http://dcnr.nv.gov/documents/documents/nevada-waterlaw-101/; Water Jesoures, RESEARCH DIVISION, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU (Apr. 2014),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/Publications/PandPReport/36-WR.pdf.
(Beneficial uses in Nevada include "commercial, industrial, irrigation, mining, municipal, power generation, recreation, stockwatering, storage, or wildlife.");
179. Glossary of Water Words, UTAH DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS (May 28, 2015),
http://www.waterrights.utah.gov/wrinio/glossary.asp. (Examples of beneficial uses in Utah include, but are not limited to, irrigation, stock watering, domestic, commercial, industrial, and
municipal uses.)
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and beneficial" and are governed by a blend of riparian and prior appropriation
regimes.'o The party's intended use must meet the relevant state's definition of
a beneficial use."'
The party seeking water rights and the current water rights holder will also
need to overcome objections from other interested parties. Water rights applications are subject to a public notice and comment period in Arizona,' California," Colorado," New Mexico, 5 Nevada,'" and Utah.'" This process can
be lengthy and expensive. According to the Colorado Department of Natural
Resources' Division of Water Resources, the process can take "anywhere from
4 months to 2 years and beyond, depending on the complexity of the case."'
Additionally, costs for necessary experts are high, with water lawyers ranging
from $150 to upwards of $300 an hour and engineering ranging from $100 to
$200 an hour.'" The process to defeat protests can be a substantial barrier to
all severance and transfer, change in diversion point, or change in use applications, including applications necessary for short-term leases. If states adopt an
expedited review system in exchange for the water rights owner trading through
a state market and foregoing a portion of their water rights, overcoming a notice
and comment process will be a less significant barrier.'

180. The Water Rights Process, STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, http://www.
("These "beneficial
waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/board-info/waterrights-process.shtml.
uses" have commonly included municipal and industrial uses, irrigation, hydroelectric generation,
and livestock watering. More recently, the concept has been broadened to include recreational
use, fish and wildlife protection, and enhancement and aesthetic enjoyment.")
181. See Glossary of Water Tenms, supra note 177; Glossary of Water Words, supia note
179; Surfice Water Rights, supra note 175; The Water Rights Process, supra note 180; Water
Resources, supra note 178; Water Jights Dichonaiy, supra note 176.
182. Lin Fehlmann, supra note 44, at 21, 25-27, 35. A surface water rights owner mustgo
through a permitting process to change their type of use or diversion point in Arizona. A transfer
of water rights from an agricultural user will likely require a change in diversion point and/or use.
If the new owner wishes to change the kind of use or the diversion point, they must file an application with the Director of the Department of Water Resources and will be subject to a public
notice, comment, and objection process. The new user must overcome objections from stakeholders including junior appropriators. Changes must not impact existing and vested rights. In
Arizona, it is not difficult to challenge a change in diversion or severance and transfer by proving
the change either conflicts with vested rights, is a menace to public safety, and/or is against the
interests and welfare of the public.
183. See generally The Water Jights Process, supra note 180 (explaining the permitting process that includes a public notice period for states under the prior appropriation system, including
California).
184.

See Obtaininga Water Right, COLORADO DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVISION OF

WATER RESOURCEs (Oct. 10, 2016), http://water.state.co.us/SurfaceWater/SWRights/Pages/
HowGetWaterRights.aspx.
185. See Notice for Publications, N.M. OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER, INTERSTATE
STREAM COMMISSION (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.ose.state.nm.us/NFP/nfp.php.
186. See Nevada Water Law l01, NEv. DEP'T OF CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES
(Oct. 10, 2016), http://dcnr.nv.gov/documents/documents/nevada-water-law-101/.
187. See Water Rights Notlications, UTAH DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS (July 14 2005),
http://www.waterrights.utah.gov/wrinfo/notices.asp.
188. Obtaininga Water Right, supranote 184.

189.

See id.

190. See Rhett Larson & Kelly Kennedy, BankruptRivers, 49 UC DAvis L. REV. 1335, 136567 (forthcoming 2016).

88

WA TER LA WREVIEW

Volume 20

Lease proposals that involve moving water outside of the basin also raise
many political questions. Inter-basin transfers are politically unpopular, but
have been happening for decades in California."' These are especially controversial when transfers involve mining groundwater and placing the aquifer at
risk of depletion."'
Despite these barriers, short-term leases can be a solution to promoting
more efficient agricultural water use. Being able to lease water rights creates an
incentive for farmers to utilize their water efficiently so they may profit from the
excess water. Short-term leases in exchange for water-reducing irrigation infrastructure will also quickly stimulate the adoption of this technology. Creative
exchanges allow for the water to be used efficiently and the "saved water" to be
put to another beneficial use.
In conclusion, promoting the adoption of water-reducing irrigation practices can help reduce the water scarcity problem in the Southwest by reducing
the water required for current agricultural practices. Technologies that increase
water-efficiency already exist, but are not being adopted because of the high
financial and transaction costs inherent in prior appropriation regimes. Financial assistance and the ability to sever water rights in exchange for financial compensation or direct irrigation infrastructure will promote the use of these practices.
CONCLUSION
Current government policies are not doing enough to address persistent
water scarcity problems in the American Southwest. Although records show
that droughts have affected the region for centuries, it is apparent that droughts
are returning with more frequency and severity. Human activities are also exacerbating the water scarcity problem, causing the consequences of these
droughts to be worse than ever. Over the years, advancements in technology
have created an expectation of ease and comfort in the desert where residents
enjoy green lawns, take long showers, and consume water-intensive foods grown
in water-scarce areas. It is hardly surprising that many residents of the region
do not want to sacrifice these luxuries in spite of their. water-related consequences.
Although they garner far less attention than suburbanites, the greatest contributors to water scarcity problems in the Southwest are agricultural water users-farmers and ranchers who have insufficient incentives to conserve the
scarce water resources appropriated to them. Agriculture plays an invaluable
role in the American economy, bringing food to our dinner tables every day.
However, the excessively loose water use practices associated with agriculture

191. See Lauren Sommer, As Water Piccs Soai, Some PiolitFrom Cihlbia'sDrought,
KQED SCIENCE (June 23, 2014), http://ww2.kqed.org/science/2014/06/23/some-california-farmers-fallow-fields-others-sell-water-for-big-profits/.
192. See id. (In this proposal, two ranchers in Merced County would pump seven billion gallons of their groundwater and send it to farmers in Del Puerto Water District through canals.);
see generally Richard Cowen, Chapter Eighteen: Mining Witer; U. OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS,
http://mygeologypage.ucdavis.edu/cowen/~gel 15/115CH1 8miningwater.html.
Information
about the harmful and permanent eflects of mining aquifers.
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in the Southwest are imposing ever greater costs on urban and suburban populations. Accordingly, the regulatory structure that governs agricultural water use
needs to change, and there is not a single "fix-all" solution.
All too often, water management laws shield producers and consumers
from paying the real cost of water.' Many farms are subsidized so generously
that they are able to profitably grow water-intensive crops, such as cotton and
tree nuts, in the desert without being deterred by the environmental consequences of that activity.'" Without regulatory and price signals that truly reflect
the value of water, agricultural users are unlikely to optimally conserve this preclous resource.
In a country that is experiencing population growth and a rise in demand
for agricultural products, the Farm Bill must be amended to reduce federal subsidies to farms that grow water-intensive crops in arid regions and increase such
subsidies in other parts of the country. Federal and state governments should
also promote the adoption of water-reducing irrigation techniques by giving
farmers financial assistance to implement new infrastructure and allow "saved
water" to be put towards other beneficial uses. These changes and others described in this Article could help create a more efficient water market that is
reflective of the ongoing drought and better protects the nation from its consequences. The costs of inaction or delay in this area could be catastrophic and
irreparable, so much is at stake. It is time for water use practices on the farm
to catch up with those in our homes and backyards.

193.
194.

See Noroian, supra note 9, at 183.
See id.

195. See id.
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BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHETICAL RELEASE OF FLOWBACK FLUIDS

Historically, states have regulated the technical aspects of oil and gas operations.' However, both state and federal agencies are increasingly interested in
the regulation of oil and gas production activities' as recent technological advances in hydraulic fracturing allow for the development of significant reserves
of shale oil.! Hydraulic fracturing activities involve the underground pumping
of significant quantities of water. The underground pumping process results in
"flowback" water when the water used in the fracturing process returns to the
surface." After fracturing a targeted formation, operators must dispose of thousands of gallons of flowback water through recycling, drilling use, and other
means. The rapid increase in use of the hydraulic fracturing process has led to
fear of water contamination based on the assumption that fracturing is dangerous and unregulated.! Generally, companies dispose of and recycle flowback
water safely using various methods consistent with existing state and federal
laws.'
While the risk of flowback water spills may not be as great as feared, spills
can occur and, in certain circumstances, cause significant damage to surrounding ecosystems and surface waters of the state.' Lawyers for operators and other
industry professionals-most notably the operator's environmental, health, and

1. Bruce M. Kramer, FederalLegislative andAdrniistiativeRegulation ofHydraubcFracturhg Operations, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 837, 838-40 (2012).
2. Dave Grossman, Regulation, Conversation, and Impact of Shale Gas and Oi in a Low-

Hice Environment, in

ASPEN INSTITUTE MODERN SHALE GAS AND OnL PRODUCTION FORUM

XI (2015), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/2015-Shale-Forum
-Report_ 11.25.15.pdf
3. Fred Hagemeyer, "Production and Marketing of Hydrocarbons in the U.S. - A Survey
of Recent Trends and Development," Oil and Gas Agreements: Midstweam andMarketing 1-1,
1-11 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2011) (observing that "[flive years ago, conventional wisdom suggested that the U.S. hydrocarbon resource base was peaking and poised for a long-term decline"
but that this wisdom has changed due largely to the hydraulic fracturing boom).
4. See Monika Ehrman, The Next Great Compromise:A ComprehensiveResponse to Opposition Against Shale Gas Development Usizg Hydrauic acuing in the United States, 46
Trx. TECH L. REv. 423, 432-34 (outlining a background on the history and process of hydraulic
fracturing as well as major arguments against-and comprehensive responses in support of-shale
gas production).
5. Flowback water is also referred to as "produced water."; Thomas E. Kurth et al., Shaking
Up EstablishedCaseLaw and Regulation:The Impacts ofHydraulicFracturing,57 The Advoc.
(Texas) 18, 22 (2011) (explaining the hydraulic fracturing process and overview of the use of
water).

6. Nicolas Loris, Hydiaulicracting:
gCiticalforEneigyProduction,Jobs, andEconomic
Giowth, 2714 THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 1, 3, 4 (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.heiitage.org/re2
8
search/reports/201 /0 /hydraulic-fracturing-critical-for-energy-production-jobs-and-economicgrowth.

7. For a detailed explanation of Federal Regulations of hydraulic fracturing relating to
wastewater, see Natwal Gas Extraction- Hydinulic iactunig, Environmental Protection Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/hydraulicfracnuring#wastewater; for a comprehensive look at state wastewater
regulations related to hydraulic fracturing, see State hackmng Regulations, http://www.alsglobal.com/en/Our-Services/Life-Sciences/Environmental/Ciapibilities/North-America-Capabilities/USA/Oil-and-Gasoline-Testing/Oil-and-Gas-Production-and-Midstrcam-Support/FrackingRegulations-by-State.
8. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Diait Assessment of de PotentialImpacts of
Hydiarulic HactuiugIor Oil and Gas on Dinking Watei Resowrces ES-17, 18 (Junc 2015),
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/hf es erd jun2015.pdf.
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safety teams-should be aware of these issues and the applicable regulatory requirements. In light of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules" or "Rules"), attorneys must have knowledge of
the appropriate conduct when responding to a spill incident. Water contamination is a significant regulatory and reputational" concern for the industry,
especially where operations intersect with drinking water supplies. The operator's "social license" to operate" (i.e., the goodwill of the community, local politicians and activists, and non-governmental organizations to allow the operator
to continue to operate without challenge) may be impacted deeply by a single,
unfortunate event. Conversely, a compliance crisis may present opportunities
to create meaningful improvements within an oil and gas industry organization.
This article investigates several aspects of ethical issues related to the hypothetical incident posed below and the enforcement proceedings that follow. Because other sources have addressed substantive state and federal regulations,
this article will not discuss the applicable spill laws and agencies in detail."
The following hypothetical, "Incident at Operator Wellpad," sets up a fictitious hydraulic fracturing flowback spill scenario and examines the applicable
Model Rules relating to potential resulting issues. Ethical Rules may apply differently to outside counsel, in-house counsel, or government counsel. Each'
designation requires appropriate licensure and continuing legal education, including annual ethics requirements, for maintaining compliance status." Depending on the type of counsel, a lawyer may need to consider slightly different
duties to the client, the tribunal, the public and other third parties. Lastly, attorneys who change jobs or focus (e.g., from a government agency attorney to
an in-house attorney or outside attorney, or from one side of a legal issue to the

9. A full set of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct is available at: http://www.
anericanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publicaions/model-rules of professional
conduct.html.
10. See Press Release, United States Department ofJustice, United States Reaches an Agreement with XTO Energy to Prevent Waste Spills from Natural Gas Exploration and Production
(July 18, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-reaches-agreement-xto-energy-prevent-waste-spills-natural-gas-exploration-and. (For example, in July 2013 XTO Energy reached a
settlement of Clean Water Act violations relatcd to the discharge of fracking wastewater from a
storage facility for its fracking operations. As part of the settlement, XTO paid a $100,000 penalty
and spent an estimated $20 million on a comprehensive plan to improve wastewater management
practices to recycle, properly dispose of, and prevent spills of wastewater.)
11. See, e.g., David Spence, Corpomte Social Responsibilityin the Oil and Gas Industy:
The Inportance of ReputationalRisk, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv 59 (2011) (discussing the reputa-

tional impact of the B.P. oil spill and crisis response).
12. Evan J. House, Fractured airytales: The EalcdSocial License lor UnconventionalOil
and Gas Devclopment, 13 WYo. L. REv. 5,51 (2013); see also INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND INVESTOR ENvrL. HEALTH NETWORK, EXTRACTING THE FAcTs: AN

INVESTOR GUIDE TO DISCLOSING RisKs FROM HYDRAULIc FRACTURING OPERATIONs 3 (2013),
http://disclosingthefacts.org/2013/Extracting-the-facts.pdf.
13. Craig D. Galli, A Complhance Crisis Is a Tenible Thing to Waste: Counsel's Role to
Enhance Coiporate Cultue, 30 ABA NATURAL RES. & ENv. 3, 5 (Winter 2016).
14. For a complete discussion on Federal Laws and Regulations, see Rebecca W. Watson
and Nora R. Pincus, "Hydraulic Fracturing and Water Supply Protection-Federal Regulatory Developments," The Water-EnergyNexus:Acquisition, Use, andDisposalofWaterforEnergyand
MineralDevelopment6-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2012).
15. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education by State, American Bar Association,
https://www.anericanbar.org/cle/mandatory_cle.html.
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other) have special consideration." Former governmental attorneys would do
well to also consider Model Rule 1.11, tided "Special Conflicts of Interest for
Former and Current Government Officers and Employees," and the ramifications that movement between the public and private sector can make to their
future client representations and advocacy." Rule 1.11 provides that neither the
lawyer nor her firm may represent someone in a matter for which the lawyer
previously had a governmental role: (i) without the informed, written consent of
the governmental entity; or (ii) where, in the process of the prior governmental
representation, the lawyer obtained "confidential (government) information""
that the government is prohibited by law or privilege from disclosing to the public. 7
A.

INCIDENT AT OPERATOR WELLPAD"

Operator has drilled and is now completing three 8000' Marcellus gas wells
(the "Wells") located on a single pad in Washington County, Pennsylvania.
The pad contains two other already producing wells. Operator has two co-venturers in the Wells, each, owning a 25% working interest. Operator has contracted with FracCo under a Master Services Agreement to perform the necessary hydraulic fracturing operations to complete the three Wells.
After completing a fracturing stage on location, the FracCo crew was tasked
with moving the equipment to the next well. Due to a miscommunication, a
crewmember began disconnecting the main waterline while it was still under
pressure. The line shifted and swung approximately four feet away from the
employee, spraying him and others with flowback water. Approximately 200
barrels of flowback water spilled or was sprayed outside of the containment area
and was inadvertently discharged to the ground surface. The release occurred
near the top slope of the wellpad, causing fluids to migrate down a steep grade
and over two constructed terraces, into the headwater area of a stream channel.
16. For a striking example, suppose an in-house company oil and gas attorney later switched
sides to outside counsel to represent landowners claiming royalty underpayment. Suppose he
advertised he had "switched sides/kept the playbook" and could rigorously assert these claims
with insider knowledge. Any attorney pursuing this type of transition should carefully consider
prior representations and whether she is utilizing privileged information to pursue claims in the
new area of emphasis.
17. Colo. Rules Prof. Conduct Rule 1.11 (2015). (Colorado's rules use this framework).
18. See, e.g., PA Eth. Op. 94-132, PA Bar. Assn. Comm. Leg. Eth. Prof. Resp., 1994 WL
928083 (discussing inquiry into application of Rule 1.11 where an attorney who had worked for
the U.S. Department ofJustice in the Environment and Natural Resources Division was subsequently approached to consult a company on an issue related to a matter she worked on as a
government attorney).
19. See People v. Shan, 204 P.3d 453, 459 (Colo. 2009) (examining imputed conflicts of
interest for lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers); Sorci v. Iowa
Dist Ct. or Polk County, 671 N.W.2d 482, 493 (Iowa 2003) (emphasizing that to accept employment in a case for which the lawyer had substantial responsibility while a government lawyer
"would be akin to switching sides, might jeopardize confidential government information, and
gives the appearance of professional impropriety in that accepting subsequent employment regarding that same matter creates a suspicion that the lawyer conducted his governmental work in
a way to facilitate his own future employment in that matter.") (citoigABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342, 62 A.B.AJ. 517, 520 (1976)).
20. For a complete discussion on the regulatory risks and responses associated with surface
spills for your client, see Hannah .1. Wiseman, Risk and Response i 1'actuigPoliy, 84 U.

Colo. L. Rev. 729, 766 (2013).
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The stream channel connects with a river where there is a public drinking water
supply intake.
Two days later, the Pennsylvania Department Environmental Protection
("PADEP") issued the Operator a Notice of Violation ("NOV") for the following:

Failure to control and dispose of fluids on site in a manner that prevents pollution;

Failure to have secondary containment for hydraulic fracturing activities;
Unpermitted disposal of industrial waste; and
Failure to maintain containment during hydraulic fracturing activities causing
a discharge of waste, with a potential to pollute the Waters of the Commonwealth.
A spill incident triggers various challenges for the Operator and, as discussed in detail below, counsel's analysis and handling of subsequent ethical
issues is extremely important for Operator's continued good standing with the
regulator and other affected third parties.
Part II of this article describes ethical issues related to spill management.
Part III.A addresses ethical issues for counsel to the.operator surrounding the
spill and response management in terms of the attorney-client relationship.
Next, Part III.B discusses ethical obligations to the agency (in this case the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection) with regulatory authority
over the location; and Part III.C covers other interested parties, including: coworking interest owners, contractors, insurance investigators, and surface owners. Finally, Part IV highlights a lawyer's best ethical practices in responding to
possible negative media coverage following a spill. This constantly changing
area is greatly impacted by current social media and political conventions. Applicable ABA Model Rules are interwoven through the paper for practitioners
to keep in mind as guidance for professional and ethical conduct in response to
a flowback water spill.
II. ETHICAL ISSUES REIATED TO SPILL MANAGEMENT
Ethical rules do not simply guide conduct; more importantly, the rules set
limits to what constitutes appropriate conduct. An attorney's breach of the rules
can result in disciplinary action by the State Bar regulator, up to and including
disbarment." The American Bar Association's ("ABA") goal in drafting, updating, and interpreting the Model Rules is to assure that the highest standards of
professional competence and ethical conduct are available to guide practicing

21. See, c.g., Inre Mancuso, 915 N.Y.S.2d 774, 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (upholding District Court's disbarment sanction for attorney who conspired with his brother to commit mail
fraud and who violated certain provisions of the Clean Air Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act by engaging in conduct that included creating
fraudulent partnerships and sending false legal documents to customers to conceal the true nature
of the illegal asbestos business conducted by attorney's brother).
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lawyers. 2 ' To date, California is the only state that does not have professional
conduct rules following the format of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct." In content, however, they remain similar. The increasing focus on
attorneys' ethical conduct in all phases of representation is demonstrated by the
Professional Responsibility Exam that all but two states require would-be attorneys to pass to obtain a license to practice law."
Each state maintains several avenues for individuals to access its rules of
professional conduct," review ethical opinions interpreting and clarifying the
rules," and even obtain anonymous advice in the face of a potential conflict."
Colorado, for example, provides a number of readily available reference materials." The ins and outs of when operators in different jurisdictions must obtain
outside counsel can be particularly complex. An operator headquartered in
one state or having operations in many states may believe it is enough to have
local counsel of record retained for the agency proceedings involving the NOV
described above. However, there are instances where a favored attorney, such
as an expert on flowback water issues, resides outside of the jurisdiction (the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in our hypothetical) and should be considered
and retained before the tribunal."
Management of flowback fluid has become a major part of the shale gas
controversy, from the treatment, recycling, and discharge of the fluid to spill
prevention and response." It follows that any attorney representing an operator
should make every effort to stay current with the relevant substantive state laws,
but also the Model Rule's professional ethics guidance in responding to a situation similar to the spill described above.

22.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA MISSION AND GOALS (2016), http://www.ameri-

canbar.org/about-theaba/ana-mission-goals.html.
23. State Adoption of the A3A Model Rules oflidessiond Conduct, American Bar Association, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/modelrulesof professionalconduct/alpha liststateadoptingnmodelrules.hul.
24.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, JURISDICTIONS REQUIRING THE MPRE

.

(2016), http://www.americanbar.org/about theaba/ana-mission-goals.html.
25. See, e.g., Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, Appendix to Chapters 18 to 20, The Colorado Rules of Professionad Conduct (2016), https://www.cobar.org/index.cfh/ID/22119/CETH/Colorado-Rules-of-Professional-Conduct/.
26. See, e.g., Formal Ethics Opinions, A joint Project of the Colorado Bar Association Ethics
Committee and Continuing Legal Education in Colorado, Inc., http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/22342/CETH/Fonnal-Ethics-Opinion-Subject-Index/.
27. See, e.g., Ethics Hotline, Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee, https://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/383/CETH/Ethics-Hotline/Calling-Committee/.
28. See Robert M. Linz, Colorado Legal Ethics: Guide to Resources, 39 COLO. LAw. 109
(Aug. 2010).
29. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct r. 5.5 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1983) (explaining that a lawyer may
practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. However, a lawyer
may be admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction by court rule or order or by law to practice
for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis, e.g. appearing as counsel in a proceeding pro hac
4ce)
30. CHARLES G. GROAT & TtOMAS W. GRIMSHAW, THE ENERGY INST. UNIV. OF TEX. AT
AusTIN,

FAcr-BASED REGU.ATION

FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION IN SHALE GAS

DEVELOPMENTS (2012), http:// heartland.org/sites/default/files/texas fracking-study feb 2012.pdf (finding that for the nation as a whole, the attitudes in newspapers, broadcast media, and
online news sources were uniformly about two-thirds negative, with 25% or less referencing scientific research).
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1I. ETHICAL DUTIES OF LEGAL COUNSEL
A.

LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AND DUTIES TO OPERATOR
1.

Competence

First and foremost, a lawyer has certain duties to her client, the Operator.
Rule 1.1 speaks to a lawyer's competence: A lawyer shall provide competent
representation-the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Subject to limited exceptions, under
Rule 1.2, a lawyer must abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives
of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to
the method by which objectives are to be pursued. In other words, a lawyer
may only take actions on behalf of the client that he is authorized to carry out
in the course of representation." A lawyer representing the Operator must be
fiuniliar with the type of operations at hand and be prepared to advise her client
regarding the public response to the hypothetical spill. Ultimately, however, the
decision on how to respond to the PADEP, perform required remediation, and
coordinate with co-working interest owners and subcontractors, belongs to the
client.
While a lawyer cannot counsel a client to engage or assist a client in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, a lawyer may discuss the legal
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client." Direct participation in a criminal scheme may result in a criminal charge or conviction for
the lawyer." A notorious environmental example is People v. InFerGeneCo.,
Inc., in which a California biotechnology company filed for bankruptcy." After
being evicted by its landlord, the company abandoned containers containing
radioactive waste. This abandonment occurred because an associate at the corporation's law firm believed that removal of the materials would constitute a
pre-petition claim under the Bankruptcy Code. The associate wrote to the landlord stating that the company would not remove the waste.
The District Attorney's office filed felony charges against the law firm and
the associate." The District Attorney based the charges on an assertion that the
letter effectuated an abandonment of hazardous waste, which equated to an illegal disposal, thereby violating the environmental laws. Stating that the attorneys knew or should have known that they were causing hazardous waste to be
disposed, the prosecutor emphasized that attorneys advising clients to violate

31. Model Rules of Profl1 Conduct r. 1.1 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1983).
32. See Model Rules of Prof 1 Conduct r. 1.2, 1.4 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1983).
33. VINCE FARHAT& CALON RUSSELL, "HOUSTON, WE HAVE A PROBLEM": CLIENTS WHO
ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL CONDUcT DURING YOUR REPRESENTATION (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/contenit/dam/aba/publications/criminalustice/wcc_newsletter unlawfulconduct.authcheckdam.pdf; see, e.g., Attorney Grievance Cormr'n of MI v. Coppola, 19 A.3d 431, 442
(Md. 2011) (explaining disbarment was an appropriate sanction for attorney who engaged in misconduct involving dishonesty by assisting the children of an incompetent person in the execution
and recording of forged and fraudulent documents).
34. Model Rules ofProfl Conduct r. 8.4 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1983).
35. See generidlyScott L. Olson, The PolentialLiabilidhes FacedBy In-House Counsel, 7 U.
Miami Bus. L. Rev. 1, 38 (1998).

36.

Id.
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environmental laws will be prosecuted. Although a municipal court judge twice
dismissed the charges against the law firm," the case provides an indication of
the potential liability that counsel may face for environmental crimes executed
in representation of the client.
2.

Duty to Investigate, Meritorious Claims and Defenses

A spill can involve several parties, each with a role in how the incident occurred. Of primary importance for the lawyer is adequate investigation into the
facts surrounding the incident. Germane facts may be hard to pin down, for
example, when distinguishing between the statements of the FracCo employee
sprayed with the flowback water (concerned for his personal health and safety)
and the operator's onsite man, who has a different perspective (and may want
to minimize the consequences). The proper collection and recording of the
facts surrounding the incident is an obvious requirement in "competently" representing one's client." Further, in interactions and communications with the
client, Rule 1.3 requires that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness. Rule 1.4 more specifically covers communications with the client.
Under Rule 1.4, a lawyer has the obligation to:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to
which the client's informed consent . . .;
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's

objectives are to be accomplished;

(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct
when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."
Each of these requirements can be a land mine if the lawyer's factual investigation is inadequate. Counsel will need frequent communication with its operator-client to ensure compliance with the five obligations of Rule 1.4. A lawyer must communicate a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions.40

37. Scott L. Olson, The Potentil Liabiliies Faced by in-House Counsel, 7 U. Miami Bus.
L. Rev. 1, 38 (1998); see Marianne Lavelle,judge Drops Chages Agaust S.E Law hin2, Nat'l
LJ., Apr. 6, 1992, at 15.
38. Mod. Rules Prof. Conduct r. 3.1 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1983) (explaining that due diligence is
a fundamental duty of the practice of law and required by Rule 3.1, which states a lawyer shall
not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis
in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous).

39.
40.

Mod. Rules Prof. Conduct r. 1.4.
Id.
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Confidentiality

The question remains of how to treat communications between the operator and subcontractor, both of whom will be working quickly to control the spill
and limit any residual impacts. They will also be concerned about liability and
indemnity for any legal action by the injured FracCo worker or claims for damages to property under the Master Services Agreement between them. Generally, under Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules, a lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to the representation of a client, and shall make efforts to not inadvertently disclose information related to the representation, unless (i) the client gives
informed consent, (ii) the disclosure is inpliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation, or (iii) the disclosure is permitted as one of the listed
exceptions to the rule." Confidentiality is a fundamental requirement that is
lifted only in the most extreme circumstances."
In the flowback spill hypothetical, information obtained through a client
will likely not meet one of the seven enumerated exceptions to Rule 1.6." And
absent extraordinary circumstances, such as criminal conduct, the confidentiality requirement is a bright-line mandatory rule: no disclosure related to the attorney-client communication is pennissible." However, that confidentiality
(which may go to legal strategies, defenses and the like between client and its
counsel) does not extend to investigation of the facts, which in our scenario
likely means that statements from individuals present during the incident and
the results of inspections and testing of equipment involved in the incident may
be shared amongst counsel to each party, even prior to the discovery process of
any lawsuits filed." It should also be noted that in the confusion immediately
surrounding the incident, both the operator's and contractor's environmental
health and safety team, as well as other personnel, will be communicating fre-

41. Mod. Rules Prof. Conductr. 1.6 (explaining that a lawyer may reveal information relating
to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary as exceptions to Rule 1.6:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property
of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client;
(6) to comply with other law or a court order; or
(7) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer's change of employment or from changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the
revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise
prejudice the client.)
42. David S. Krakoff & Susan H. Ephron, The Ethics OfDi:sclosureIn The Environmental
Arena, ALI/ABA Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws (Oct. 20, 1994).
43. See Mod. Rules of Prof. Conduct r. 1.6.
44. Id.
45. Mod. Rules Prof. Conduct r. 1.6 cmt.
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quently. Creating a framework for communications so that the necessary managers and counsel are informed, while attorney-client privilege remains intact as
to each involved party, goes a long way towards fulfilling counsel's duty to her
client.
4.

Advisor

Finally, with respect to the lawyer's relationship with the client, Rule 2.1 is
important because it explains the lawyer's role as an advisor." In all client representations, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice. Advice from a lawyer is not restricted to the law and may
include other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors relevant to the client's situation. 7 Counsel to a hydraulic fracturing operator
has a responsibility to be apprised of these external considerations in rendering
advice related to the spill.
B.

REPRESENTATION BEFORE AGENCY ON NOV
1.

Candor to the Tribunal

An important Rule for counsel to keep in mind is Candor to the Tribunal,
Rule 3.3. Under this Rule 3.3(a) a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's
client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the
lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial
measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal
matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
Similarly, under 3.3(b) a lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative
proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has
engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall, if
necessary, disclosure such conduct to the tribunal. These duties imposed by
Rule 3.3 continue to the conclusion of the proceeding and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.`
For counsel to the Operator as well as counsel representing the agency or
other interested parties, this Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid any conduct that might undermine the integrity of
the adjudicative process. Per the Rule, a lawyer acting as an advocate for the
Operator or any other represented party in an adjudicative proceeding before
46. See Mod. Rules Prol Conduct r. 2.1.
47. Id.
48. Mod. Rules Prof. Conduct r. 3.3.
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the PADEP on a notice of violation has an obligation to present the client's case
with persuasive force." However, performance of that duty while maintaining
confidences of the client is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the
tribunal." As such, although a lawyer in this adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial position on the law or to vouch for the evidence
submitted in a cause,.the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false
statements of law, fact, or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
2.

Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

Similar to counsel's duties under Rule 3.3, Rule 3.4 seeks to protect the
integrity of the judicial and adversary system. Rule 3.4 acknowledges that the
procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is
2
to be positioned competitively by the contending parties. Fairness in the adversary system is secured by the Rule 3.4 prohibitions against destruction or
concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics
5
in discovery procedure, and any other similar behavior. This rule includes a
prohibition against frivolous discovery requests on pretrial procedure and failure to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.5 During representation, Rule 3.4 bars counsel from alluding to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal
5
opinion as to the justness of a cause or the credibility of the witness.
In terms of the hypothetical posed, Rule 3.4 allows for counsel to present
evidence that supports the zealous representation of the client. It does not,
however, condone the use of unsubstantiated evidence.
'

'

3.

Impartiality and Decorum

With respect to impartiality and decorum under Rule 3.5, a lawyer shall not
seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means
prohibited by law." Likewise, during a proceeding, a lawyer may not communicate ex parte with persons serving in an official capacity in the proceeding, such
as judges, masters or jurors, unless authorized to do so by law or court order."
Under this Rule, any conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal is prohibited."
This means that counsel to the Operator or other parties cannot seek to comrnunicate with the PADEP in regard to the agency decision-makers evaluating
the NOV. Any appearance of impropriety is frowned upon and the best way

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id.
Id.
Id
Mod. Rules Prof. Conduct r. 3.4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mod. Rules Prof. Conduct r. 3.5.
Id.
Id.
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for counsel to avoid even the suggestion that it has violated Rule 3.5 is to not
attempt to communicate with any persons serving in an official capacity as part
of the proceeding.
4.

Truthfulness

In exchanges with other interested parties, Rule 4.1 mandates a lawyer's
duty to remain truthful. As such, in the course of representing a client, a lawyer
shall not knowingly make false statements of material fact or law or fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by the client (unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6)." The
essence of this rule is to authorize conduct that is in accordance with generally
accepted conventions in negotiations and formulating agreements, such as good
faith and fair dealing, while simultaneously prohibiting flat out lies and intruths." Misstatements may undermine a relationship that is formed between
the operator and working-interest owners, subcontractors, or regulatory bodies.
It is especially important for the lawyer not to be perceived as untrustworthy in
a flowback spill situation that will require cooperation by all to resolve and conduct the necessary remediation. Unfortunately, a perception of dishonesty may
arise from an innocent misstatement, but it is much worse for a lawyer to invite
such a negative perception by deliberately lying or withholding key informnation.
This rule speaks for itself and is fundamentally important to the legal process.
5.

Communications with Person Represented by Counsel

With respect to the PADEP agency proceedings on their NOV, it is likely
that the agency is represented by either in-house or outside counsel. The Model
Rules speak to situations where a lawyer needs to communicate with persons
represented by counsel in Rule 4.2." In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with anyone the lawyer
knows to be represented by a lawyer, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
other lawyer." On its face, this no-contact rule appears to protect represented
administrative agency personnel from contacts by opposing counsel when counsel for the agency has not consented to contact. The as "authorized by law"'
language of Rule 4.2 includes the constitutional right to petition the government
for redress of grievances and the policy of ensuring a citizen's right of access to
the government." Thus, in general, a lawyer may communicate with regulatory
agencies and other government officials without having to request consent from
counsel to the government. However, courts, the ABA, state bar associations,

60. Mod. Rules of Prof. Conduct r. 4.1.
61. See id.
62.

Mod. Rules of Prof. Conduct r. 4.3.

63.

See id.

64. Mod. Rules of Prof. Conduct r. 4.2. (stating that in representing a client, a lawyer shall
not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer
oris authonzed to do so bylaw ora court orclei) (emphasis added).
65. John M. Burman, The Anti-ContactRule and Connunications widi Goveinment Entities, 24 Wyo. Law. 14 (Feb. 2001)
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and the American Law Institute differ on the application of the rule in the administrative context." Before communications with any agency official, the lawyer for the Operator should familiarize herself with the interpretations of the
rule in the jurisdiction in which she is practicing and exercise caution in contacting a government agency on behalf of the client. Communication with private
groups such as the co-working interest owners and subcontractor is more strictly
limited by the rule because no "authorized by law" exception applies. If a spill
of hydraulic flowback water occurs, it would be prudent for counsel to seek
consent from the other counsel before discussing the spill with any of the represented parties. An attorney is always permitted to contact an individual upon
the consent of counsel."
C.

ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS TO OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES

As we have seen, under the Model Rules, a lawyer's ethical obligations extend beyond the client. In our hypothetical flowback spill, the lawyer will have
to work with various interested parties, including surface owners, co-working
interest owners, insurance company adjustors and contractors-all within the
ethical guidelines of the Model Rules.
1.

Confidentiality of Information Related to the Client's Issue

In certain circumstances, Rule 2.3 allows a lawyer's report or evaluation for'
the client to be shared with someone other than the client as an exception to
the disclosure protections of Rule 1.6." For example, a lawyer may provide a
legal evaluation of the spill (such as for insurance purposes) at the client's request. Otherwise, the lawyer cannot freely share her evaluation; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to affect the
client's interests materially and adversely." In that circumstance, the lawryer shall
not provide the evaluation unless the client gives informed consent. Often such
evaluations are prepared under the rubric of an attorney work-product."o A Rule
2.3 disclosure is exclusively authorized in connection with the client's consent
of counsel sharing a report or evaluation. All other attorney-client information
relating to the evaluation or other communications is otherwise protected by
confidentiality under Rule 1.6.
2.

Fairness

For unrepresented persons (such as the surface owner or potentially the
subcontractor), the Model Rules provide guidance under Rule 4.3. In dealing
on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer
shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested in the issue." Further,

66.

SeeJ.B. Ruhl, Legal Ethics When Advocacy Involves the Government-Can We Talk?,

44 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. (1998).
67. See Mod. Rules Prof. Conduct r. 4.2.
68. Mod. Rules of Prof. Conduct r. 2.3.
69. Mod. Rules of Prof. Conduct r. 2.3 cmt.
70. The work product doctrine is codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and
its state counterparts.
71. Mod. Rules of Prof. Conductr. 4.3.
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when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding." Importantly, the lawyer shall
not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure
counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of
such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the
interests of the client." Essentially, counsel should give equal respect and concern, without providing legal advice, to an unrepresented party involved in the
flowback water spill hypothetical. Respectful treatment ofunrepresented persons in managing the spill response is not simply an ethical obligation but also
an effort that will prevent delays or other issues and help facilitate an agreeable
resolution amongst all parties involved, including unrepresented individuals.
Though a lawyer should put the interests of her client above others, the
lawyer must nonetheless be attentive to and respectful of the rights of third persons. Undoubtedly, the flowback spill scenario will result in competing interests
and opposing desired outcomes. Rule 4.4 explains that in the process of representing the client's interests a lawyer shall not take any action that lacks substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person."
Model Rule 4.4 aims to prevent unscrupulous lawyers from derailing agency
proceedings or other lawsuits by obfuscation or other misconduct relating to the
facts at issue. In obtaining evidence, a lawyer shall not use methods that violate
the legal rights of a third person." Rule 4.4 also speaks to the inadvertent sharing of electronic documents, an all too common reality in the digital age." Under the rule, a lawyer for any of the involved parties, whether it's the PADEP,
Operator, or any other party, nust promptly notify the sender if she receives a
document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of
the lawyer's client and she knows or reasonably should know that the sender
inadvertently shared the message.
IV. ETHICAL RESPONSE TO POST-SPILL NEGATIVE MEDIA COVERAGE
The recent boom in shale gas, particularly in major population centers, has
resulted in significant media attention on the hydraulic fracturing process and
elevated concerns that the process negatively impacts water quality." Incidents
such as the hypothetical spill can bring unexpected issues if, or more realistically, when, the media gets involved. Lawyers should be keenly aware of possible negative media coverage and the impact that it can have on the client." Industry must effectively address the social and environmental concerns
72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.

Mod. Rules of Prof. Conduct r. 4.4.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Examples include the Oscau-nominated documentan following claims of frac-related
groundwater contamination, Gas/and, and a New York Tmes series of op-ed pieces addressing
natural gas production and hydraulic fracturing. See Gasland, http://www.hbo.com/documentaries/gasland; see also Drilling-Down Series, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/us/DRILL-

INGDOWNSERIES.html?_r=0.
78. CHARLES G. GROAT& THOMAS W.
AuSTIN,

FACT-BASEi)

REGULATION

GRIMSHAW, THE ENERGY INST. UNIv. OF TEX. AT
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN SHALE GAS

Issue 1I

ETHICAL ISSUESINENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS

105

surrounding fracking to gain the social acceptance necessary to operate effectively and profitably."
Negative coverage is no longer restricted to traditional media outlets. Any
individual or organization may have a captive audience online. Blog posts and
social media comments often focus on tales of woe but regularly fail to state
facts and cite to legitimate trustworthy sources." Even early scientific studies
and other studies without peer review have promoted findings that were later
discredited by scientific scrutiny identifying fundamental flaws."
In its haste to raise doubts and questions about shale development, the media often overlooks the fact that science and engineering are at the core of developing oil and natural gas." Decades of applied science and empirical research-from both inside and outside industry-have shown that the risks
associated with oil and natural gas development are manageable by constantly
updated industry standards and an overlapping network of local, state, and federal rules." Improperly addressed, these concerns threaten to curb the development of unconventional resources.
Not all media is bad news, however. A 2013 flowback water spill in Colorado presents an example of industry working with the state commission, local
community, and news outlets to show its respectable efforts to work with all
parties involved." After a 30-hour, 84,000-gallon fracking flowback fluid spill,
PDC Energy offered to go above and beyond an otherwise minor fine by entering into an administrative order by consent PDC Energy formally agreed to
pay $35,000 in response to the spill, despite the fact that soil tests and groundwater samples indicated there was little to no contamination, according to the
company's incident report filed with the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission ("COGCC").
In response, the COGCC director noted: "PDC's response was exemplary.
It presented for the staff a very interesting, unusual and challenging enforcement
proposition. They could have fought this. They probably would have won.

DEVELOPMENTS (2012), http:// heartland.org/sites/default/files/texas-fracking-studyfeb_2012.pdf (finding that for the nation as a whole, the attitudes in newspapers, broadcast media, and
online news sources were uniformly about two-thirds negative, though only 33% or less referenced
scientific research).
79. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, GOLDEN RULES FOR A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS: WORLD
ENERGY OUTLOOK SPECIAL REPORT ON UNCONVENTIONAL GAS (2012), http://www.worldener2
gyoudook.org/media/weowcbsite/ 012/goldenrules/weo2Ol2goldcnrulesrepoitpdf.
80. See, e.g., Walter Tsou, MD, MPH, The Big Secret? FrackingFluids, PHYSICIANS FOR
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (June 18, 2012), http://www.psr.org/environment-and-health/environmncntal-health-policy-institute/responses/the-big-secret-fracking-fluids.htmlI.
81. See, e.g., Steve Everly, jurping de Gun: How the Media Rushes to Promote racking
Crides (Sept. 11, 2014), http://energyinlepth.org/national/jumping-gun-media-promotes-f'racking-critics/.
82. Vanessa Klass, What's the Big FackigDeaJl, 42 W. St. L. Rev. 159, 166 (2015).
83. Steve Everley, How Anti-Fracking Actipists Deny Science: Water Contambration,
ENERGY IN DEPTH (Aug. 13, 2016), http://cnergyindepth.org/national/how-anti-fracking-activistsdeny-science-water-contamination/.
84. See GOLDEN RULES, supra note 79, at 9-10.
kingFluidSpill,TIHETRIBUNE
85. Jason Pohl, PDCEnergytopay $35,000 lbrFebruaryFrac
69 65 826
-113/pdc-commission-crews-en(June 17, 2003), http://www.greeleytribune.com/news/
forcement#.
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But they understand that's not the best thing for the industry to do, and I appreciate that very much.""
Another media source is the increasingly popular documentary films. Although few studies have investigated the effect of documentaries on collective
behaviors and social movement campaigns, one new study uses the internet and
social media to show how a documentary film systematically reshaped public
perception and ultimately led to municipal bans on hydraulic [racking." Negative public sentiment about hydraulic fracking is more readily apparent in online
activity and social media chatter because traditional newspapers typically face
heightened obligations to show both sides of an issue. It is important that counsel to the industry organizations is aware of the perceptions and that she actively
presents a positive image.
Model Rule 3.6 speaks to media-related issues. Although the rule refers to
trial publicity issues, it also serves as analogous guidance for any media related
issue a lawyer might encounter in the course of representing the client. The
rule allows a lawyer to make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe
is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of
recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. But, such a
statement shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate recent
adverse publicity.
The following ten helpful tips, borrowed from an ABA article on "Avoiding Ethical Lapses When Using Social Media," can assist a lawyer in determining whether her media and social media activities are ethical based on the
Model Rules and various State Ethics Opinions:"
1. Social media profiles and posts may constitute legal advertising;
2. Avoid making false or misleading statements;
3. Avoid making prohibited solicitations;
4. Do not disclose privileged or confidential information;
5. Do not assume you can "friend" judges;
6. Avoid communications with represented parties;
7. Be cautious when communicating with unrepresented third parties;
8. Beware of inadvertently creating attorney-client relationships;.
9. Beware of potential unauthorized practice violations;
10. Tread cautiously with testimonials, endorsements, and ratings.
While not all ten tips apply to the flowback spill hypothetical, each tip presents a thoughtful recommendation on navigating legal issues in the era of increased media, particularly social media. Along with the ABA, various states
have considered how the model ethics rules apply to a lawyer's online activities.

86. Id. (quothigCOGCCDirector Matt Lepore).
87. ION BOGDAN VASI Er AL., STUDY lSES INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA TO SHO\v How
FRAcKING DocUMENTARY INFLUENCED PUBLIC PERCEPI'ON, PourICAL CHANCE (2015),
ttt://journials.sagepub.coi/doi/pdf/10.1177/0003122415598534.
88. ChristinaVassitiou Harvey etat., 10 Tius/orAvoiinEthica/LapsesWhen UsingSoci
Mdia, AMERICAN BAR AssociATION BUsINESs LAw TODAY (Jan. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/pibIications/bt/2014/01/03jharvey.html.
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In fact, the New York State Bar Association has published a "Social Media Ethics Guideline" specifically explaining guiding principles predicated upon the
New York Rules of Professional Conduct and ethics opinions interpreting the
state rules."
The takeaway for counsel to a hydraulic fracturing operation is not to avoid
use of social media and other means of communication. Despite the risks associated with using social media as a legal professional, technology brings opportunities to the legal profession to promote greater understanding, foster
community, and educate the public about the legal issues and governing law
related to hydraulic ['racking. Media reporting will surely be an element of a
flowback fluid release response, and counsel will need a plan to guide the message or be able to answer with a comprehensive picture of the situation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Flowback water spills can lead to regulatory issues, protests from local communities, or other problems that can create operational disruptions that increase costs and lower revenues. These impacts alone should drive counsel to
react swiftly. The industry and relevant regulating bodies must work together'
to ensure the continued safety and health of citizens and that state economies
can continue to improve as hydraulic fracturing secures the energy future. The
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct apply to an attorney's decisions and
actions surrounding hydraulic fracturing spill issues and provide comprehensive
guidance on what constitutes ethical action in counsel's response.
The Model Rules are act-centered, and it is exceedingly important to adhere to the rules closely given the constant scrutiny of industry. Model Rule 8.4
captures general behavior lawyers should know to avoid." It is misconduct to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or
official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law;
(1) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of
applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or

89. Social Media Ethics and Guidelines of the commercial and federal litigation section of
the New York State Bar Association (June 9, 2015), https://www.nysba.org/Sections/CommercialFederalLitigation/ComFed-PDFs/Social-MediaEthicsGuidelines.htnl.
90. Mod. Rule Prof. Conduct r. 8.4.
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(g) engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimhination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law. This paragraph
does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a
representation in accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.
To state it simply, lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or
instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf." In addition to considering
the general information in this article, lawyers should be aware of ethics rules
and ethics opinions adopted by the specific jurisdictions in which they are licensed. The ABA Model Rules, along with State Rules of Ethics, may not provide ethical guidance for every situation, thereby leaving a decision to personal
ethics. In that case, a lawyer should act cautiously and tread lightly.

9 1.

Id.

SELECIONS OF POETRY
JUSTICE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.
In Volume 3/Issue 2; Volume 5/Issue 2; Volume 7/Issue 2; Volume 9/Issue
11/Issue 2; Volume 13/Issue 1; Volume 14/Issue 2; Volume 15/IsVolume
2;
sue 2; Volume 16/Issue 2, Volume 18/Issue 1, we published selections of poems by Justice Hobbs. In the tradition of updates to previous publications, we
hope you enjoy this additional selection.
TENT LIKE OPENINGS
Let the music in your judgments sing!
The rule of law is nothing but the song of human beings
raised in hopeful expectation of yearning for a place to
Nourish, grow, and cultivate each and every living thing.
A cup of water from the widow's well, a burning bush,
a father's knife, spared to save a darling son
His future husbandry.
When so much is given, holding to the world's rim
intonations of a cherished sister's richer resonance,
If not to ask, "Why does each and every day re-circulate?"
as if the day before we'd missed the cairn the breaking light
Sets upon the ripples of a lake.
BOLO TIEJUSTICE
The people of Colorado put us together
a person at a time to conference
and to stand for the rule of law
determined a case at a time,
reasoning and differing together
enjoying each other's company,
109
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celebrating our western regalia.
Well worn together.
(for my dear colleagues, Nancy, Ben, Allison, Monica, Will, Brian, thank you
and may the court forever change, true and resonant)
ASK THE TowERs
Why did the builders build you?
Because the bees led us to the water pockets
And raven played lookout over farmsteads,
See here! See here! He cried out loud,
Climb down! Climb down!
Taste the rain a cavern ceiling drips
with lightning from the sky
You can paint upon a water jar.
Every morning, every evening
Sleeping Man is with you,
In the slant the seasons make
and the Ancestors,
When it's time to plant
and time to harvest.

0, COLORADO!
Never so vibrant does our country seem
this first full week of the Solstice 2015,
Back and orange tail feathers streaming.
Never such a ruby-throated white-breasted,
green-backed purple sheen!
Stone cold ice balls give way to stars,
the bee homes to the blossom.
A torch is lit,
New ground is broken,
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wild orchids hang in the air,
Charred forests are renewed,
all creatures live creation.
Sound the bell!
Each of us is loved greatly.
A SMALLER DOOR
Herod's Palace outside of Bethlehem.
He commanded wise men to return and tell him
where the child could be found.
Disappointed, he ordered the murder of every
newborn male Jewish child. Shepherds watched
over them,
Joseph packed them up and headed for Egypt.
The Holy Spirit guides wise man and women
away from Herod.
Many churches, like the Church of the Nativity,
are built on sacred ground. All ground is sacred
When one enters through a smaller door
in the company of others Mother and Child in
the place, they say, is the birthplace of this child
May as well be any place on Earth. Without
distinction, every person's birth and origin
Is endowed in grace with love.
PRAISE, PRAISE UNTO THE TURNING OF THE LIGHT
Go you now, serving simply well goodbye
Steady bright the many ways into night,
Praise, praise unto the turning of the light
As you festoon our window's living room
As limbs extend the arc of day's array,
Praise, praise unto the turning of the light
This bed of straw awaits the bearing gifts
Children bring tomorrow morning, singing,
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Praise, praise unto the turning of the light
At Earth's opposite end Beagle Channel
Starts its summer breaking newer worlds in
Praise, praise unto the turning of the light
Remnant witness, testament towers stand
Gone and build we here, leave and yet abide
Praise, praise unto the turning of the light
And you, grandchildren, where so many be
Upon this mount been brought about, for love
Go you now, serving simply well goodbye
Praise, praise unto the turning of the light.
FOR A NEW YEAR
May we please bow our heads as we pray for our dear friend,
Diane Hoppe, Aspinall Award winner who is in the hospital today,
As we gather today in each other's good company
to share the abundance of all gifts we receive,
this food we eat, this water we drink, this conversation
we generate through the labor and fruit
of the commitment of others.
May the story of our lives continue to invigorate the Colorado
we inherit, love, and bequeath. In the open space of
opportunity, may we learn to practice grace and respect,
with self-correcting wit and humility in our slips and falls,
Righting the wrongs we do unto others and celebrating
another chance to engage in what we may and what we will.
Lord, we thank you.
CENTENNIAL VILLAGE
February 1861 Colorado becomes a territory carved out of
Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico & Utah Territories
Taking in the Great Divide, the upper reaches of the Platte,
Republican, Arkansas, Rio Grande, and Colorado rivers.
A new President awaits his oath of office,
on account of him, the South secedes.

V
Volumec
20

Issue 1I

POETRY

113

Free soil, anti-slavery Colorado lumbers into
sagebrush plain farms, villages, courthouses,
Lawyer Lincoln presiding.
Newly-married Leroy and Martha Carpenter
take up residence in the Union Colony
At the confluence of the Poudre and the Platte
Delph Carpenter, one of three boys, the one with the rakish curl closest to
his mother, is destined to become the architect of interstate river treaties.
He sleeps in the attic with his brothers, stokes a stove of ditches and
dreams. Beneath the spacious skies, row on row they rustle green.
Hair-woven family ties are coded into future generations.
ENCORE
Strider and I set out this morning of the 4h with a commission
to fetch a smidgen more of
Louisiana Purchase columbine for friends in Philadelphia
of the Declaration's proclaiming
She prefers nooks of filtered-light companionship
with ponderosa, aspen, Doug Fir
In the upper reaches of the Missouri Mississippi watershed
of the Hayman and Buffalo Creek Windy Peak burns
As if she were the quieter whir of a hummingbird.
CROSSING THE BAR, YoUR SWEARING IN!
May it please the Court! Distinguished colleagues, family and friends. And
especially you, our newest Colorado-licensed attorneys.
Welcome! You are about to take the attorney's oath of this office. We call
upon you now to cross this Bar. For you it's a new morning, a new day as it is
for us.
To quote a poet of the common law tradition, Alfred Tennyson, "may there be
no moaning at the bar" as you put out to sea. In this "bourne of Time and
Place," you embark to "one clear call" which "drew" you "out the boundless
deep" and "turns again home."
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You embark upon no solitary venture. Listen well as you and your fellow colleagues say this oath together. Take to heart each of its vows. Practice them
through every new morning given you.
To quote a poet in our constitutional tradition of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, "Can't you hear the rooster crowing ...
underneath the bridge
where the water flows ... so happy to see you smile underneath the sky of
blue ... on this new morning with you." His parents named this Nobel Laureate Robert Allen Zimmerman.
Bob Dylan's Jewish paternal grandfather Zigman was born in Odessa, Ukraine,
grew up in an atmosphere of virulent anti-Semitism, and fled with his wife Anna,
whose family roots were originally in Turkey near the Armenian border, to Ellis
Island in 1909, then to Minnesota.
Abraham Lincoln, another mid-westerner, haled his ancestry from England,
thence into Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois. As a one term Congressman from
Illinois elected in 1846, he opposed the Mexican- American War for being an
unjust slave-owner conspiracy fomented to add additional lands to the United
States for the expansion of slavery.
His stance on the floor of Congress against President Polk's war was so unpopular he did not seek another term. His call to the summit of service came when
the United States Supreme Court announced its 1857 Dredd Scott decision,
holding slaves could never be free, could never be citizens, could be held in
bondage anywhere within the Territories and States of the United States.
Orient yourself well to this place of your admission! Colorado became a Territory in February of 1861 shortly after Lincoln was elected President and the
Southern States were leaving the Union. We became a State in 1876 during
the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant.
The courtrooms of the Colorado Supreme Court and Court of Appeals are
housed in the Ralph Carr Judicial Center along Lincoln Street across from the
Capitol, anchored on a hill along Grant Street. The four pillars through which
you enter the courthouse stand for the four pillars of the Rule of Law in Colorado and the United States. These are the Separation of Powers among the
Legislative, Executive, andJudicial Branches of Government; Guaranteed Individual Rights; Due Process of Law; and Equal Protection of the Laws.
Two of these four pillars of the Rule of Law, due process and equal protection
applied to state and local government statutes, rules, and ordinances, result
from the Civil War Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Lawyer, constitutional scholar, witty and wise speaker and writer, Lincoln
founded his unswerving devotion upon a Nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all persons are created equal. To us, to each and
every generation of lawyers, citizens, and public officials he says: "It is for us the
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to the unfinished work" of justice.

Carved out of heart of the Great Divide as it runs through our State, Colorado
comprises a legacy of Native American, Hispanic, and multi-immigrant vigor
amongst a grand and vast landscape of plains, mountains, mesas, and canyons.
We share a common heritage forged from all too many common experiences. Despised, dismembered, exiled, enslaved, seeking refuge, protection,
and fulfillment, each and all of us, created equal, seeking like treatment,"Liberty
and Justice for All."
This is the sacred promise of the Declaration of Independence written into the
constitution as the result of the Rule of Law and inscribed at the pinnace above
the four pillars of the Ralph Carr courthouse, embraced and explained in the
building's Learning Center. As you enter through the four pillars, Martin Luther King's ringing reminder appears directly in front of you: "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."
Welcome, you, our state and our nation's newest lawyers! Justice is an incremental work in progress honed a decision at a time through exercise of the First
Amendment. As you take your oath, please reflect upon the fundamentals of
human experiences that bring you here to this day and hour forged into the
genealogy of the Rule of Law's DNA.
Take a look around you, please! Who do you share this promise with? We
do not stand on the shoulders of giants. We stand among them. They helped
get you here. You, in turn, will help others on. Practice well for each and every
business or person who calls upon your counsel. Take pro bono cases for those
who need you and lack financial means. Serve on boards and commissions,
local units of government, the state and nation. Play your music, art, and intellect. Write, speak, exercise the dual lobes of your brain, the two chambers of
your beating heart.
When you take the attorney's oath of office, you swear to yourself and to the
court you will step outside of yourself to walk in the shoes, the boots, the slippers, the moccasins, the loafers, the high heels, the tennis shoes, the ice skates
of someone else's no longer comfortable fit. You can feel the pinch of their
desperation, bad deal, loss, victimization, crash or ambit of their fondest wish
to leave something of their own to the future's very next ancestors.
This oath of office you are about to take invites you to cross tribal boundaries
within the jurisdiction of your mind and heart's ability to feel and listen well,
reason prudentially, give wise counsel freely to another tying the constraints of
the law to its ever-creative possibility. In this, you will stir the leaven of your
own legacy into good and edible fry bread.
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I AM A CREATURE LIGHT

I'm a creature light upon the water.
I have the gift of wings, of winged companions notching the waters.
Some mornings, though, I feel I'm clutching for a foothold.
I want to tuck my head amongst my feathers and hold myself off.
That's when the ripples others make gather me up.
YESTERDAY EVENING

Yesterday evening we gathered with our Book Group to enjoy each other's company and discuss "Our Souls at Night" by Colorado author Kent Haruf.
This his final writing opens with "It was an evening in May just before full dark"
and closes with "She could see her reflection in the glass. And the dark behind

it."
Even as move, we gather each other. We elders bound together by who we are
becoming.
No distance cannot be bridged. No loss cannot be re-gained. No belief worthy
of being disregarded.
No partiality other than becoming part of a wider and more comprehensive
opening into our souls at night.
As FROM A CLouD
And the Spirit came among them,
as from a cloud.
All understood one another,
through their tongues
Knew not the words many others
were pronouncing.
A gentle rain fell upon their beliefs,
forgiving them,
Lending them wings,
for each and every one of them
Had been fully conceived
from the inception of all creation.
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When the sun starts moving
north again?
When you hear the whirring
Sandhills fly overhead?
When you say your story in a paperwhite flurry of intoxicating garlic?
When the wind shushes down at dusk
and you glimmer the evening star?
When you swirl within that river of stars
Circling round and round above your heads?
O, Today! (Bobbie and Greg)
COLORADO,
Your name above all
Mountains, mesas, plains
Where we've been
Where we're going
Where we are
Your waters flow.
ON OUR WAY WE ARE MARTIN LUTHER KING
There are mountains higher
than the Great Divide,
Wider than the widest seas,
we the people are passing through
We've been this way before
We were born to become
a more perfect Union,
Oppressed, reviled, deprived
depending on each other's will
To right love into the rule of law.
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KINDs OF PROOF
Kinds of proofs more persuasive of character than admissible in a court of law.
Love of family.
Loyalty of friends.
Well-earned and affectionate allegiance in the work place.
Long drives up from the Valley and back again.
The giver's receiving line.
Every kind of growing thing.
Tug of a river dweller on your line.
UP THE SPINE
Do not doubt the curvature of your
backbone is up to the journey ahead
The contour of this land winds up
the artery of rivers
From both coasts.
Bird Woman in the lead
bride of a Frenchman
She carries her child on her back
bearing for the Bitterroots.
Shall we turn back now?

LEGISIATIVE REPORT
House Bill 16-1005 (Colo. Rev. Stat. 37-96.5-101 (2016)) (Effective Date:
Aug. 10', 2016) (allowing for rainwater collection limited to specific quantities
on single- and multi-family residential properties for outdoor use on that property and providing that such collection cannot create a water right).
INTRODUCTION
Colorado House Bill 16-1005 (2016 Colorado Session Laws 509)' (the
"Rainwater Bill", referenced hereinafter as the "Bill") creates the state's first
exception to the general ban on rainwater collection. The Bill restricts collection to a specified amount on single- and multi-family residential properties.
Residents may only collect Rainwater temporarily for outdoor usage. Unlike
previous efforts to implement rain water collection laws, the Bill contains critical
language that protects the prior appropriation system. The Bill balances the
delicate needs of water users by limiting rainwater collection to outdoor uses
and requiring the State Engineers Office to monitor for discernable effects on
downstream rights.

BACKGROUND
Prior to the Bill, Colorado was among several states that banned collection
of rainwater.' Those opposing collection argued the practice would injure
downstream water rights by depleting water that would otherwise return to the
watershed.' Previous attempts to end the rainwater collection ban failed because they did not account for the needs and concerns of downstream water
rights holders. Citizens sought to end the ban because they saw the use as minimal in relation to other demands in the Colorado water system.
In 2007 the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) observed the
effects of rainwater harvesting and suggested that the legislation be changed due
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to the minimal impact and the benefit from collecting rain water.' The CWCB's
suggestion, droughts, and an increase in Colorado population created an opportunity to revisit the issue.

DISCUSSION
The Bill delicately balances the different uses of water across the state. It
satisfies senior and junior appropriators by allaying injury concerns while
providing the Bill's proponents with a new water source. Its proponents see the
Bill as an opportunity to show that rainwater collection and prior appropriation
can coexist. The Bill accomplishes this balance through regulating the collection process, limiting quantities, specifying uses, preventing collectors from vesting water rights, and creating a preventative monitoring system that curtails the
practice if harm to downstream users occur.
Despite the Bill's efforts to balance interests, some still voice the same concerns that have previously plagued efforts to introduce rainwater collection.
SenatorJerry Sonnenburg (R.-Dist. 1) raised concerns regarding possible injury
to those with vested rights downstream from rainwater collection. The Colorado Farm Bureau held concerns that rain barrel use would impede water rights
of senior appropriators.! Sen. Sonnenberg criticized rain barrel use as potentially "stealing"' and expressed concerns over how much water the collection of
precipitation. However, the prevailing belief is that the Bill's safeguards against
such negative impacts will prevent these concerns fror manifesting.
The Bill only allows for rainwater collection from residential rooftops when
certain conditions are met. The Bill allows for a maximum of two rain barrels
for outdoor use on properties. Rain barrels are above-ground containers with
sealable lids connected to a gutter or downspout. A barrel's storage capacity
may not exceed 110 gallons. Collectors can use the collected precipitation only
on the property where-collected, for outdoor uses only. Rainwater may only be
collected on single family residential properties or multi-family residential properties with four or fewer units. This excludes most apartment buildings and all
commercial buildings. The Bill also encourages the state Department of Public
Health and the Environment to develop best practices for nonpotable use of
the collected precipitation to the extent practicable.
Next, there is a level of efficiency that the specified uses can help to reduce
loss of usable water. Supporters of the bill see the outdoor use as beneficial
because (i) collecting rainwater for later outdoor use merely alters the timing of
return flows, not the actual availability of the water in the watershed and (ii)
water that would have fallen on a paved or other impermeable surface and been
lost to evaporation, thus harvesting and outdoor application of rainwater offsets
5.
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potential losses to the system.' This keeps harvested rainwater separate from
indoor (in many areas, municipal) water systems that would otherwise carry water to a septic field or water treatment plant rather than returning it to tributary
streams as return flows. This protects those with downstream water rights premised on the availability of those return flows.
Importantly, water collectors do not get the opportunity to acquire a water
right. The House added an amendment clarifying that rain barrels would operate in accordance with the prior appropriation principles enshrined in the
state constitution. It specifies that the use of a rain barrel does not create a water
right or allow a rain barrel user to place a "call" on the stream, leading to curtailment of junior water rights. This keeps a downstream user from worrying
about the ability of a rain barrel user to hinder the appropriators' right to water.
Lastly the preventative monitoring creates an additional safeguard for appropriators. Water rights holders' concerns are mitigated because the Bill tasks
the State Engineer's Office with monitoring rain barrel use and making future
reports to both agriculture committees in the General Assembly on whether this
has any discernable effect on downstream water rights.o The Bill grants power
to the State Engineer to curtail rain barrel use if harm to downstream user rights
occur." Furthermore, no language in the bill suggest that a water rights holder
cannot use a rain barrel to collect water under the provisions of the bill and use
them for purposes specified in the bill. Nonetheless, for the time being, Colorado joins the rest of the country in allowing the collection of precipitation.
CONCLUSION
There is longstanding controversy between rain barrel collection and prior
appropriation in Colorado. The Bill represents legislative compromise where
legislators saw an opportunity to craft a mutually beneficial law that could have
significant, positive impacts moving forward.
Written and sponsored by: Rep. Daneya Esgar (D-Dist. 46), Rep. Jessie Danielson (D-Dist. 24), and Sen. Michael Merrifield (D-Dist. 11).
Notable For:Rep. Mark Scheffel(R-Dist. 4, Maj. Leader), Rep. Kevin Lundberg
(R-Dist. 15), Rep. John Cooke (R-Dist. 13, Maj. Whip), Rep. Michael Merrifield (D-Dist. 11), Rep. Chris Holbert (R-Dist. 30).
Notable Against: Sen. Jerry Sonnenburg (R-Dist. 1), Sen. Ray Scott (R-Dist. 7),
Sen. Kent D. Lambert (R-Dist. 9), Sen. (R-Dist. 23), Beth Martinez Humenik
(R-Dist. 24), and Kevin Grantham (R-Dist. 2).
Kole Kelley
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CONFERENCE REPORTS
TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
ENVIRONMENTAL, ENERGY, AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAw FALL
CONFERENCE
A GLASS HALF EMiTY - FLINT, ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE, AND
AMERICA'S DRINKING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEM
Denver, Colorado

October 5-8, 2016

At the 24th Annual American Bar Association Environmental, Energy, and
Natural Resources Law Fall Conference in Denver, a panel of three professionals in the field of environmental justice tied themes of environmental justice to
the history, issues, and lessons learned from the recent drinking water crisis in

Flint, Michigan.
Randy Hayman, from Beveridge & Diamond in Washington, D.C., opened
by stating that the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") is the most important
piece of legislation the United States Congress has ever passed, because "water
is life." The SDWA gave U.S. citizens assurance that their water would not be
contaminated by anything that could cause serious health problems. Considering the necessity of water to human survival, Hayman said the SDWA is inherent to environmental justice.
The majority of Hayman's statements were about the history and execution
of the SDWA. Many regulatory checks were put in place by Congress to ensure
that everyone is confident their water is safe to drink and use for everyday needs.
Other than wells serving fewer than twenty-five people, every public water system is subject to the rules of the SDWA, and failure to meet the standards set
forth by the law can result in fines of $25,000 per day. The damage does not
just end with the fine, however. Public confidence in officials erodes when a
community violates SDWA rules. Therefore, public officials face the dilemma
of whether to publicize the existence of a water crisis, because failure to solve
the problem swiftly result in the public's trust quickly diminishing.
The moderator asked Hayman to elaborate on the Lead and Copper Rule,
a health standard that minimizes the amount of those contaminants in public
pipelines. Lead and copper particles enter the water stream from pipes, pollution, and natural processes. As long as the amount of either remains below a
specified "action level," the water is still considered safe for huian consumption. An action level is an amount of contamination that will require additional
action from water system administrators, including treatment, public notification, or exposure minimization. Exceeding an action level is not a violation
itself-nor is it necessarily a health and safety hazard-but it could indicate the
existence of a water-pollution problem. According to Hayman, because education about safe contaminant levels is insufficient, news of a community's water
123
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getting contaminated at all sometimes causes panic. Hayman suggested officials
should take greater steps to inform the public about lead and copper, since it is
only when those measurements rise to very high levels that they become a potential threat to health.
The second speaker was Quentin Pair, a professor of environmental justice
at Howard University School of Law who also works in the environmental justice division at the Department of Justice. According to Pair, environmental
justice is the civil rights of the Twenty-First Century. In his discussion, Pair said
the themes of the civil rights movement are tied directly to modern environmental justice because the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") definition of "environmental" has very similar language to Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act- equal treatment is emphasized in both. He mentioned how critical it is to
consult the general public first about environmental issues, rather than waiting
for elected officials to take notice. He believes grassroots organizing can begin
to solve environmental problems much more efficiently and effectively than any
other public resource, because local community members, more than elected
officials, know which issues are most important to their neighbors.
As part of his discussion, Pair shared the story of the beginning of modern
environmental justice in Warren County, North Carolina. Beginning in 1973 a
large landfill was used to dispose of contaminants without the knowledge or
consent of one of the poorest counties in the state, the populations of which
were more than seventy percent black at the time. This controversy was addressed in several lawsuits, including
v. Wardin 1982. This trend
vhedStates
has since continued, and three out of every four disposal facilities in the country
are located in minority and low-income communities. According to Pair, race
is the most significant determinant of the location of these disposal facilities
across the country. He said that in order to talk about environmental justice, it
is impossible not to consider how much damage environmental racism has
caused.
Michelle Wilde Anderson, a law professor at Stanford who focuses on state
and local government, was the final speaker on this panel. She brought the
discussion full-circle by connecting what the other speakers discussed to the
Flint crisis. She described the professionals who initiated the documentation of
the contaminated drinking water in Flint, including a pediatrician who investigated the doubling and tripling of lead levels in her patients' blood. Those
professionals did what Pair criticized public officials for not doing: they listened
to the community and learned what was wrong.
Wilde Anderson also described how the cause of the crisis was a revenue
problem rather than a spending problem. Because of an abundance of deferred
spending and loans in the 1970s, Flint did not have the resources to meet local
needs. Public infrastructure suffered as a result of the lack of resources, and
old systems that were not properly maintained grew more vulnerable to leaking
contaminants over time. Ultimately, she said, the decision to rebuild these outdated infrastructure systems is left to the taxpayers, and the longer those systems
go without repair the more likely health hazards are to occur in the near future.
Wilde Anderson views Flint as a warning or a wake-up call to the nation because
old pipeline systems will fail without better and more regular maintenance.
The panel then accepted questions from the audience. One audience
member asked how federal agencies, including the EPA", could do a better job
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dealing with environmental injustice. Pair suggested those problems could not
be solved without providing more funding for environmental justice, which
Congress has denied. He further noted that many communities do not trust
the federal government to solve all of their problems, so the EPA currently has
neither the political nor the financial support needed to tackle those issues. Another audience member asked how local communities can recognize access to
safe drinking water as a basic human right. Wilde Anderson answered by saying
that leaders do not try hard enough to make water available to communities that
cannQt afford it, so communities fall short of recognizing access to safe drinking
water as an essential human right. The costs associated with delivering water to
these communities are high, and not many cities have completed these critical
delivery infrastructure projects.
Travis Parker

NATIVE AMERICAN IAw STUDENTS ASSOCIATION, NATURAL RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENTAL IAw SOCIETY, AND THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER
WATER IAW REVIEW PANEL
WATER, OIL, AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE FIGHT FOR THE DAKOTA
ACCESS PIPELINE

Denver, Colorado

September 27, 2016

On September 27, 2016, the University of Denver Sturrn College of Law
("DU") hosted a panel discussion about the current legal fight over the Dakota
Access Pipeline in North Dakota. The panel addressed legal, historical, social
justice, and environmental justice topics related to the dispute. The discussion
was co-sponsored by DU's Natural Resources & Environmental Law Society,
Native American Law Students Association, and the DU Water Law Review
Professor Fred Cheever, a DI Law professor and co-director of the
school's Environmental & Natural Resources Law Program, moderated the discussion and introduced the issue. The Dakota Access Pipeline ("DAPL") is an
approximately 1,170-mile pipeline constructed to transport crude oil from
North Dakota to Illinois. The pipeline's path is intended to span four statesNorth Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, and Illinois-and cross the Missouri River
at a point located a half-mile from the Standing Rock Indian reservation in
North Dakota. The DAPL route would pass through tribal lands of great dultural, religious and spiritual significance to tribes.
Professor Brad Bartlett, a visiting assistant professor in the Environmental
Law Clinic at DU Law, offered a timeline of events regarding the DAPL legal
conflict. In July 2016, Earth justice, on behalf of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe,
filed a declaratory and injunctive relief complaint in U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia (StandingRock Sioux Tribe v. US. Army Corps of Engineers). The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe intervened and joined the lawsuit in
August 2016. In the initial complaint, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe argued
that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") violated multiple federal statutes, including the Clean Water Act, National Historic Protection Act, and National Environmental Policy Act, when it issued permits to move forward with
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construction of the DAPL. First, the DAPL's route is intended to pass under
the Missouri River just a half a mile upstream of the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe's reservation boundary. A federal permit is required under the Clean
Water Act for any construction project impacting federally regulated riversincluding the DAPL's crossing of the Missouri River. In this case, the permitting
process triggers requirements under the National Historic Protection Act that
intend to protect areas of great cultural significance to the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe, such as sacred sites and burial grounds. The Tribes argue that the Corps
pre-authorized construction of DAPL without ensuring compliance of the National Historic Protection Act, allowing the Corps to circumvent its statutory
responsibility to ensure that the DAPL does not harm historically and culturally
significant sites. The Tribe's injunctive relief complaint seeks to stop the DAPL
from proceeding and causing irreparable harm.
Professor Bartlett oversees DU law students in the environmental law clinic
who worked in conjunction with Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP, a national
Indian law firm, to file a complaint on behalf of the Yankton Sioux Tribe on
September 8, 2016, for declaratory and injunctive relief in U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia (Yankton Sioux 7ibe v. US. Anny Corps ofEngineers) to stop construction of the DAPL. The Yankton Sioux Tribe Reservation is located in South Dakota along the Missouri River. The complaint seeks
to prevent the Corps and other federal agencies from violating the National
Historic Preservation Act, the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),
the Clean Water Act, the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie, and the Administrative
Procedures Act. Specifically, NEPA requires a federal agency to complete an
environmental impact statement, including public engagement and detailed
comparison of alternatives. Additionally, the complaint requests that the Corps
engage in a more meaningful consultation process with the tribal communities.
Professor Bartlett noted that neither has happened as of September.
On September 9, 2016, U.S. District Court Judge James Boasberg denied
the tribes' motions for an injunction. Immediately following this decision, the
Justice Department, the Department of the Anny, and the Department of the
Interior issued a joint statement moving to stop construction of the DAPL on
land near the Standing Rock Indian Reservation until the Corps could revisit
and reconsider previous decisions under federal laws. The joint statement also
requested that tribes and government agencies meet to evaluate the current govermnient-to-government consultation and to determine how to better include
tribes in decision-making processes concerning pipeline construction.
Professor Bartlett also noted that the tribal response to the construction of
this pipeline has resulted in the largest congregation of Native Americans in the
past 100 years. Police and private security forces have responded with arrests
and violence to tribes' peaceful acts of civil disobedience. As of September
2016 a prayer camp still remains in the area with ongoing protest demonstrations.
The second panelist, Dr. Angel M. Hinzo, is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Interdisciplinary Indigenous Studies at the University of Denver Interdisciplinary
Research Institute for the Study of (In)Equality (IRISE) focusing on Native
American history from the mid-19th century to the present. In the panel, Dr.
Hinzo recounted how the history of U.S. governmental and tribal relations is
characterized by contrasting, and often conflicting, worldviews. She said the
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federal government's extraction of natural resources embodies western values
of exploitation for economic gain. For example, proponents of the DAPL have
framed the project as benefiting the public good' by creating jobs during the
construction phase of the pipeline and contributing to federal sales and income
taxes. Tribes, on the other hand, view the same natural resources, as sentient
beings to be respected and revered, not exploited. The current DAPL conflict
illustrates this fundamental difference in worldview because the pipeline would
transport crude oil over an area rich in cultural and natural resources. Historically, according to Dr. Hinzo, the Corps-the oldest agency dealing with natural
resources in the United States-has harmed native lands and the environment.
Additionally, Dr. Hinzo raised concerns that the construction of pipeline
threatens local tribal burial sites. In September 2016, the pipeline construction
company-Dakota Access LLC-destroyed burial sites near the Standing Rock
Indian Reservation to build the DAPL. Dr. Hinzo emphasized that the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA") provides regulations to protect culturally significant sites during infrastructure projects,
which the Corps and pipeline workers did not respect. Dr. Hinzo also argued
that discussions around the DAPL need to better address the NAGPRA.
Lastly, Dr. Hinzo noted the social costs associated with the oil-and-gas boom in
North Dakota. Communities living near fossil fuel extraction have witnessed
an increase in violence and sex trafficking. Low income tribal communities
living near the proposed route of the DAPL, who already experience difficulty
with these issues, are increasingly at risk.
The panel's third speaker, Mr. David Neslin, is of counsel at Davis Graham
& Stubbs LLP in Denver, Colorado. He previously managed the Colorado Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission within the state's Department of Natural
Resources, which regulates all oil and gas development in Colorado. During
his career, Mr..Neslin has also represented multiple tribes in natural resourceextraction issues.
First, Mr. Neslin noted that the sole issue of the preliminary injunction action was whether the Corps violated federal laws when it issued permits allowing
construction of the DAPL to move forward. In general, preliminary injunctive
relief actions seek to halt a project and maintain the status quo until the court
has a chance to go through the full litigation process and resolve the issue. Consequently, the court's denial of the injunction in this case was a narrow decision
because it did not go to trial or produce a full development of record. Next,
Mr. Neslin spoke about the importance of the administrative record to the
court's decision and how this case represents a good example of why it is vital
for parties to develop and convey a cohesive narrative to the court. While people can disagree about the substance of such records, he said that the Corps
adequately documented its compliance and "checked all the boxes" needed to
comply with federal regulations as to tribal consultations and environmental impacts of the DAPL. As noted earlier, the federal government is required to
provide permits under the Clean Water Act to allow the DAPL to move forward, triggering requirements under the National Historic Protection Act to ensure proper treatment of sacred sites. Because the Corp followed and completed steps outlined in the permitting process, Judge Boasberg denied the
tribes' motions for an injunction. Mr. Neslin argued that it was the Department
ofJustice's multiple affidavits, for example, that illustrated the ways in which the
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Corps took the proper steps in allowing the DAPL to move forward. The
tribes, he said, could have done a better job of illustrating and citing examples
to the court of the DAPL's impacts on tribal cultural resources. Finally, Mr.
Neslin noted that the district court opinion serves as a reminder of the potency
of judicial deference toward agency decision making in cases like this. Traditionally, courts defer to agencies-such as the Environmental Protection
Agency-to determine whether infrastructure projects have followed proper
procedure when considering environmental and cultural impacts. When not
one overarching agency exists to ensure proper compliance, as in the case of
the DAPL, multiple federal agencies follow their own processes when dealing
with a discrete aspect of the overall project. Mr. Neslin said that federal segmentation of this kind results in piecemealed environmental and cultural impact
assessments, overlooking the potential for studying the impacts of the project as
a whole.
The final panelist, Ms. Heather Whiteman Runs Him, is a staff attorney at
the Native American Rights Fund ("NARF") in Boulder, Colorado, where she
works on tribal water and natural resource rights issues. She provided an overview of tribal water rights and upcoming meetings between tribes and the U.S.
government to evaluate current administrative consultation requirements. Ms.
Whiteman Runs Him explained that NARF's role in the current DAPL actions
is to coordinate multiple amicus briefs in support of tribes' ongoing defense.
Ms. Whiteman Runs Him explained that the foundation of tribal water rights
under federal law rests on the Winters Decision, which says that the establishment of an Indian reservation includes an implied reservation of water for future use in an amount necessary to fulfill the needs of the reservation.
While Winters recognized tribal rights to water, Ms. Whiteman Runs Him
noted, some tribes are working with state and federal governments to quantify
their water rights and build water infrastructure in order to put their water to
use. Currently twenty-nine tribes have settled their water rights, while many
more have not. Settlement negotiations are generally expensive, lengthy, and
multi-step processes that involve analyzing the land base of the reservation, hydrology, soil science, economics, etc. Ms. Whiteman Runs Him emphasized
that neither the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe nor the Yankton Sioux Tribe have
either quantified or settled their reservation water rights, but that does not diminish the Tribes' rights to a reliable and safe water supply for their citizens.
These tribes have concerns about the DAPL's affect on their water supply because the pipeline's proposed route traverses the Missouri River, a major municipal water source to the Standing Rock Indian Reservation, directly upstream
from the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation, and the point of diversion for
its drinking water.
Ms. Whiteman Runs Him explained that federal agencies are required to
establish policies and procedures to meet the consultation standards of the National Historic Protection Act. Most federal agencies have established such policies; the Corps, however, has a history of failing to comply with federal standards in regard to tribal sovereignty. Ms. Whiteman Runs Him believes that
federal agencies need to "make the letter of the law match the spirit of the law"
by not only requiring the Corps meet requirements of the administrative process, but also implementing requirements in a way that is meaningful to the
intent of the regulations.
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One major point illuminated throughout the panel discussion and the question and answer period is the adequacy of a permitting process that allowed the
DAPL to move forward in the face of federal trust obligations to tribes. As
previously mentioned, the permitting process for the DAPL requires certain
mitigation activities under federal regulations to ensure proper treatment of sacred sites. While federal agencies may have completed the required steps to
receive permits, the tribes argue that such steps lack substance and do not adequately and meaningfully consider tribal input. While the permitting process
may be administratively sufficient, many question whether the process actually
fulfills spirit of the federal trust obligations to substantively consult and include
tribal input.
Lindsey RaIcii
SIXTH ANNUAL CARVER COLLOQUIUM
WATER FOR SALE: PRIOR APPROPRIATION OR FREE MARKET TRADE?
Denver, Colorado

September 29, 2016

The Rocky Mountain Land Use Institute hosted the sixth annual Carver
Colloquium on September 29, 2016. Former Colorado Supreme Court Justice, Gregory Hobbs, and Professor Gary Libecap, of the University of California, Santa Barbara Bren School of Environmental Science and Management,
compared the relative merits of the prior appropriation system and the free
market system of water allocation. The debate over which system of water allocation is better suited for today's environmental realities quickly evolved into
an in-depth discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of the doctrine
of prior appropriation, as well as an insightful comparison between Colorado's
use of prior appropriation and California's hybrid utilization of prior appropriation and riparianism. University of Denver Sturm College of Law professor
Jan Laitos moderated the event, which consisted of a ten-minute opening comment by each speaker, followed by three discussion questions from Professor
Laitos, and a thirty-minute session in which the speakers answered questions
from the audience.
Justice Hobbs began by reciting a poem and providing a brief history of
water law in Colorado. He discussed how the terrain of the American West
requires the prior appropriation system of water allocations because the riparian
system is not realistic in a place where the few sources of water are scattered
across an arid landscape. Water rights, he said, are for the beneficial use of the
people, and Colorado's historical use of the prior appropriation doctrine reflects that reality.
Professor Libecap followed Justice Hobbs' introduction with a brief explanation of California's current approach to water allocation. In California, the
riparian doctrine is still used in conjunction with the prior appropriation system.
The state owns the few large water projects that serve the main metropolitan
areas, and contracts between water rights holders in the water-rich north and
the water-scarce south tend to result in unfair distributions to the detriment of
southern water users. This complicated situation has led to heavy reliance on
groundwater supplies, which has caused severe shortages. Professor Libecap
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noted that the doctrine of prior appropriation is not to blame for California's
drought situation. Instead, Mr. Libecap pointed to the ill management of water
supplies by state legislators and municipalities.
After the introductory remarks, Professor Laitos directed his first question
to the two speakers: Could a "water markets" system or "water capitalism"where water rights are bought and sold like a commodity-ever replace the prior
appropriation system? Justice Hobbs began by stating that water rights are a
type of property right and such rights cannot be bought and sold like a product
or commodity. He said he did not believe a system in which water was bought
and sold like a commodity could be successful, especially in Colorado because
water rights are a public good determined by beneficial use, and although water
rights can be owned, the use of such a right is dependent on use by all other
owners. While prior appropriation is an adaptable system and could promote
a "water market," water rights could never be traded like other commodities.
Professor Libecap did not view the prior appropriation system as significantly
different from a "water market." He noted that there have been many water
contracts created in California, and said water acting as a commodity in a water
market promotes a more versatile system, with more cooperation between water-rights owners. Legislators in California are considering the use of legislative
mandates to control the current water shortage, but Mr. Libecap insisted that
this kind of approach would be unmanageable and inflexible for responding to
market and climate changes.
Professor Laitos then asked whether it is old fashioned that in 2016, when
our society is more technologically advanced, the largest and most senior water
rights holders are still ranchers and farmers as opposed to factories and production sites. Justice Hobbs argued that Colorado should remain true to its roots,
saying that although Coloradans need to find a way to meet the growing water
demands of booming urban areas, they should not do so at the detriment of
older agricultural water rights holders. Professor Libecap claimed that the media is misinformed about the actual amount of water used by agricultural producers. Californian farmers are not opposed to trading or sharing water rights
with the urban population; their main concern is that the state legislature will
see them as old fashioned and outdated, and will proceed to forcefully take their
rights away and reapportion them to others.
Professor Laitos' final question was whether the speakers believed that the
prior appropriation system is equipped to accommodate the countervailing
needs of the environment-keeping water in the stream to protect water quality
.and aquatic wildlife-and of making sure a senior appropriator has enough water, even if it means dewatering that streamJustice Hobbs responded that prior
appropriation is equipped to deal with environmental concerns but that it
comes at a cost. He pointed out that federal legislation has created permitting
regulations that overlay Colorado's prior appropriation system for any new major water projects, but those processes can take fourteen to eighteen years. Because of the increasing difficulty and uncertainty associated with getting those
supplies through new transbasin or storage projects, Front Range municipalities
are forced to turn to accelerated water-market acquisition, stoking the fears of
buy and dry on the Eastern Plains. Professor Libecap agreed that prior appropriation is perfectly set up to deal with environmental flows. Nevertheless, he
cautioned against states like California turning to solutions that involve issuing
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mandates to protect stream flows, which he called a tax on senior rights holders
and one that causes endangered species to become the enemy, thus creating a
conflict between local and environmental objectives. Instead, he argued, if
states really want to protect stream flows in the long term, they need to turn to
market solutions like leases, option contracts, or outright sales to protect that
water. That way the environment "owns" it and the farmers benefit financially,
both of which prevent the type of conflicts mandates will have down the road.
In the final portion of the debate, the audience asked questions of the
speakers. Justice Hobbs clarified that the prior appropriation doctrine used in
Colorado does not create the "use it or lose it" problem because the key concept of the prior appropriation system is benelicial use. Applicants are only
required to show actual use (historic consumption) and what is left over returns
to the stream for the public; thus, nothing is lost. Then, Professor Libecap
commented that the hybrid system currently used in California, when compared
to the much more streamlined Colorado system, lacks the clear statutory structure and direction required to create an active and effective "water market."
Professor Libecap also assuaged the general fear that recreational or aesthetic
water use in times of drought are frivolous by noting that such uses are so minuscule that they do not have much impact on broader water issues. Finally,
Justice Hobbs advised that the only problem with the prior appropriation system is management and enforcement of the system; he felt that the government
sometimes gave in to pressure from private parties, which decreases the effectiveness of the system. Justice Hobbs proposed that more administrative control in the future should combat this governmental failing and make the prior
appropriation system more successful.
7na Xu

COURT REPORTS
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAIS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist., 821 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2016)
(holding that a real estate developer and home builder failed to state facts sufficient to establish a facially plausible claim for relief in their complaint, which
alleged that a water district and its superintendent deprived them of federal and
state constitutional rights when the superintendent raised valid objections of
public concern against the construction of a subdivision).
In 2012, Najas Realty, LLC ("Najas") purchased a ten-acre parcel of land
(the "Property") in Seekonk, Massachusetts (the "Town") and filed a preliminary subdivision plan application to develop a ten-lot subdivision (the "Pine Hill
project"). The Seekonk Board of Health met to discuss the application. The
Seekonk Water District's Superintendent, Robert Bernardo, attended the
meeting and expressed concerns that the Pine Hill project could potentially impact one of the Town's wells, Well GP-4. Bernardo asserted that a malfunctioning septic system servicing a nearby middle school caused high nitrate levels
in the soil around GP-4. As a solution, the Board of Health required that Najas
perform a nitrate loading analysis.
After the Seekonk Board of Health initially met, Bernardo expressed concerns at two other meetings that the Pine Hill project's septic system could increase nitrate levels and expose unborn babies and nursing infants to "Blue
Baby Syndrome," and that nitrate contamination requires high clean-up costs.
Najas rejected these claims.
After these meetings, Najas completed its nitrate loading analysis and submitted a definitive subdivision plan. Najas claimed the plan satisfied regulatory
requirements for septic systems and kept nitrate levels in the GP-4 area within
regulatory limits. The Board of Health initially voted to approve the analysis.
After approval, the Planning Board held a public hearing. At the hearing, Bernardo claimed the nitrate loading analysis' data was false. In response, the Planning Board reviewed and denied the Pine Hill project. Najas then appealed to
the Massachusetts Land Court.
The appeal led to a settlement allowing Najas to proceed if it reduced the
number of lots from ten to nine and shortened the subdivision's road length.
The Planning Board reviewed the revised plan at another public meeting. Bernardo again attended and voiced concerns about water contamination issues.
The Planning Board approved the revised Pine Hill project. The Seekonk
Water District then filed a petition to the Planning Board to rescind or modify
the approved plan. The Planning Board denied the petition, and the Pine Hill
project continued in accordance with the revised plan.
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Najas, joined by Petra Building Corporation ("Petra") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts against the Seekonk Water District and Bernardo (collectively,
"Defendants"), asserting claims under the United States Constitution and analog claims under the Massachusetts Constitution. The complaint asserted: (1)
Defendants retaliated against the Plaintiffs for asserting First Amendment rights
to petition and freedom of speech; (2) Defendants violated Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights by singling them out; (3) Defendants
violated Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by opposing the
plan; and (4) Defendants tortuously interfered with Plaintiffs' business. The
district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Defendants,
stating that Najas and Petra failed to state a viable claim. Subsequently, Plaintiffs
submitted a second complaint, which the district court also dismissed in a final
judgment.
Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, claiming the district court required too much at the pleading stage and the
complaint was suflicient to deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
court of appeals reviewed the appeal de novo.
The court of appeals started its analysis noting that for constitutional claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must prove the conduct complained of was
committed under color of state law and that the conduct worked as a denial of
rights secured by the United States Constitution. The court of appeals accepted
that Bernardo acted under the color of state law, and proceeded by determining
whether he encroached on the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
To begin, the court of appeals analyzed whether Bernardo had retaliated
against the Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to petition and freedom of speech.
The court of appeals stated that a cognizable retaliation claim under the First
Amendment requires plaintiffs to show the conduct was constitutionally protected and that a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and
the retaliatory response. The court of appeals found it was unclear whether
Najas's conduct was protected petitioning conduct or free speech comprising
commentary on a matter of public concern. Instead, the court of appeals evaluated the test's second prong, whether the Plaintiffs had established a causal
connection between the protected conduct and the retaliatory response.
For this element, Najas pointed to Bernardo's accusation that the data submitted for the Pine Hill project was "fabricated, false, inflammatory, and baseless." The court of appeals first discussed the retaliatory conduct and found the
record offered no indication that Bernardo did not genuinely hold his concerns.
Graphs revealed "variable and sometimes excessive" nitrate levels from in the
monitoring the area dating back to 1995. The record also showed that members on the Board of Health previously expressed concerns regarding nitrate
levels before Bernardo spoke at the initial meeting. The court of appeals also
took judicial notice that the Environmental Protection Agency has linked excessive nitrate levels to Blue Baby Syndrome and that nitrate contamination requires high clean-up costs. Therefore, the court of appeals found the Plaintiffs'
allegations of retaliatory conduct were conclusory and that Bernardo had a duty
to raise objections about potential public health impacts that he believed were
valid.
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The court of appeals then discussed whether Bernardo violated the Plaintiffs' protected First Amendment right to free speech on a matter of public concern. Matters of public concern are those "relating to any matter of political,.
social, or other concern." The court of appeals found Bernardo had not committed such a violation because, as superintendent, he had an obligation to
speak out on matters of public concern.
Next, the court of appeals analyzed the claim that Bernardo violated the
Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights by singling them out
for unique reasons. To prevail on this claim, the complaint had to show the
Defendants were motivated by bad faith or malicious intent to injure when they
treated the Plaintiffs differently from others similarly situated and without a rational basis for doing so. However, the court of appeals found the Plaintiffs
failed to explain how other developers and builders were similarly situated because they did not provide basic information, such as when other projects were
located, and when they were built.
After the equal protection claim, the court of appeals examined the Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. To assert a viable substantive claim, plaintiffs must prove deprivation of an established life, liberty, or property interest, and that the deprivation occurred'
through governmental action that shocks the conscience. The court of appeals.
found that it was unclear what deprivation occurred, and noted the Plaintiffs
"oddly" claimed that by opposing the project, the Defendants deprived them of
life and liberty. The court of appeals instead analyzed the claim as a deprivation
of property.
Substantive due process claims regarding deprivation of property cases are
only available in "horrendous situations." The court of appeals found that, at
worst, the Defendants actions were "doggedly persistent," and this did not
amount to "brutal, meaning, and harmful" conduct as is necessary in such a
claim.
Finally, the court of appeals analyzed the Plaintiffs' claim that Bernardo
intentionally interfered with a business expectation, opportunity, and advantage.
Here, the court of appeals addressed whether Bernardo's actions directly attempted to interfere with business relations. The court of appeals granted Bernardo immunity for his actions under Massachusetts common law, where public
officials who act in good faith and exercise judgment and discretion are not liable for errors in making decisions. Here, the court of appeals again stated that
the Plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a plausible claim for bad faith or malice
intent.
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the order of the district court.
Kole Kelley
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAIS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding: (i) the
fishing clause in the Stevens Treaties guaranteed Indian tribes the right to offreservation fishing, with an inferred promise that sustainable fish populations
would be available for tribal harvest; (ii) the State violated the fishing clause by
constructing and operating barrier culverts that interfered with fish migration;

136

WA TER LA WREVIEW

Volume 20

and (iii) the permanent injunction appropriately ordered the State to correct
barrier culverts).
In 1854 and 1855, multiple Pacific Northwest Indian tribes ("Tribes") entered into the Stevens Treaties ("Treaties"), in which, inter alia, tribes relinquished land known as the "Case Area" to what is now the State of Washington
("State") in exchange for a guaranteed right to off-reservation fishing. Pursuant
to this "fishing clause," tribes had the right to take fish "at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations ... in common with all citizens of the Territory."
These Tribes rely on salmon fishing and engage in commercial salmon fishing,
consume salmon to meet dietary needs, and use salmon in cultural and religious
ceremonies. The Tribes and the State have long been in conflict over these
fishing rights. This case stems from a United States suit brought on behalf of
Tribes in 1970 to resolve these persistent conflicts.
When building roads over streams, State road builders historically constructed culverts under the roads to allow natural stream flow. However, these
culverts interfere with salmon migration. The culverts prevent juvenile salmon
from migrating to sea where they mature, prevent mature salmon from returning to their spawning grounds, and prevent young salmon from freely locating
food and avoiding predators. As a result, salmon numbers diminished.
In 2001, the Tribes filed a request for determination with the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington ("district court"), which
sought to impose a duty upon the State to abstain from constructing culverts
that degraded fish habitat and reduced adult fish populations. The United
States joined the Tribes' request for determination and sought declaration from
the district court that the fishing clause in the Treaties imposed a duty upon the
State to abstain from constructing or maintaining culverts that interfered with
the fishery resource in way that "deprive [d] the Tribes of a moderate living from
the fishery." Additionally, both the Tribes and the United States individually
sought a permanent injunction from the district court requiring that the State
open culverts that interfered with salmon migration, and requiring the State to
remedy culverts that substantially reduced fish migration, respectively.
The district court ruled against the State on two grounds: (i) that the fishing
clause imposed a duty upon the State to abstain from constructing or operating
culverts that interfered with fish migration in a manner that reduced salmon that
would "otherwise be available for Tribal harvest"; and (ii) that the State operated
culverts that violated this duty.
In 2013, after failed settlement efforts, the district court issued a Memorandum of Decision, in which it found that the Treaties purported to assure Tribes
that they would forever have an adequate salmon supply. The district court
reasoned that culverts, in part, degraded salmon habitat by inhibiting the free
migration of adult and juvenile salmon, which resulted in reduced Tribal harvests that prevented tribal members from earning a living and caused "cultural
and social hann to the Tribes in addition to economic harm." On the same
day, the district court issued a permanent injunction ordering the State, in consultation with the United States and Tribes, to compile a list of state-owned barrier culverts within the Case Area and required the State to correct all listed
culverts in a manner that provided fish passage. The State appealed.
On review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the
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State contended that the Treaties did not impose a duty on the State to abstain
from constructing barrier culverts, and objected to the scope of the district
court's injunction
First, the court of appeals determined the State's duties under the Treaties.
The court of appeals found that the State misconstrued the Treaties by characterizing their primary purpose as "opening up the region to settlement"; the
court of appeals instead deemed the primary purpose as establishing a reliable
means to sustain tribal livelihoods once the Treaties took effect. The court of
appeals, relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, construed treaties
between tribes and the United States in favor of the tribes. Along that vein, the
court of appeals reasoned the Tribes understood that the Treaties would provide not only access to usual and accustomed fishing places, but also to sustainable salmon populations; thus, regardless of explicit language, the court of appeals would infer that promise.
The court of appeals then reviewed the facts presented to the district court
regarding the State's culverts and recognized their effects within the Case Area
as "blockling] approximately 1,000 linear miles of streams suitable for salmon
habitat." Therefore, the culverts precluded sufficient salmon populations that
would maintain a moderate living for the Tribes. The court of appeals further
reasoned that replacing or modifying culverts to increase salmon migration
would render more mature salmon available for Tribal harvest.
Next, the court of appeals addressed the appropriateness of the district
court's injunction and rejected the State's contentions. The State contended
that the Tribes did not provide sufficient evidence that the culverts significantly
caused the salmon's decline. However, the court of appeals determined that
the Tribes had presented extensive evidence. Specifically, the Tribes presented
a report prepared by state agencies, which acknowledged culverts as a type of
barrier to fish migration and as "correctable obstacles." The State also contended that the district court's injunction ordered the State to correct almost all
state-owned barrier culverts without evidence that such corrections would improve salmon migrations. However, the court of appeals reiterated that the
State's own evidence illustrated that once salmon habitat is accessible by unblocking barrier culverts, "hundreds of thousands of adult salmon" would be
available to Tribes.
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's holdings and
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the permanent injunction.
Gia Austin
Idaho Conservation League v. Bonneville Power Admin., 826 F.3d 1173
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding that three federal agencies managing a dam did not
violate the requirements of NEPA when they decided to fluctuate the level of a
reservoir without filing an environmental impact statement, because that decision was within the range of action originally available when the dam was first
operational, and therefore, was not a major federal action).
The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") requires that federal
agencies prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS") for all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." An
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EIS is a detailed study that examines the environmental consequences of an
agency's action. To determine whether an EIS is necessary, Agencies prepare
environmental assessments ("EA"). In this case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided whether the Bonneville Power Administration ("BPA") violated the requirements of NEPA when BPA concluded in

an EA that no EIS would be necessary to raise and lower the level of Lake Pend
Oreille to generate power through the Albeni Falls Dam.

The Albeni Falls Dam ("Dam") lies on the Pend Oreille River and operates
to balance a variety of competing objectives including flood control, power generation, navigation, and wildlife conservation. Lake Pend Oreille ("Lake")
serves as the Dam's reservoir. The Dam's electricity output corresponds with
the amount of water released from the Lake. Higher output lowers the Lake
and causes its shoreline to recede.
The Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), the BPA, and the Bureau of Reclamation jointly manage the Dam. Since its completion in 1957, the Corps
fluctuated the level of the Lake to generate power as needed during the winter
months. However, from 1997 to 2011, the Corps maintained the Lake at a
constant level to mitigate adverse effects on the kokanee salmon population.
In 2009, the BPA advocated for more "flexible winter power operations."
The operating agencies developed a new plan (the "Plan"), which preserved the
Corps' discretion to raise and lower the level of the lake by up to five feet during
the winter. Along with the Plan, the agencies published an EA in which they
concluded that fluctuating the level of the Lake had no significant environmental impact. The agencies moved forward without preparing an EIS.
The Idaho Conservation League ("Petitioner") challenged the agencies' decision to move forward without preparing an EIS as a violation of the requirements of NEPA. The Petitioner requested the court of appeals to require that
the BPA prepare an EIS. The Petitioner also challenged the EA's finding of
no significant impact, claiming the agencies failed to consider the Plan's impact
on the spread of the flowering rush, an invasive species. The court of appeals
held that the Plan did not violate the requirements of NEPA.
First, the court of appeals rejected the Petitioner's EIS request, explaining
that an action is not a major federal action when an agency operates a facility
"within the range originally available to it," and that the EIS requirement only
applies where the proposed action is major. Actions regarding ongoing projects
can be major when agencies make changes that "themselves amount to major
Federal actions." There was no change in the Plan. In other words, the Plan
"did not change the status quo" because if the agencies had before consistently
fluctuated the levels of the Lake during the winter, then formalizing the approach to fluctuation would be "doing nothing new, nor more extensive, nor
other than that contemplated when the [Dam] was first operational." The court
of appeals concluded the Corps never relinquished its discretion to fluctuate
the level of the Lake from 1997 to 2011 when the agency maintained the Lake
at a consistent level. The court of appeals reasoned that because the agencies
decided to maintain the Lake at a consistent winter level on a year-to-year basis,
that they had always retained the authority to respond to annual changes in
power demands. By rejecting Petitioner's request, the court of appeals held
that all other challenges to the EA were moot. Since the Plan did not trigger a
major federal action, the agencies had no need to further consider the flowering
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rush.
Finally, the court of appeals noted that the Petitioner may have had a separate colorable claim if they had argued that the agencies must have supplemented an existing EIS with an analysis of how year-round dam operations affect the spread of the flowering rush. Agencies have a duty to supplement if
there are "significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns" that were not considered in an earlier EIS. However, the court of
appeals found that issue was outside the scope of the case and only raised on
appeal.
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the agencies' decision to move
forward with the Plan without preparing an EIS did not violate NEPA.
Trevor C Lanbirth
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
New Mexico, ex rel. State Engineer v. Trujillo, 813 F.3d 1308 (10' Cir.
2016) (holding that a special master in a general stream adjudication properly
granted summary judgment against an individual who objected to a district
court's proposed order limiting her water use to 0.5 acre-feet per year ("AFY")).
This case came before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as an individual
challenge to a general stream adjudication initiated by New Mexico to determine water rights in the Nambe-Pojoaque-Tesuque Basin ("Basin"), which originates in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains. Elisa Trujillo held a domestic well
permit allowing her to divert underground water in the Basin. The individual
adjudication of water rights led to the conflict between Trujillo and New Mexico. In 1983, the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
prevented the State from issuing domestic well permits in the Basin unless the
water was used only for household purposes. This permit provision specifically
excluded using water for irrigation. In 1985, Trujillo's predecessor-in-interest
received a domestic well permit in accordance with the 1983 injunction (prohibiting irrigation) and was granted a maximum use of 3.0 AFY.
In 1994, the district court directed a special master to determine the appropriate amount of water rights for all permits granted after 1982, including Trujillo's. The doctrine of beneficial use controls how much water is granted to
each permit and, under the New Mexico Constitution, is the amount of water
that can be used beneficially and with purpose; water rights are limited based
on that use.
Because of the 1994 order by the district court, Trujillo's permit was
amended to limit water use to either 3.0 AFY or the historic, beneficial use,
whichever was less. The district court allocated 0.5 AFY for domestic wells
unless permit holders showed a greater beneficial use. In 2006, the district
court required permit holders to show (1) why the permit should not be adjudicated to 0.5 AFY and (2) why the water rights should not be otherwise adjudicated consistent with the terms of the domestic well permit in order to obtain
more AFY. Essentially, the burden was placed on the permit holder to prove
a need for more than 0.5 AFY in keeping with the doctrine of beneficial use.
Trujillo's permit was originally designated for domestic use, and in 1985,
the permit allowed for up to 3.0 AFY of water. The State's proposed order
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restricted Trujillo's water use to indoor purposes and limited the amount to 0.5
AFY based on historic beneficial use. Trujillo objected to her permit's prohibition on outdoor use and the limitation of 0.5 AFY. The State offered into
evidence an affidavit by an expert witness stating that, on average, permits for a
domestic well use 0.4 AIN per household. Trujillo failed to prove that she had
the right to use more than 0.5 AFY under the doctrine of beneficial use for a
purpose other than as allowed in the permit. In 2010, the special master granted
summary judgment in favor of New Mexico.
After the special master issued the order, Trujillo filed several motions, including an objection to the 2010 order of summary judgment, two motions to
quash the 1983 injunction, and a motion to reconsider the district court's overruling of her objection to the order of summaryjudgment. In 2015, the district
court issued an order adjudicating Trujillo's domestic water rights as part of a
regional general stream adjudication. The 2015 order issued by the district
court imposed identical conditions on Trujillo's domestic water rights as had
been stated in the 2010 order: a limit of 0.5 AFY with a prohibition on outdoor
use including irrigation.
On appeal, the court of appeals did not find this to be a final ruling subject
to its jurisdiction because Trujillo and other permit holders may object to the
order during the itlerse stage before the district court enters a final judgment
on September 15, 2017. Therefore, the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review 2015 order by the district court. The
pragmatic finality doctrine is an exception under § 1291 and may be applied in
order to expedite appellate review. However, the court of appeals did not apply
the pragmatic finality doctrine to Trujillo's appeal, instead finding jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a), which permits interlocutory appeals.
Accordingly, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the special master's summary judgment order issued in 2010. The court of appeals upheld the
district court's ruling from 2010 and the subsequent order in 2015. Trujillo did
not present the court with evidence of her beneficial indoor use. Trujillo failed
to raise an argument against the 2010 decision upon which the 2015 decision
was based. Contrary to New Mexico law, Trujillo argued that her permit alone
created the water right. Beneficial use is the basis from which all water rights
within the state may be legally measured and limited, and Trujillo gave no evidence of her beneficial use for indoor purposes in excess of the allocated 0.5
AFY.
Therefore the court of appeals affirmed the district court's order for summary judgment in favor of the state of New Mexico.
MargaretCasey
STATE COURTS
COLORADO

County of Boulder v. Boulder & Weld Cnty. Ditch Co., 367 P.3d 1179
(Colo. 2016) (holding that the Water Court correctly denied the County of
Boulder's change of use application because it failed to meet its burden of proving an accurate historical consumptive use analysis).
Beginning in the early 1990s, the County of Boulder (the "County") entered
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into a series of transactions to acquire the Bailey Farm, a 290-acre property
historically used for irrigated agriculture and gravel mining. The County aimed
to develop the Bailey Farm into an open-space park featuring two ponds made
from gravel pits filled with groundwater. The ponds would expose groundwater
and increase evaporation, requiring the County to replace lost water through an
augmentation plan under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-137. To meet this requirement, the County filed an application in the District Court for Water Division
No. 1 for underground water rights, approval of a plan for augmentation, a
change of water rights, and an appropriative right of substitution and exchange.
Each component was interdependently linked. The application hinged on approval of the change in water rights. The County sought to change fifty inches
of its Martha M. Matthews Ditch surface water right ("MM water right"), used
historically to irrigate the Bailey Farm (the "Bailey Farm Inches"), into an augmentation plan. Boulder and Weld County Ditch Company ("BW Ditch")
opposed the County's application, claiming injury from the proposed change.
At trial, the County submitted two historical consumptive use ("HCU")
analyses examining the Bailey Farm Inches to prove BW Ditch would not suffer
injury. Both analyses included a prorated estimate that assumed previous users
delivered the Bailey Farm Inches entire to 101 acres of the Bailey Farm. The
County's first analysis assumed full delivery of all fifty Bailey Farm Inches to
Bailey Farm from 1950 to 2000; however, BW Ditch records later revealed the
HCU analysis overestimated actual consumption by thirty-seven percent from
1973 to 2000. As a result, the County supplemented the original HCU analysis
with BW Ditch's correct numbers from 1973 to 2000 and the same estimated
numbers for 1950 to 1972. The Water Court cited three fatal deficiencies. in
the County's HCU analysis.
First, the County inaccurately calculated actual use of the Bailey Farm
Inches. BW Ditch claimed the County overstated the number of acres the
Bailey Farm Inches historically irrigated, which would unlawfully enlarge the
Bailey Farm Inches water right and injure down-stream users. Second, the
County failed to prove the Bailey Farm Inches irrigated the seventy-acre parcel
of land that the County purported. Specifically, the County assumed without
support that the Bailey Farm Inches irrigated the entire Bailey Farm and based
the HCU analysis on these figures. Finally, the County ignored the historical
consumption of other water rights by conducting a parcel-specific analysis, rather than ditch-wide analysis. The Water Court rejected the County's findings
as inaccurate and insufficient to meet the County's burden of proving HCU,
and consequently dismissed the entire application because the County could
not demonstrate an absence of injury to others or that the proposed change in
water rights would not fully compensate for the anticipated loss. The County
appealed the Water Court's determination.
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court's holding. The supreme court divided its analysis into two stages. First, the supreme
court discussed applicable principles of Colorado water law. Second, the supreme court discussed whether the County provided an accurate HCU analysis.
In its discussion of legal principles, the supreme court explained why an
accurate HCU analysis is necessary for persons exposing groundwater through
gravel pits. It first explained the interaction between surface and ground water
rights, and the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969,
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which integrated the prior appropriation of surface with ground water while
maximizing beneficial use of water. Integrating surface rights with groundwater
often requires augmentation plans. Augmentation plans allow users out-of-priority- groundwater diversions, so long as he or she adequately replenishes the
diversion from existing water rights to protect senior water rights. Water districts only approve augmentation plans that do not injure other users. A careful
accounting of actual water use may help demonstrate lack of injury and prevent
the unlawful expansion of water rights.
Next, the supreme court examined long-established principles regarding
changes of water rights and HCU analyses. The supreme court noted that the
amount of water changed must reflect the actual amount of water used and exist
within the water's contemplated use at the time of appropriation. This limitation comes from the principle that water rights derive from both appropriation
and beneficial use. Once diverted, the water's beneficial use becomes the basis,
measure, and limit of the water right. The supreme court also explained that
modification of use itself cannot injure other water users. Courts often intertwine these principles, as an expansion of a water right's previous use often reduces the amount of water in return flow. Thus, established principles allow
water rights holders to change only as much water as they historically consumed
in the manner contemplated by those rights.
The supreme court then analyzed whether the County upheld its burden in
proving a reliable HCU. The supreme court first found the County did not
accurately report historical consumption of Bailey Farm Inches. As the applicant, the County had to prove that previous users of the Bailey Farm Inches
actually used the water as calculated in the HCU analysis. Despite this change,
the supreme court found the inaccurate estimate cast serious doubt on the validity of the remaining figures and, thus, the entire report. The County failed
to provide a convincing explanation for their inaccurate HCU. Thus, the supreme court affirmed the Water Court's decision that the County failed to carry
its burden of accurately quantifying the amount of Bailey Farm Inches actually
used on the Bailey Farm.
The supreme court also held that the County did not show the Bailey Farm
Inches historically irrigated the entire Bailey Farm. Covering a total of 101
acres, the Bailey Farm existed as two main parcels: a thirty-one-acre parcel and
a seventy-acre parcel. To carry its burden, the County had to prove that the
101 acres of the Bailey Farm claimed was within the lawful place of use and
historically irrigated with Bailey Farm Inches. The County failed to offer definitive proof that the larger portion of the Bailey Farm in fact received Bailey
Farm Inches for irrigation. Specifically, the supreme court pointed to the lack
of evidence on the record demonstrating the seventy-acre parcel received any
of the Bailey Farm Inches. Without actual evidence showing past users irrigated
the seventy-acre parcel with Bailey Farm Inches, the supreme court could not
accept the analysis. Moreover, the supreme court also explained that even if
the seventy-acre parcel fell within the lawful place of use, the County would still
have to prove that the MM water right was actually used on that land over time.
At first, different entities appropriated the Bailey Farm Inches to use in different
properties. Over time, the owners consolidated the properties. Because of the
convoluted past, the Water Court required an accurate accounting of actual past
use. Absent actual proof of historical use, the Water Court declined to rely on
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the County's HCU. In committing these two errors, the County failed to prove
the HCU and, thus, failed to prove a lack of injury to other water users.
The supreme court also rejected the County's request for an appropriative
right of substitution and exchange. The supreme court found the County could
not supplement its augmentation plan through a water lease with the City of
Lafayette because the lease alone could not satisfy the County's replacement
obligations.
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the ruling of the Water Court and
denied the County's change of use application.
ConnorPace
San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Pres. Ass'n v. Special
Improvement Dist. No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 351
P.3d 1112 (Colo. 2015) (en banc) (affirming the Water Court's decision in holding: (i) the Water Court correctly rejected challenges to issues previously affinned by appellate courts; (ii) objections to an annual replacement plan pending resolution does not justify a stay on the plan; (iii) the Closed Basin Project
water was an adequate source of replacement water; (iv) the annual replacement
plan's treatment of augmentation plan wells did not violate the water management plan; and (v) the omission of the augmentation plan wells lifespan did not
render the annual replacement plan invalid).
In 2011, under San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequla Pres.
Ass'n v. Special Improvement Dist. No. 1, 270 P.3d 927 (Colo. 2011) ("San
Antonio"), the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a May 2010 decree ("Decree") issued by the District Court for Water Division No. 3 ("Water Court")
for Special Improvement District No. 1 ("Subdistrict") of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District. The Decree states that, along with specific decreed
conditions, the amended water management plan ("Plan") established a "satisfactory methodology and procedure" to determine injurious depletions due'to
well pumping within the Subdistrict and to acquire replacement water. The
Plan's appendices established requirements for the Subdistrict to develop an
annual replacement plan ("ARP") to support the operation of the Plan. The
Water Court retained jurisdiction to ensure operation of the Plan and to prevent injury in conformity with the terms of the Decree.
The Subdistrict submitted the initial ARP to the State Engineer for approval
The State Engineer determined that the ARP was sufficient to remedy
2012.
in
injurious depletions without injuring senior water rights and approved the ARP
on May 1, 2012. Several senior surface water rights holders ("Objectors") raised
objections to the ARP and challenged the approval.
The Water Court reviewed the objections and made several pretrial rulings.
The Objectors appealed two of the rulings. The first was whether the Water
Court appropriately denied a motion to halt all pumping until resolving protests
to the ARP. The Objectors based this motion on the reasoning that the ARP
was an extension of the Plan and subject to groundwater management rules and
regulations. The Water Court clarified that the Plan was complete with the
Court's decision in San Antonio and that the ARP was an operating tool created
annually to predict stream depletions and establish replacement of depletions.
As such, the Water Court saw no requirement to halt operation of an ARP until
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all challenges are resolved.
The Objectors also took issue with the Water Court's decision regarding
the supporters' motion to dismiss ten of the Objector's challenges. The Water
Court partially granted the motion and dismissed eight of the challenges. The
Water Court reasoned that the challenges should be dismissed because they
questioned methodologies approved by the Decree and affirmed in San Antonio. The Water Court concluded that it was barred from reconsidering those
issues. The remaining two challenges the Water Court addressed were whether
the water produced by the Closed Basin Project was a suitable source of replacement water and whether the treatment of augmentation plan wells violated
the Plan. First, the Water Court maintained that the basin water was a suitable
source of replacement water, as established in the Decree, and that challenges
to "salvaged" water rights of basin water were a collateral attack on the Basin
decree. Second, the Water Court determined that the treatment of augmentation plan wells was appropriate, and while the failure to include a list of augmentation wells was improper, this failure did not invalidate the 2012 ARP.
Following the trial, the Water Court upheld the State Engineer's approval
of the 2012 ARP. The Objectors appealed to the supreme court, and argued:
(i) the Water Court could address issues previously decided; (ii) the ARP could
not go into effect with open challenges; (iii) the replacement water source was
not appropriate use of water; (iv) the inclusion of augmentation plan wells violated the Decree; and (v) the omission of a list of wells invalidated the 2012
ARP.
First, the Objectors claimed that the Water Court's retained jurisdiction
required it to hear all challenges to the Plan, regardless of the supreme court's
affirmation of the Plan and Decree. Reviewing the supreme court's decision in
San Antonio, the supreme court verified that the Decree was still appropriate
and continued to meet its stated objectives. Consequently, the supreme court
determined the Water Court correctly dismissed the challenges regarding previously decided issues.
Second, the Objectors claimed that the ARP is an extension of the Plan.
Thus, the Objectors argued, the ARP should be subject to the rules and regulations of groundwater management plans and should not be effective until all
protests are resolved. However, the supreme court determined that prior decisions affirming the Plan deemed the Plan complete. In addition, the supreme
court found that the Plan established the ARP as an operating "tool." The supreme court discussed that halting the implementation of the ARP every year
to address objections would be impractical because it would ultimately stop the
Plan from ever going into effect. Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the
Water Court's finding that the ARP is an extension of the plan and is not subject
to a stay pending the resolution of all challenges.
Third, the Objectors argued that using basin water as replacement water in
the 2012 ARP was not permissible. The supreme court noted that the basin
waster is a result of a federal reclamation effort to help meet obligations under
the Rio Grande Compact ("Compact"). The Objectors claimed that using basin
water interferes with the State's ability to meet Compact obligations and, furthermore, falls under the definition of salvaged water managed by the priority
system. Below, the Water Court determined that the basin water was a suitable
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source of replacement water as set forth in the basin decree, allowing the Subdistrict to simultaneously meet Compact obligations and replace injurious depletions. The Water Court also found that using basin water provided the opportunity to reduce curtailments upriver, benefitting senior water right owners.
Finally, the Water Court found the salvaged water claim was an improper collateral attack on the basin decree. The supreme court agreed with the Water
Court's analysis and affirmed the Water Court's finding that the basin water was
adequate and suitable to prevent injury to senior surface right holders. The
supreme court further stated that the basin water provided a suitable source of
replacement water in the 2012 ARP, and that the water usage falls within the
decreed purposes.
Fourth, the Objectors contended that the inclusion of augmentation plan
well pumping in the calculation of the Subdistrict's groundwater use violated the
Plan. The supreme court noted that the Decree established that Subdistrict
landowners with augmentation plan wells may, but are not required to, opt out
of the Plan. The supreme court held that including the augmentation plan wells
was appropriate and found that including augmentation plan wells as Subdistrict
wells did not injure senior surface right holders. Therefore, the supreme court
allowed the 2012 ARP to include wells covered by augmentation plans and held
it did not violate the Decree.
Finally, the Objectors claimed that the ARP's omission of a comprehensive
list of augmentation plan wells violated the Plan, and rendered the 2012 ARP
invalid pursuant to the doctrine of substantial compliance. The supreme court
agreed with the Water Court that this was a minor omission as the Subdistrict
and the State Engineer made good faith efforts to comply with the Plan. Thus,
the supreme court found that the failure was an oversight caused by the unfamiliarity of the process and did not invalidate 2012 ARP.
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the Water Court's decision and
upheld the approval of the ARP.
Dana L. Showaker

Upper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Wolfe, 371 P.3d 681 (Colo. 2016) (holding that an owner of multiple water rights can choose to divert and make absolute any of its in-priority, conditional water rights and is not required to make
absolute a senior conditional water right before ajunior conditional water right,
so long as the owner lives with his or her choice and does not injure the rights
of other water users).
Effective as of March 25, 2004, the Upper Eagle Regional Water Authority
(the "Authority") formed a water service agreement with the Edwards Metropolitan District and the Cordillera Metropolitan District. Under the agreement,
the Cordillera Metropolitan District gave certain water rights and facilities to the
Authority, which in turn provided water services to the Cordillera area. The
rights conveyed to the Authority included the SCR Diversion Point No. 1 conditional water right (the "Senior Lake Creek Right"), with a priority year of 1989,
and the Eagle River Diversion Point No. 2 conditional water right (the "Junior
Eagle River Right"), with a priority year of 1991. Pursuant to the agreement,
the Authority would limit use of both conditional water rights to irrigation, domestic, commercial, and fire protection purposes, with diversions to occur at
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the Edwards Drinking Water Facility.
On July 4, 2004, a day on which there was no call on the Colorado and
Eagle Rivers, the Authority diverted 0.716 cubic feet per second ("cfs") of water
at the Edwards Drinking Water Facility on the Eagle River for beneficial use in
the Cordillera area. The Authority allocated 0.47 cfs of this diversion to its
Junior Eagle River Right. On December 29, 2004, the Authority filed an Application for a Finding of Reasonable Diligence and to Make Water Right Absolute ("Application"). The Application requested confirmation that the Authority had made absolute 0.47 cfs of the Junior Eagle River Right at the
Edwards Drinking Water Facility for irrigation, domestic, commercial, and fire
protection purposes during free conditions. The State and Division Engineers
(the "Engineers") opposed the Application.
The Engineers initially argued the Authority must make diversions in accordance with the "seniors first" policy, requiring that users first attribute diversions to senior absolute water rights, then to senior conditional rights, and finally, junior conditional rights. The Water Court granted the Engineers'
motion for summary judgment in part and denied the Authority's claim for
making 0.47 cfs of the Junior Eagle River Right absolute. The Water Court
held the Authority did not have discretion to choose a junior water right over a
senior water right when both rights decreed the same point of diversion for the
same purposes at the same place of use.
The Authority appealed the Water Court's decision, arguing that it should
have the discretion to choose the conditional water right it wants to divert and
use. The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed de novo the Water Court's conclusions of law.
The supreme court only examined whether the Authority had to attribute
its diversion to a senior water right. The Engineer partially based its argument
on a previous Colorado Supreme Court holding, which required that applicants
seeking to make a conditional water right absolute first show they appropriated
water in excess of an existing absolute decree. The supreme court rejected that
argument by distinguishing the facts of this case as involving a choice between
two conditional rights rather than a choice between a conditional right and an
absolute right. The supreme court reasoned that the previous case was not
compatible, because the Authority had to attribute one of its conditional rights
to a needed water diversion.
The Engineers then argued that application of a "seniors first" policy here
would help effectively administer the prior appropriation system and "correctly
express" the Colorado Constitution and state statutes. The Engineers believed
that if the supreme court allowed the Authority to freely select among its conditional water rights, the Authority could change its attribution of diversions from
one day to the next. The Engineers claimed that this potential behavior was
dangerous because it could allow the Authority to make absolute more water
rights than it actually needed. The supreme court did not accept the Engineers'
argument. The supreme court ruled that once the Authority makes 0.47 cfs of
the Junior Eagle River Right absolute, it must live with that choice; the only way
the Authority could later perfect its other conditional water rights is through a
showing of quantifiable evidence that it requires more water than 0.47 cfs of the
Junior Eagle River Right to fulfill the need of the Cordillera area. The supreme
court summarized that, absent any evidence of waste, hoarding, or injury to the
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rights of other water users, the Authority may choose which of its conditional
water rights it wishes to divert and make absolute.
Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the order of the Water Court that
the July 4, 2004 diversion must be allocated to the Senior Lake Creek Right,
and remanded the case with instructions to make 0.47 cfs of the Junior Eagle
River Right absolute.
Wha Xu
IDAHO

Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 371 P.3d 305 (Idaho 2016)
(affirming the district court's ruling that: (i) the Idaho Department of Water
Resources' approval of a mitigation plan that deferred consideration of injury
to other water users was not an abuse of discretion; (ii) a mitigation plan that
included curtailment and insurance as contingencies was adequate to assure
protection to senior priority rights; and (iii) construction of a water pipeline
across private land to a place of beneficial use did not constitute an unlawful
taking under Idaho's eminent domain laws).
On December 13, 2011, Rangen, Inc. ("Rangen") filed a petition for a delivery call with the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR"), alleging
groundwater pumping by junior appropriators in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer ("ESPA") materially injured its water rights. In response, IDWR's director
(the "Director") issued an order that curtailed some junior-priority groundwater
pumping in the ESPA. The order allowed junior-priority groundwater users to
avoid curtailment by participating in an approved mitigation plan providing 9.1
cubic feet per second ("cfs") of water to Rangen. Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc. ("IGWA"), who represented junior priority users in ESPA, submitted several mitigation plans to IDWR. On October 8, 2014, the Director
conditionally approved IGWA's Fourth Mitigation Plan (the "Plan"), which required IGWA build and maintain a pumping station, pipeline, and other necessary facilities for the transport of water ("the Magic Springs Project"). Under
the Plan, SeaPac of Idaho, Inc. agreed to sell or lease 10 cfs of water to IGWA.
IGWA would then pump that water to Rangen through the Magic Springs Project.
The conditional plan hinged on IGWA obtaining approval for its Application of Transfer from SeaPac of Idaho, Inc. The Director declined to rule on
the Application of Transfer in the order. The Plan also required IGWA to
purchase an insurance policy that covered Rangen's losses of fish attributable
the Magic Springs Project's failure. Last, the Director ordered Rangen state in
writing that it would accept the water delivered and the construction of the
Magic Springs Project on its land. If the conditions failed, IDWR would suspend the Plan. Nevertheless, IGWA constructed the Magic Springs Project's
pipeline during the conditional period.
After approval, Rangen petitioned the district court to review the Director's
decision. The district court affirmed the decision. Rangen then appealed to
the Supreme Court of Idaho, challenging that: 1) the Director abused his discretion when he deferred consideration of potential injury to other water users
until proceedings on IGWA's Application for Transfer; 2) the Director erred
by approving a plan with inadequate contingency provisions; and 3) the Director's order constituted an unlawful taking of Rangen's property and should be
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set aside.
First, the Supreme Court of Idaho held the Director did not abuse his discretion by deferring consideration of potential injury to other water users until
the proceedings on IGWA's Application for Transfer. Here, Rangen argued
the Director did not have discretion to defer consideration of injury to water
users under Conjunctive Management Rule ("CMR") 43.03j and that it was unreasonable to ignore those factors. CMR 43.03 and subsection (j) state the Director "may" consider "whether the mitigation plan is consistent with the con-

servation of water resources, the public interest or injures other water rights, or
would result in the diversion and use of ground water at a rate beyond the reasonably anticipated average rate of future natural recharge." The supreme court
began its analysis by interpreting the CMR's regulatory language.
The supreme court found that a plain reading of the CMR gave the Director
discretion to defer consideration because the word "may" was permissive rather
than imperative. The supreme court compared the regulatory language to its
interpretation in another case that required the Director consider several factors
in determining injury prevention. The case was distinguishable as it referred to
a different subsection that stated, "the mitigation plan must include. . . ." After
undertaking this analysis, the supreme court turned to Rangen's assertion that
it was unreasonable to ignore the factors under CMR 43.03j.
Rangen claimed it was unreasonable for the Director to not consider CMR
43.03j for two reasons. Rangen first claimed the Director would not find injury
to other users because IGWA had completed construction of its pipeline and
accordingly had failed to consider potential injury to other users. The supreme
court rejected this argument, finding it unclear how potential injury to users
would occur without consideration, as the Plan provided other users with the
opportunity to raise issues at the later proceeding. Furthermore, Rangen failed
to submit any evidence to the court showing the Director would allow construction based on the pipeline's construction and IGWA bore the risk when it built
the pipeline early. Rangen also argued the Director should have conducted the
injury analysis in the Plan because the later transfer proceeding went forward
under a different regulatory provision than CMR 43.03j. In response, the supreme court again pointed to the Director's discretion provided by the CIVR.
After determining the Director did not abuse his discretion by delaying Application of Transfer Proceedings, it turned to Rangen's challenge that the Plan
did not include adequate contingency provisions.
The supreme court found the contingencies were adequate because the
IDWR did not avoid curtailment of junior-priority rights in the event that the
Plan became unavailable. CMR 43.03c requires mitigation plans "assure protection of the senior priority right in the event the mitigation water sources becomes unavailable." Under this regulation, Rangen argued curtailment was not
a contingency because it was a natural and legal consequence that occurs without
mitigation, and that the benefits of curtailment can take years to materialize and
would not immediately remedy its injury. The supreme court rejected this argument, finding the Plan offered sufficient protection to Rangen's right through
the combination of a curtailment and insurance. It noted the insurance policy
would provide as a safeguard if curtailment failed to provide a remedy. Rangen
then challenged that the insurance plan's adequacy for compensating potential
losses it would suffer if a shortage occurred. The supreme court allayed these
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concerns by stating the insurance policy covered exactly the type of injury
Rangen discussed.
Finally, the supreme court turned to Rangen's argument that IDWR's order
constituted an unlawful taking of senior owner's property. Rangen argued the
Director's order amounted to an unlawful taking because it forced senior owners to choose between granting IGWA an easement or risk losing water that
they were entitled to because the order allowed IGWA to suspend its mitigation
obligation if Rangen did not allow the pipeline's construction. The supreme
court found that even if it interpreted the Director's order to require Rangen to
grant IGWA an easement because Idaho's constitutional eminent domain
power extends to property of public use after just compensation. Under the
Idaho Constitution, right of ways for the construction of pipelines to convey
water to the place of beneficial use fall under that power. This would allow the
state to take the property after just compensation. Since Rangen did not allege
that it was not provided just compensation, the supreme court rejected this
claim.
Accordingly, the supreme court upheld the district court's partial affirmation of the Director's order conditionally approving the Plan.
)alton Kelley
MONTANA
Curry v. Pondera Cty. Canal & Reservoir Co., 370 P.3d 440 (Mont. 2016)
(holding that: (i) the Water Court did not err in concluding that the number of
shares issued by water company determined the company's rights; (ii) water
supply company's rights corresponded to size of service area as opposed to a
historical place of use; and (iii) the Water Court erred in determining water
supply company put storage rights to beneficial use prior to 1973).
The Curry Cattle Company ("Curry") is a private landowner in Montana
and owns shares to irrigation rights in the Birch Creek Flats ("Flats"). Curry
obtained these rights in 1988, some of which are the oldest rights in the Marias
River Basin. Pondera County Canal & Reservoir Co. ("Pondera") provides land
owners in Pondera County with water shares for beneficial use. Pondera possesses water rights to divert from Birch Creek, as well as a complete distribution
system to serve the area.
This case originates from a dispute between the parties regarding waters in
the Birch Creek. Pondera's predecessors in interest secured some of the water
rights in question through the Carey Land Act ("Act"), a federal law meant to
encourage relocation to the American West. In response, Montana set up the
Montana Carey Land Board ("MCLB"), which sought to meet the requirements
laid out in the Act. The Act functioned by setting up operating companies comprised of shareholders who had rights to water as determined by acres of land
owned. Under the Act, the operating company maintains ownership of the water rights for a service area. In this case, the service area is accompanied by
72,000 water shares. Land owners in the service area may acquire these water
shares. Pondera's predecessors operated under the Act and began appropriating water for irrigation and sale in the late 1800s, eventually organizing as the
Pondera Canal Company. The Company officially registered as an operating
company under the requirements of the Carey Act in 1927. As currently
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aligned, individual stockholders own the Pondera Company, which distributes
water as such on a per-share basis.
Disagreement over the priority of Curry's rights under this scheme existed
for some time before this case. In 2004, Pondera communicated to Curry that
its water share was less than previously believed. Curry rejected this assertion
and continued to put more water to beneficial use than Pondera believed it was
entitled. In 2005 Pondera locked Curry's head gate, leading Curry to file a
complaint alleging Pondera interfered with their water rights.
The Water Court initially ordered a preliminary injunction against Pondera
to unlock the head gate. In 2008, the Water Court held a six-day hearing to
determine the correct quantity under the water right. The water master held in
favor of Curry, finding the beneficial historic use of its water right established its
water quantity. In 2014, the Water Court issued an order amending and partially adopting the master's report. The Water Court determined that the rights
in question instead correspond to the number of shares MCLB authorized for
the project. Curry appealed this order to the Montana Supreme Court.
The supreme court reviewed de novo five distinct issues resulting from the
order of the Water Court. The supreme court also reviewed whether Water
Court conducted its review of the master's findings properly under a clear error
standard.
The supreme court first reviewed the Water Court's determination that a
stockholder's actual historic use limits the water rights of an entity organized
under the Carey Land Act. Before the supreme court, Curry argued that beneficial use is the touchstone of water law in Montana, and therefore the Water
Court improperly placed Pondera's rights above all others by allowing it to retain ownership over water that was not put towards beneficial use. In opposition, Pondera argued that its beneficial use was not shown through actual irrigation, but by putting water into sale and service for shareholders. The supreme
court reviewed the history of Montana water law and relied on a 1912 Montana
Supreme Court case, Bailey v. Titingel; which held that either system capacity
or company need would determine the extent of rights, to clarify the doctrine
of beneficial use. The supreme court noted Montana public policy encourages
public service corporations in the endeavor of irrigation. Therefore, the supreme court held that the Water Court did not err in determining that water
rights paralleled the actual shares issued, and that sale of water unquestionably
constituted a beneficial use.
The supreme court next confronted the issue of the Water Court's grant of
a service area to Pondera rather than a place of use based on historically irrigated land. Curry contended that the Water Court misinterpreted Bailey in
entitling Pondera to a service area larger than the historical place of use. Pondera argued that the service area was the appropriate boundary for determining
place of use. The supreme court began by discussing the concept of appurtenance of water to the land as a general rule in Montana law. The supreme court
then explained that due to the movement of water inherent in the scheme of
the Carey Act, a strict requirement of appurtenance was not applicable in this
case. The supreme court noted that under the Act, the individual stock certificate's appurtenant land did not define the overall place of use. Relying on Bailey, the supreme court alfirmed the Water Court by holding that the idea of a
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service area is the proper method of satisfying the Carey Act's place of use requirement. The supreme court declined to determine the exact size of the service area at this stage of litigation.
The supreme court also considered whether there was any evidence of water use by irrigators on the Birch Creek Flats prior to 1973. The water master
found some evidence of historic use on the Flats, including some releases from
storage facilities that eventually flowed into canals utilized by non-Pondera water
users, but determined that these releases did not amount to Pondera use warranting inclusion of the Flats within the service area boundary. However, the
Water Court found that there was evidence of Pondera water being used on the
Flats prior to 1973, and concluded that the Flats should be considered as falling
within the boundaries of the Pondera service area. The supreme court evaluated the use of water in the Flats based on Pondera's actions, and disagreed with
the Water Court's conclusion that Pondera put the water to beneficial use on
the Flats prior to 1973. The supreme court reversed this portion of the decision
and remanded for further consideration.
The supreme court next examined whether the Water Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the master regarding the "Gray Right." Curry
argued that the judgment of the Water Court was erroneous regarding the flow
rate of the Gray Right. Pondera in turn argued that the Master's report contained contradictory findings and therefore the Water Court's judgment was not
erroneous. The supreme court held that the Water Court applied the appropriate standard of review to the Master's findings, and the Water Court's determination of the flow rate for the Gray Right was not clearly erroneous.
Finally, the supreme court considered whether the Water Court's tabulation of the parties' respective claims to water rights should have included volume measurements when it did not. Pondera contended that the tabulations
should have included volume. The supreme court held that while such measurements would undoubtedly be helpful, this was a matter of discretion for the
Water Court.
Accordingly, the supreme court partially affirmed the Water Court by finding Pondera's water rights corresponded to actual shares allotted under the
Carey Act and extended to its entire service area, and reversed and remanded
the determination with respect to the acreage determination.
Bn~in Hinkle

Kelly v. Teton Prairie LLC, 376 P.3d 143 (Mont 2016) (holding: (i) the
district court properly applied the prior appropriation doctrine against a junior
rights holder who failed to adhere to a call for water; (ii) the junior water right
holder failed to meet its burden in establishing the futile call doctrine as an
affirmative defense; and (iii) the district court had proper jurisdiction and authority to grant injunctive relief to the senior water right holder).
The Teton River ("River") flows through Teton and Chouteau Counties in
Montana. The River primarily relies on melting snowpack to maintain its late
season flow and has a long history of water right disputes stemming from farming and ranching operations. Steven Kelly ("Kelly") was a senior appropriator
who held water rights for stockwater purposes and domestic use. Teton Prairie
LLC ("Teton") was a junior appropriator, located upstream from Kelly, and
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held water rights for irrigation. In August 2013, Kelly observed that he was not
receiving the full extent of his water rights. Kelly's attorney sent a round of call
letters to junior appropriators, including Teton, instructing them to cease diversion of water from the river. Despite the call, Teton continued to divert water.
Kelly filed suit, seeking injunctive relief in its claims of wrongful interference
with a water right and wrongful diversion of water by ajunior water right holder.
A Montana district court granted Kelly's motion for summary judgment and
enjoined Teton from making out-of-order diversions after the receipt of call
letters from senior appropriators, such as Kelly. Teton appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana.
The supreme court first considered whether Teton violated the prior appropriation doctrine. The supreme court explained that the Montana Water
Use Act explicitly recognized the prior appropriation doctrine. Under the Prior
Appropriation Doctrine, the first to take possession of water on the public domain and put it to beneficial use becomes the "first in right." The supreme
court noted that the senior appropriator is entitled to receive his full appropriation and junior appropriators must take notice of the senior's call and stop
diversions until the senior's appropriation right was fully maximized. The supreme court rejected Teton's argument that Kelly's call was invalid because
Kelly had made calls to "selective" junior appropriators, instead of making the
call based on the strict order of reverse priority. The supreme court noted that
when a senior water right holder's interest is injured, any and all junior water
right holders are equally answerable for the injury. The supreme court concluded that senior appropriators need not follow a strict order of calls, as such
a requirement would conflict with the purpose of the doctrine. The supreme
court upheld the district court's finding that Teton had violated the prior appropriation doctrine by improperly ignoring a call for water by Kelly.
The supreme court next addressed the futile call doctrine, which is an affirmative defense for a junior right holder who elects not to honor a senior appropriator's call. Montana has never explicitly adopted the doctrine. The futile
call doctrine excuses a junior right holder from a call when the outcome would
result in no beneficial use by the senior right holder. The burden is on the
junior right holder to show that no usable water would reach the senior appropriator's point of diversion because of carriage loss. The supreme court rejected Teton's application of the doctrine, noting expert testimony, which revealed that usable water could have traveled to Kelly's point of diversion had
Teton ceased its diversion.
Finally, the supreme court addressed whether the district court's grant of
injunction was proper. The supreme court noted that the district court had the
jurisdiction, authority, and sound discretion to grant an injunction in water right
disputes. The supreme court rejected Teton's argument that the injunction's
scope was too broad, reasoning that the district court order only required Teton
to refrain from activity that would violate the prior appropriation doctrine and
Montana law. Finding no instance of manifest abuse by the district court, the
court affirmed the grant of injunctive relief to Kelly.
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Reggie Norris

